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As apparent from its title – Essays on the Self-Employed in the Netherlands and Europe– this doctoral thesis’ focus lies on the self-employed. To be more precise, the three essayspresented here study the dynamics of self-employment in the labour market and the
resulting career trajectories over time.
The motivation for this thesis lies in the recent increase in the number of self-employed in the
Netherlands and the resulting concerns of policy makers about the impact of this increase on the
social security system. One particular concern are the pensions, as most self-employed, unlike
the majority of employees, are excluded from participating in the second pillar of mandatory
occupational pensions. Instead they are expected to make sufficient provisions for their old age
voluntarily (the third pillar). As mandatory pension savings and career decisions are therefore
directly linked with each other, it is important to understand which individuals are more likely
to remain in self-employment – the subject of the first essay. Moreover, it is also important to
understand how career trajectories are related with income, savings, and financial well-being –
the subject of the second and third essay.
Chapter 2, entitled A Dynamic Multinomial Model of Self-Employment in the Netherlands
(co-authored with Arthur van Soest), focuses on transitions into and out of self-employment, wage
employment and non-participation in the labour market. We estimate a dynamic multinomial
logit model using Dutch micro-panel data, the LISS panel, covering a period of ten years. Our
model incorporates unobserved heterogeneity through random effects that are correlated across
labour market states. Adding these to the dynamic model allows us to differentiate between the
effect of what Heckman (1981b) calls true state dependence and spurious state dependence. True
state dependence refers to the causal effect of being in a labour market state today on being in
e.g the same labour market state next period. Spurious state dependence refers to non-causal
reasons why individuals observed to be more likely in a specific labour market state are also more
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
likely to be in an other state. The distinction is important because of the differences in policy
implications.
In addition to demographic characteristics, our model also incorporates personality traits.
These allow us to not just simulate employment paths for benchmark individuals with different
demographic characteristics but to also have a more nuanced picture by looking at individuals
who are better or less well suited for entrepreneurship. These simulation results in turn help us
to illustrate the limitations of the common assumption in wealth and pension income modelling,
that individuals remain in their observed labour state until retirement. We show that while
the probability to not remain in self-employment on a year-on-year basis is less than 10%, the
probability to remain more than five out of ten years, not necessarily consecutively, in self-
employment for the least-suited to entrepreneurship male benchmark individual may be even
less than 50%. The simulations also indicate that persistence in self-employment is even lower
for women. Hence we argue that simulations that project future pension incomes and pension
adequacy should account for labour market dynamics, as the paths that “static” projections
assume, with constant self-employment for those observed as self-employed, are not necessarily
representative for many individuals.
Chapter 3, entitled Labour Market Trajectories of the Self-Employed in the Netherlands
(co-authored with Arthur van Soest), takes the concerns raised in Chapter 2 to the data and looks
at realised labour market trajectories between 1989 and 2017 of Dutch individuals born between
1936 and 1980. Using Dutch administrative data, we analyse the trajectories of more than 50,000
individuals including 13,000 with some self-employment experience. We find that a large share of
the individuals that are at least one year self-employed do not remain self-employed for a long
time. Overall, a quarter of the individuals spends no more than three years in self-employment.
Less than half of all individuals with some self-employment experience spend more than 10 out
of the maximum of 29 years as self-employed, and only a third spends more than half of these
years as self-employed.
Using the technique of sequence analysis developed in the social sciences, we cluster the
trajectories based on the patterns of self-employment, wage employment and non-employment
that individuals with some self-employment experience display. We find seven different clusters
with distinct life-cycle trajectories. We then study the characteristics of these clusters in terms
of individuals’ income, wealth and pension investments. We find that incorporated individuals,
the so-called DGAs, are the “positive” outliers among the self-employed – they are financially
better off than, e.g., individuals who spend their whole career as wage employees. At the other
end we find three clusters (self-employed with low labour market attachment, those that spend a
large part of their trajectories as benefit recipients, and employees with short self-employment
spells) whose members do not spend a long time in self-employment. These individuals are found
to have large gaps in their occupational pension accumulation and are not more likely than
employees to save in the third pillar. Individuals that switch from employment to self-employment
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late in their career are not found to perform much “better”. That is, they do not seem to take
measures to compensate for the loss of further contributions to their pension accumulation
in the second pillar. Last, we find that, despite of frequent worry about the lack of pension
preparedness of the groups with self-employment experience, individuals that spend most of their
career in self-employment have also accumulated significantly more non-pension wealth than
employees. We therefore suggest that policies that target the pension incomes of self-employed
should differentiate between short- and long-term self-employed.
Last, Chapter 4, entitled Self-Employment Careers and Financial Well-Being in Old Age
in Europe, uses information from retrospective interviews in the Survey of Health, Ageing
and Retirement in Europe on individuals’ careers to examine whether certain trajectories are
correlated with more financial difficulties for individuals born between 1931 and 1955 once they
are aged 60 and older. I use again sequence analysis to group the individual career trajectories,
and I find different clusters of short- and long-term self-employed. Because the sample consists
of different European countries with a variety of institutions that might impact self-employed
individuals differently, I divide the countries into groups based upon their percentile ranking
based on the World Bank’s Rule of Law indicator in 1996, a time when the individuals in the
sample were mostly active in the labour market. This indicator captures perceptions regarding
the extent to which individuals and firms have confidence in and abide by the rules of their
society.
The biggest difference I find across the country groups once I study different measures for
financial well-being is that self-employed women in the highest ranking countries seem to be
mostly second income earners. They have a higher household income on average and the majority
of clusters of individuals with careers involving some self-employment do not have a lower
pension income than women that were mostly employees. This stands in contrast to women in
the lowest ranking countries that seem to have been self-employed out of necessity, and who
report lower incomes. Overall though, the result that prevails when I also study indicators of
financial well-being, is that individuals who were always self-employed are on average worse off
financially than their peers who were employees. This suggests that the results from Chapter 3,
where we found that long-term self-employed were better off financially than other self-employed,
might have to be taken cautiously. Furthermore, in particular if we also consider that the current
self-employed are often not accumulating as much capital in their companies as older generations
did, these individuals’ risk for financial difficulties once they are older may be even higher than
what I observe for the older generations in the sample. Economic policy measures should address
these shortcomings. This holds particularly in the light that several European countries still












A DYNAMIC MULTINOMIAL MODEL OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN THE
NETHERLANDS
This chapter is based on the identically entitled working paper which is co-authored
with Arthur van Soest
This paper presents a dynamic multinomial logit model to explain the transitions intoand out of self-employment using Dutch micro-panel data, the LISS panel. Basedon the estimates we simulate employment paths for benchmark individuals. These
are used to illustrate the limitations of the common assumption in wealth and pension
income modeling, that individuals remain in their observed labour state until retirement. In
particular, we find that although one year transition probabilities out of self-employment are
not more than 10%, the chances that individuals who are self-employed remain self-employed
for the majority of the next ten years can be much smaller, and vary substantially with
individual characteristics such as education level and personality.
2.1 Introduction
In recent years the number of self-employed in the Netherlands has grown substantially, leading
to an increase of almost 30% in their share in the working population: from 12.8% in 2003 to
16.6% in 2017.1 The main driver behind this growth have been the so called solo self-employed
(SSE; in Dutch “zzp’ers”= zelfstandigen zonder personeel). As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the share
of SSE in the working population increased from 8.1% in 2003 to 12.3% in 2015 and has remained
1All numbers are based on CBS Statline, Arbeidsdeelname; kerncijfers, downloaded on 4 May 2018.
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rather stable since then. The share of other self-employed has, on the other hand, seen a slight
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Data source: CBS Arbeidsdeelname; kerncijfers
Figure 2.1: Cummulative share of self-employment in the working population
Because of the growing numbers, Dutch policy makers have become more interested in the
effects the self-employed or SSE in particular may have on the labour market, social security,
and government finances. Accordingly, several recent policy papers describe the trend in self-
employment and the characteristics of the self-employed, or analyze their performance; see, e.g.,
Bosch et al. (2012), Bosch (2014) or Bolhaar et al. (2016). One key concern of the Dutch policy
makers in relation to social security is adequacy of the pension savings of the self-employed; see,
e.g., Mastrogiacomo and Alessie (2015) or Knoef et al. (2016). While the pay-as-you-go pension
(the so called AOW, the first pillar of the Dutch pension-system) covers all individuals who have
lived in the Netherlandsbetween ages 15 and 65, contributions to a fully funded pension plan (the
second pillar) are, unlike for the large majority of employees, neither mandatory nor accessible for
most of the self-employed.2 Instead, the self-employed are expected to save themselves through
(voluntary) savings (the third pillar). Such pension savings are tax-favoured for everyone with an
“incomplete” second-pillar pension, in order to stimulate that individuals indeed save enough for
2Most second pillar pensions are built up via employer based pension plans or industry specific
pension funds. In total about 90% of all employees are required to contribute to a pension plan
(https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/pensioen/opbouw-pensioenstelsel). Self-employed individuals in industries
with industry specific pension funds (e.g., painters and doctors) are required to participate in a second pillar pension.
The majority of the self-employed is not in such a sector.
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their pension.3 This then raises the question whether the self-employed save enough in the third
pillar.
It turns out that the policy makers’ concerns have some basis. Mastrogiacomo (2016) shows
that while the self-employed have the same savings ambitions as the employed, they are not more
likely to save in the third pillar. Only one third of the self-employed contributes to the third pillar,
which indicates that the majority will fall short on their savings. In line with this finding, earlier
studies by de Bresser and Knoef (2015), and Knoef et al. (2016) found that the self-employed are
less likely to meet their retirement expenditure or saving goals. Zwinkels et al. (2017) focus on
the solo self-employed and estimate that more than 40% of SSE households fall short on their
savings if a target replacement rate of 70% of earnings is used.
One simplifying assumption made in the pension wealth projections by Zwinkels et al. (2017),
but also by de Bresser and Knoef (2015) and Knoef et al. (2016), is that the observed individuals
remain in the labour state in which they were at the point in time when the data were collected.
To our knowledge this assumption (“static micro-simulation”) is standard in the pension literature
and its consequences have not been discussed so far. Still, given that the savings in the second
(and third) pillar – a large share of most individuals’ pension wealth – are linked directly to the
individuals’ labour state, it may be worthwhile to study the validity and consequences of this
assumption. This paper therefore studies the dynamics in the Dutch labour market, considering
self-employment as one of the labour market states. For instance, it asks how likely it is that
somebody who is observed in self-employment will remain self-employed, depending on the
individual’s characteristics.
We will use data from the LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences) panel,
a representative sample of adult individuals in the Netherlands administered by CentERdata
(affiliated with Tilburg University). It is based upon a random sample of Dutch households drawn
by Statistics Netherlands. Individuals of age 16 and older in the participating households are
invited to answer survey questions on a monthly basis. The surveys cover domains such as work,
education and income, but also a wide range of other topics, like health and personality, thus
offering a rich set of information on which we can build our analysis. It also allows to distinguish
between employees, SSE and other self-employed. Because sample size limitations, the main
analysis is done without a distinction between different self-employment types, even though such
a distinction might be desirable given the specific interest in the SSE in the Dutch policy debate.4
In addition to a set of personal and household characteristics also included in most of the
studies cited above, we control for personality traits and a (lagged) health index. Recent work
on the economic importance of personality traits (see e.g. Borghans et al., 2008) has shown that
personality traits matter for different labour market outcomes and, particularly, the decision to
become self-employed (see e.g. Beugelsdijk and Noorderhaven, 2005) This has also been found
3Recently, a specific pension fund for the self-employed has been opened but it should be considered as a third
pillar annuity.
4As illustrated in Figure 2.1 most of the recent dynamics in self-employment seem to be driven by the SSE.
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in sociological research on career counseling. For instance, Obschonka et al. (2013) construct an
Entrepreneurship-Prone Big-Five Profile (EP) Distance measure and find that in the US, the
EP distance’s geographical distribution corresponds to observed entrepreneurial activity. We
therefore also include the EP distance in our analysis. Good health has been identified as a factor
that increases the probability to become self-employed for older workers in the US (Rietveld et al.,
2015). We use the rich nature of the LISS data to construct a health index and study the role of
health for self-employment transitions in the Netherlands.
We first model self-employment in a static multinomial choice panel data framework with
unobserved heterogeneity. We then extend our model to include dynamics to demonstrate the
importance of state dependence. We not only consider self-employment and wage employment,
but also account for transitions into and out of paid work. Our dynamic multinomial logit model
is similar to that of e.g. Gong et al. (2004), who model the choice between not working, informal
work, and formal sector work in Mexico, or Buddelmeyer and Wooden (2011) who model dynamics
between casual and other types of employment in Australia. Oguzoglu (2016) follows Gong et al.
(2004) to model the influence of disability on employment decisions, and Zucchelli et al. (2012)
consider self-employment as an alternative to part-time employment for the elderly under possible
ill-health. Another case in point is Prowse (2012) who includes self-employment when modelling
the labour participation of women. Finally, Been and Knoef (2017) also use a dynamic multinomial
logit model to explain self-employment decisions in the Netherlands, focusing on workers of ages
50 and above and using administrative data. We consider all individuals of working age and
use survey data, which has the advantage of providing rich background information such as
personality or health indicators, as already emphasized above.
Our models incorporate unobserved heterogeneity, allowing for correlated random effects
following Train (2009). Adding this to the dynamic model allows us to differentiate between what
Heckman (1981b) calls spurious and true state dependence, which is important to understand the
dynamics in the data. We solve the problem of initial conditions that arises in dynamic models
following Wooldridge (2005) and Albarrán et al. (2019).
The paper continues as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the LISS panel and our sample selection
process. Our model is presented in section 2.3 and the corresponding estimation results in section
2.4. Section 2.5 presents the simulation results based on the estimations. Section 4.5 concludes
the paper.
2.2 Data
In this paper we make use of the LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences) panel.
The LISS panel consists of monthly Internet surveys to a representative sample of households
drawn from the Dutch population register.5 Among the monthly surveys there are ten annual




or biennial longitudinal core studies. Additionally, individuals are asked to fill in a basic survey,
the household box, about the most important general characteristics of their household and its
members such as age, gender, education, marital status, as well as their primary occupation and
gross income. Individuals, or the contact person of the household — if there is more than one
member of the household participating in the LISS panel — are asked to fill in the household box
at the beginning when joining the panel and then prompted every month before each survey to
fill in changes if such have occurred.
2.2.1 Self-employment
Among all longitudinal surveys, there are three instances within the LISS panel through which
we can identify self-employed individuals. First, information about an individual’s labour market
status is stored in the household box. Instead, self-employed individuals can be identified using
either the Work and Schooling or the Economic Situation: Income core study. We will base our
analysis on the income study for two main reasons. First, the income study allows us to identify
solo-self-employed (SSE) while the work and schooling study does not allow for a distinction
between SSE and other self-employed. Second, the income study based sample suffers less from
selection or attrition bias than the work and schooling study.
The income survey has a different timing from other LISS studies. Individuals are supposed
to use documentation on income taxes in the previous year to fill out the survey questions.
Therefore, the survey asks individuals in period t about sources of income in the calendar
year t−1. For example, the 2008 survey asks about all income received in 2007. We classify
individuals as employees who report receiving only income from employment over the whole
year. Individuals with income from both employment and self-employment are classified as
self-employed, together with those individuals who report only income from self-employment.6
An individual is classified as self-employed if indicating at least one type of entrepreneurial work
activity. The activities that the income survey covers are (part-time) work as an entrepreneur or
freelancer, SSE, owning a company (including a private limited liability company or a limited
partnership), or participating in a partnership (either a so called maatschap or vennootschap
onder firma, VOF) and, lastly, making a profit (or loss) through an enterprise in some way (except
as spouse or partner cooperating in the business). Next, we classify all individuals as unemployed
who report receiving unemployment benefits and no other source of income, ignoring other social
benefits. Because this will only classify individuals who are unemployed for a whole calendar
year as unemployed, the unemployment definition is rather strict, covering a smaller number
of individuals than the work and schooling based definition which refers to one point in time.
Finally, individuals with no income from any of these sources are classified as not in the labour
force. A comparison of this classification with the work and schooling based classification is given
in Appendix A.
6About 40% of all self-employed have income from both employment and self-employment.
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2.2.2 Sample selection
The surveys in the LISS panel generally have a response rate between 75 and 80%. Thus, every
year we have answers of around 5000 – 6500 individuals, of which a few are incomplete. Individ-
uals who leave the panel (i.e. stop answering the surveys all together) are replaced in later waves
through refreshment samples. Most of these are stratified to improve the representativeness of
the panel, aiming at oversampling difficult to reach groups with below-average response rates. For
the surveys that we use, there are in total more than 14,000 individuals across the 11 waves and
some 81,000 observations. We have information on the labour status for some 60,000 observations
if we use the income based classification.
We restrict the sample to individuals from age 25 up to and including age 60, i.e. individuals’
prime working years. We choose the lower bound at 25 because, first, the minimum wage increases
with the worker’s age until 23 in some sectors. As a result of this it seems that young workers in
these sectors may have a higher risk of becoming unemployed close to their birthdays (Kabátek,
2020). Second, students who are finishing their education are harder to classify. They may hold
a (side) job, while studying, and can also be considered first time job seekers. By age 25 most
individuals should no longer be students. The age limit at 60 years stems from the idea that
individuals older than 60 may have access to (early) retirement.The age restriction reduces the
sample size to approximately 32,000 individuals.
Furthermore, we limit ourselves to individuals for whom the basic covariates, such as age,
gender, household status, and education, are observed (only very few observations are dropped
due to this restriction). The final sample restriction that we have to make is model based. In
the dynamic models, we want to model labour market state outcomes based on individuals’
past labour market state. Hence we can only use individuals for whom we have at least two
consecutive observations. Moreover, we have to discard observations made after an individual
has not responded for one or more years. For example, if an individual answers the income survey
in the years 2008-2012 and again from 2014-2018, we do not include the 2014-2018 block. These
restrictions make us lose approximately 15% of the observations.
As shown in Appendix 2.A the final restriction potentially creates (or worsens) attrition bias
in the sample. Because a large share of the dropped observations belongs to individuals that
participate in more than one wave, we correct for breaks in sequences with information from the
work survey. The details are described in Appendix 2.A.2.
Figure 2.2 compares the self-employment share in the income sample with CBS population
data already seen in Figure 2.1. It shows that the LISS panel replicates neither the magnitude
nor the time trend of the share of self-employment. This difference can be due to selection bias, i.e.
self-employed individuals are less likely to respond when invited for the LISS panel, or attrition
bias, i.e. self-employed individuals are more likely to stop responding in a later wave. Most likely,
the problem is a mixture of both. Examining the evolution of self-employment shares over time
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of self-employment shares in regression sample and population
shares at recruitment, followed by a drop, and ending with a flat or slightly downward trend. The
fact that shares are initially closer to population figures suggests that the trend is more affected
by attrition bias than by initial selection.
Both selection and attrition bias are of less concern if they are driven by observables like
age, gender, or eduction. In such a case one can correct for the bias by weighing the observations
accordingly. We therefore tried weighing observations using weights based upon the observable
characteristics that enter our model.7 Weighing only leads to an increase of one percentage point
in self-employment shares overall and does not change the trend. Furthermore, Wooldridge (2007,
p. 1293) cautions about using weighting in panels. We therefore decided not to use these weights.
To correct for selection on unobservables, we would have to impose a structure on the selection
process. As this would require strong assumptions, and because the self-employment shares
are initially not that different from population shares, we refrain from correcting for selection
bias and focus on attrition bias only. Correcting for attrition bias requires weaker assumptions,
especially if we can use an exclusion restriction. We test and correct for attrition bias in section
2.3.2.
7The weights are determined using population data downloaded from CBS Statline.
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2.2.3 Explanatory variables
Because personality traits are less commonly used, we discuss them in some detail. The Personal-
ity core study of the LISS panel focusses on respondents’ “personality and characteristics”. Its
questions are based on established questionnaires from the field of psychology that each have a
different focus. One of these questionnaires is the short 50 question set for the Big-Five factor
markers by Goldberg (1992). Individuals answer these questions on a 1 to 5 scale. We code their
answers according to the corresponding International Personality Item Pool key.8 For each of
the five factors we then sum up the points on an individual basis and standardise these values
with the mean and standard deviation of the complete LISS sample for each year, allowing us
to interpret coefficients of the factors in terms of changes relative to the standard deviation.
The Entrepreneurship-Prone Big-Five Personality Profile Distance (EP distance) measure is
calculated using the non-standardised factor values following Obschonka et al. (2013).
To reduce the number of questions asked to individuals, the LISS panel only poses the Big-
Five questions every second year. In the other years the Big-Five related questions are only asked
to new entrants. Furthermore, the personality survey was not asked to participants in 2016. We
find that the personality traits in our sample remain rather stable across time, with a between
variation that is two to three times larger than the within variation for all factor markers. This
is in line with Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2012) who found that personality traits are stable over
time. We therefore fill in the gaps in Big-Five factor markers and EP distance by computing
individual means over all observations available and substituting missing values in gap years
with those means.
Since health variables are more standard in the literature, we refer to Appendix 2.D for
the construction of the health index. In addition, we include the individual characteristics age,
gender, and dummy variables for medium level education (VMBO, VWO, or MBO diploma) and
higher education (university (WO) and applied science university (HBO) degrees), which have
been shown to have some correlation with the choice to be self-employed.9 In addition, we use
household specific variables: dummy variables controlling for whether an individual lives with a
partner and/or has children, as well as the size of the household. These variables also have been
found to have explanatory power in regressions explaining the decision to be self-employed; see,
e.g., the overview of research on entrepreneurship by Blanchflower (2000).
Table 2.1 reports the means by labour market status for all covariates. Overall we see that
women are slightly over-represented in the sample as they make up 55% of all observations.
Approximately half of the individuals in the sample have at least one child and the majority
lives with a partner. Unsurprisingly, we find that those not in the labour force are mostly women,
and that the majority of them lives with a partner. The two education dummy variables account
for 96% of the sample, implying that only 4% of the sample has the lowest education level.
8https://ipip.ori.org/newBigFive5broadKey.htm retrieved on July 6, 2018.
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Table 2.2: Observed transition probabilities (in %) by gender
Labour market state Men Women
past \ current 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0: employee 93.96 1.65 1.04 3.36 92.23 1.47 1.28 5.02
1: self-employed 8.15 89.35 0.51 1.99 9.34 84.73 0.71 5.22
2: unemployed 24.22 2.34 45.70 27.73 19.05 1.90 42.38 36.67
3: not in labour force 24.26 2.09 7.13 66.52 14.28 1.82 6.06 77.85
LISS total 74.67 13.08 2.51 9.75 66.01 8.82 3.46 21.72
CBS population 71.09 16.88 3.68 8.36 65.84 9.69 4.07 20.39
Based on 12014 and 14496 observation pairs respectively. Probabilities are unconditional on other individ-
ual characteristics.
Source: LISS Panel and CBS Arbeidsdeelname; kerncijfers, own calculations.
Furthermore, we can see that the distribution of the two dummy variables varies between the
working and non-working population — the higher educated are much more likely to do paid
work. The distribution of the health index is left skewed with the mode at 0.76, and we can
see directly that individuals in the working population have a higher health status than those
not working. There are also differences in Big-Five factor markers between the working and
non-working individuals.
Comparing across the labour status groups, we find that the means of all variables except
for the health index and the fourth personality factor marker are statistically different between
employees and the self-employed. This difference is in line with the literature: men are more
likely to be self-employed than women, the self-employed are on average older (compared to
the employed), and the self-employed more frequently have a higher level of education. They
are also more likely to have children. The argument for the EP distance by Obschonka et al.
(2013) predicts that entrepreneur prone individuals are more extraverted, less agreeable, and
more open to new experiences. We find all of this reflected in the differences of the means of
the three factor markers. However, the theory also argues that entrepreneurs should be more
conscientious, and we find the opposite. Still, the EP distance measure has a lower average value
for the self-employed than for employees, as theory would predict.
2.2.3.1 Observed labour market state dynamics
In Table 2.2 the observed transition probabilities of the labour market states by gender are
shown.10 We see that employees are more likely to remain in the same state than the self-
employed, whose probabilities to exit to working as an employee are 8 to 10% per year. This
already suggests that the assumption that self-employment is persistent has its limitations. The
10The transition matrix is, of course, affected by the imputations for the gaps in the data. The changes are relatively
small, however. See Table 2.E.1 in Appendix 2.E.
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majority of the self-employed who do not continue as such switch to employment, and since the
number of employees is much larger than the numbers in other labor market states, the largest
contribution in numbers to entrants into self-employment are individuals making the transition
from employment.
Comparing the transition matrices of men and women, we see that women are less likely to
remain in self-employment than men are, and much more likely to remain out of labour force.
Because of the substantial differences between men and women, we estimate all models separately
by gender. Finally, we observe, in percent as well as in absolute numbers, very few changes from
unemployment to self-employment and vice versa. This may be due to our categorisation approach
in the income based definition of self-employment, or to sample selection. Finally, comparing with
CBS population figures shows that self-employed are under represented, as already discussed.11
2.3 Model
This section presents the empirical model and the estimation procedure. Both are similar to the
econometric specifications used by Gong et al. (2004) and Been and Knoef (2017). Note that the
static multinomial model is nested in the dynamic model. We will therefore focus the discussion
on the dynamic model, treating the static model as a special case. In the final subsection, we
address the issue of attrition bias.
2.3.1 Dynamic multinomial model of labour states
We model the observed labour market state of an individual as the outcome of a utility maximi-
sation process. Each individual re-evaluates the potential states every period, and chooses the
labour state j that maximises utility for that period. In terms of the econometric specification we
thus consider a discrete choice model where an individual i derives utility y∗i jt from state j at
time t. In other words:
(2.1) yi jt =
1 if y∗i jt > y∗ikt for j,k = 0,1,2,3; j 6= k; i = 1, . . . , N; t = 2, . . . ,T0 otherwise
where yit = (yi0t . . . yi3t) is a column vector with a 1 in the position that corresponds to individual
i’s labour market state at time t and zeros everywhere else. Due to data limitations, we do not
include higher order lags.
Utility y∗i jt from choosing state j is unobserved. It is assumed to be given by
(2.2) y∗i jt = X itβ j + y
ᵀ
i,t−1γ j +αi j +εi jt
Here yi,t−1 is a vector of dummy variables describing the individual’s labour state in the
previous period, X it is a vector of k observed strictly exogenous variables, and the coefficient
11The CBS shares presented in Table 2.2 are calculated for the 25 to 60 year olds, taking the average for 2008–2017.
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vectors γ j and β j, j = 1,2,3, are to be estimated; γ0 and β0 are normalized to zero. The variables
in X it are individual as well as household characteristics that may influence the utility y∗i jt.
These variables have been discussed in section 2.2.3. X it also includes time dummies, to control
for macro-economic effects.
The error terms εi jt are identically and independently distributed, independent of X it and
αi j and drawn from a Type 1 extreme value distribution. This implies that the labor market
state probabilities, given X it, αi j and yi,t−1, are the well-known multinomial logit probabilities
(see Appendix 2.C for details). Because equation (2.2) includes lagged dependent variables, an
initial conditions problem arises (Heckman, 1981a). For most individuals, we have no information
on how and when they entered the labor market and the first observation yi,0 is typically some
time after labor market entry. To account for the fact that yi,0 may well be correlated with the
time persistent individual effects αi j, j = 0. . . . ,3, we model (αi0, . . . ,αi3) as follows, following
Wooldridge (2005):
(2.3) αi j = yᵀi0δ j +µi j
Here µi = (µi0, . . . ,µi3) is independent of yi0 and all X it and εi jt. Like Gong et al. (2004) and
Been and Knoef (2017), we assume that µi is drawn from a J-dimensional multivariate normal
distribution with mean zero and covariance W (see Appendix 2.C for details on how this is
implemented). The δ j are 4-dimensional parameter vectors to be estimated. This essentially
boils down to including the vector of dummies yi0 as additional regressors when estimating the
model.12 Note that due to the presence of the unobserved heterogeneity terms, the independence
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption is not imposed. This IIA assumption is often seen as a
drawback of the standard multinomial logit model. The estimates of the covariances will give
an indication whether individuals who prefer one labour state are also more likely to prefer any
particular other labour state. For example, if the covariance for states 1 and 2 (self-employed
or unemployed) is positive, we should expect an individual, ceteris paribus, to have a higher
probability of choosing self-employment when he or she has a high individual parameter for
unemployment.
Static multinomial model of labour states
As already mentioned, the static model is a special case of the dynamic model. That is, in the
static model we exclude the past period’s labour state and as a consequence also drop the initial
conditions. Equations (2.2) and (2.3) can then be rewritten as
y∗i jt = X itβsj +αsi +εsi jt with αsi =µsi(2.4)
12Here t = 0 is the first time individual i is observed, which varies with i due to the refreshment samples in the
LISS panel. See Albarrán et al. (2019) for an extensive discussion of the plausibility of this way of modeling the initial
condition for an unbalanced panel.
16
2.3. MODEL
where superscript s indicates that the coefficients are for the static regression. Detailed assump-
tions and likelihood contributions are similar to those for the dynamic model.
Estimation
The probabilities implied by the static and dynamic model discussed above have to be simulated.
Following Bhat (2001) and Train (2009, chapter 9.3.3) we use Halton draws to simulate the
multivariate normal distribution of µi. See Appendix 2.C.3 for details and reasoning.
2.3.2 Attrition Bias
As noted by Verbeek and Nijman (1992, p. 681), it is well known since Heckman (1976, 1979) that
“inferences based on either the balanced sub-panel or the unbalanced panel without correcting
for selectivity bias, may be subject to bias if the nonresponse is endogenously determined". We
therefore want to analyze whether self-employed individuals are more likely to leave the LISS
panel, and thus contribute to the unbalanced nature of the panel, and, if they do so, whether
this leads to biased estimates for the model above or not. In order to test for attrition bias we
use a variation of the variable addition test of Verbeek and Nijman (1992). They consider three
possible variables that can be included in the regression: the number of waves an individual
participates in the panel, an indicator whether the individual participated in all waves, and
an indicator whether an individual was observed in the previous period. Because we also want
to make use of the refreshment samples, the first and third are not applicable, and the second
has a different interpretation. Instead, we construct a variable that measures the ratio of the
number of periods in which an individual participated and the maximum number of periods they
could have participated. This is still a function of the response indicator and thus follows the
idea of the variable addition test. If attrition was independent of the unobservables in the model,
this additional variable should not enter the model significantly under the null hypothesis of no
attrition bias.
In our benchmark specification of the model, we find that this variable enters the multinomial
model significantly for men, providing evidence that the model for men suffers from attrition bias,
but not for women (p-values are 0.1% for men and 0.4132 for women). We therefore estimate an
extension of the model adding a Heckman correction term (estimated in a first stage). Formally
the attrition model extends equations (2.1) and (2.2) as follows:
(2.5) A it =
1 if A∗it > 0 for i = 1, . . . , N; t = 2, . . . ,T0 otherwise
(2.6) A∗it = X it−1βH + y
ᵀ
it−1γ
H + zᵀit−1θ+νi +ψ1,it i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 2, . . . ,T
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where A∗it is latent and A it indicates whether an individual is observed in the LISS panel at
time t or not.13 Together, equations (2.5) and (2.6) model the attrition process in the first stage of
estimation. X it−1 contains the same vector of regressors as X it in equation (2.2) but one period
lagged. yit−1 is a vector of dummies indicating the labour state of the individual one period past.
Lastly, zit−1 is a vector of variables entering the attrition equation but not the other equations in
the model (the “exclusion restrictions”). For the exclusion restriction we follow Cheng and Trivedi
(2015) and use the number of days that individuals took to answer the last wave of the Economic
Situation: Income core study after they received the invitation. We further include a dummy that
controls for whether the individual answered within the deadline of the first call to participate in
the survey, or only after the reminder, as well as an interaction term of the dummy with the days.
The random term νi is assumed to be a time invariant random effect while ψ1,it is assumed to be
iid standard normally distributed.
Stage one is estimated separately as a panel probit model with random effects. The second
stage model is then given by equations (1) and (2), but with the inverse Mills ratio φ(·)/Φ(·),
estimated using the panel probit model, as an additional regressor in equation (2).14
2.4 Estimation results
We estimated four different models: the baseline model with the basic personal and household
characteristics, and models in which we add the (lagged) health index, the EP distance measure,
and the Big-Five factor markers. We first present the first stage results used to construct the
Heckman correction term. In our discussion of the results, we will focus on the partial implied
effects, keeping all other observed and unobserved characteristics constant, and averaging over
the complete sample. We use separate models for men and women, since some of the the estimated
coefficients differ substantially between men and women.15
2.4.1 First stage — Heckman correction
In the first stage regression the sample also includes all individuals in the selected age range for
whom we only have only one observation.16 Detailed results for women and men are presented in
Tables 2.E.4 and 2.E.5 in Appendix 2.E.
For women, we find rather weak effects of the labour market state indicators for self-
employment and not participating in the labour force on the chances to remain in the sample.
13We exclude individuals from this step if they leave our sample because they turned 61 years of age. The first
stage only aims at correcting for an individual’s own choice to participate in the survey or not; it does not correct for
the sample selection choices we made (see Section 4.2).
14Since the error terms in equation do not follow a normal distribution but a Type 1 extreme value distribution,
our specification differs from the original Heckman correction model. Consequently the coefficients on the inverse
Mills ratio cannot be interpreted as the covariances.
15The pooled regression results are available in Appendix 2.E
16This does not include new entrants to the income survey from the last year of data collection as we do not know
yet whether they will return or leave in the next wave.
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These effects are larger and statistically more significant for men. We find the same signs for both
genders though: Compared to employees, self-employed individuals are less likely to be observed
in the following period, and individuals not in the labour force are more likely to be observed
again. In particular for men, and in combination with the findings of the variable addition test,
this confirms the need to correct for attrition bias: attrition is at least part of the explanation
why the self-employed are underrepresented in later waves of the panel.
The first stage estimates for the basic personal and household characteristics are robust
across different model specifications. Only age has a statistically significant positive coefficient,
implying that older individuals are more likely to continue participating in the LISS panel. For
women, we do not find a statistically significant effect for any of the other basic covariates. For
men, several educational dummies are statistically significant, showing that men are more likely
to continue participating in the LISS panel the higher their education.
The variables that are excluded from the main model (“the exclusion restrictions”) have the
expected signs in the first stage. The more days individuals take to answer after the invitation to
participate in the survey has been issued, the less likely they are to return in the following year.
For women, this effect is particularly strong for those who answer after the first invitation for the
survey, as shown by the significant interaction terms.17
We do not find significant effects of the respondents’ contemporary health status on the
probability to be observed in the next period. The EP distance measure is not significant for
women either, but it is significantly negative at the 5% level for men. Recall that the EP distance’s
interpretation is that the lower its value, the more likely an individual is self-employed. The
results show that conditional on employment or self-employment status, less entrepreneurial
individuals are less likely to stay in the sample, perhaps because they are more pressed with
time.
More conscientious individuals are more likely to continue participating in the LISS panel, as
expected. For men, we there are no other individually significant effects, but the Big-Five factor
markers are jointly significant (at a 2% level).For women, emotional stability and openness for
experience have marginally significant negative effects on the probability to stay in the sample,
which is not what we would have expected.18
2.4.2 Second stage — static models
To compare the static and dynamic models, we restrict ourselves to the sample of the dynamic
model and estimate the static model excluding those individuals for whom we only have a single
observation.
17For each of the surveys the LISS panel collects data in two calendar months. A reminder is sent to all those panel
members that did not complete the questionnaire during the first month.
18The Big-Five factor markers are also jointly statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000 in the regression for
women.
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Table 2.3: Static model with Big-Five factor markers, women
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -17.84*** -5.96*** -4.65***
(1.2323) (1.0431) (0.8464)
Age 0.13*** 0.07*** 0.1***
(0.0169) (0.0135) (0.012)
Has partner 0.45 -0.53** 0.75***
(0.305) (0.2302) (0.2087)
Has child -0.64 -0.46* -0.73***
(0.3988) (0.277) (0.2374)
Middle education -0.24 -1.28*** -1.51***
(0.6524) (0.4414) (0.3927)
High education 0.39 -2.83*** -2.92***
(0.6965) (0.4805) (0.4226)
Household size 0.47*** 0.26** 0.34***
(0.1511) (0.1203) (0.0958)
F1: extraversion 0.13 -0.09 -0.07
(0.1555) (0.1128) (0.0955)
F2: agreeableness -0.05 0.18 0.19*
(0.1572) (0.1118) (0.0972)
F3: conscientiousness 0.09 -0.58*** -0.65***
(0.1581) (0.121) (0.0998)
F4: emotional stability -0.24* -0.47*** -0.32***
(0.1417) (0.1059) (0.0864)
F5: openness for experience 0.36** 0.36*** 0.17*
(0.145) (0.1097) (0.0987)












Nr. of Individuals: 3267
Loglikelihood: -7704.03
Regression including year fixed effects.
(Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.4: Static model with Big-Five factor markers, men
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -22.07*** -10.28*** -2.5***
(1.4174) (1.5229) (0.9608)
Age 0.2*** 0.13*** 0.07***
(0.0181) (0.019) (0.0127)
Has partner 0.08 -0.77** -0.76***
(0.3333) (0.3629) (0.2579)
Has child -1.65*** -0.38 -0.73**
(0.348) (0.4375) (0.309)
Middle education 0.67 -1.46*** -2.45***
(0.7667) (0.5278) (0.3789)
High education 1.6** -2.6*** -3.83***
(0.7987) (0.5816) (0.4332)
Household size 0.21 -0.03 0.16
(0.1608) (0.1919) (0.1335)
F1: extraversion 0.39** -0.07 -0.06
(0.1608) (0.1678) (0.1028)
F2: agreeableness -0.32** 0.13 0.05
(0.1311) (0.1309) (0.0938)
F3: conscientiousness 0.02 -0.3** -0.46***
(0.1423) (0.1407) (0.1037)
F4: emotional stability -0.17 -0.6*** -0.67***
(0.1417) (0.1422) (0.0988)
F5: openness for experience 0.73*** 0.34** 0.23**
(0.1359) (0.1464) (0.1009)












Nr. of Individuals: 2647
Loglikelihood: -5244.5
Regression including year fixed effects.
(Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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For the static model, we find similar effects of personal and household characteristics in
all specifications. See e.g. the results for the model with Big-Five factor markers for women
in Table 2.3 and for men in Table 2.4.19 For women, only few of the personal and household
characteristics are individually significant in the self-employment equation. In contrast to this,
almost all of them are highly statistically significant (i.e., most at the 1%-, and some at the
5%-level) in the other two equations. In other words, personal characteristics do not help us
much to explain the difference between being self-employed or working as an employee, but
they are helpful in explaining the difference between employment and unemployment or not
participating in the labour market. The only variables that have a significant coefficient in the
self-employment equation are age and household size (both at the 1%-level). We find that the
self-employed are on average older, and that the larger the household, the more likely women are
to choose self-employment over wage-employment.
For men the coefficients on personal and household characteristics are also very similar
across different models, but they differ from what we found for women. We still find that age
is significant at the 1%-level and has a positive sign, implying that also for men, the chances
that an individual is self-employed increase with age. However, we do not find a significant
coefficient for household size. Unlike women, men with high education are significantly more
likely to be self-employed and men with at least one child have a significantly lower probability
to be self-employed.
For both genders, we find that the lagged health index does not enter the self-employment
equation significantly. Health does have significant effects in the other equations though, and the
coefficients are also jointly significant. The negative signs suggest that individuals who had bad
health one period earlier are more likely to be observed in unemployment or out of the labour
force.Similarly, we find an insignificant effect of the EP distance for women, although the sign
is, as we would expect, positive in the other two equations. For men on the other hand, we find
a significant effect (p-value < 0.01) also in the self-employment equation. The negative sign is
in line with our expectations: as the EP distance decreases, an individual is more likely to be
self-employed.
For the Big-Five factor markers, effects differ by gender. For both women and men, individuals
who are more open to experiences are also more likely to be self-employed than employees. The
effect is however twice as strong in magnitude for men. For women, we find that also emotional
stability is significant at the 10%-level. The negative sign implies that higher emotional stability
reduces the chances to become self-employed. For men on the other hand, we find that high
scores for extraversion increase the likelihood of being self-employed, and that high scores for
agreeableness reduce it. These effects are in line with our expectations.
In all static models, the inverse Mills ratio is highly significant for the self-employed and for
the equation explaining “not in the labour force.” It has a positive sign in the self-employment
19The pooled regression results for the model with Big-Five factor markers are in Appendix 2.E, Table 2.E.7. The
results for all other models are available upon request.
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equation and a negative sign in the equation for not in the labour force. For women, it is also
significant and negative in the unemployment equation. This suggests that, keeping observed
characteristics constant, attrition is correlated with the unobserved factors driving someone’s
labor market status, implying that it is important to correct for attrition bias.
Looking at the estimates for unobserved heterogeneity in the mixed logit model (the matrix L
driving the covariance matrix), we see that all coefficients are highly significant. The variance
of the unobserved heterogeneity in self-employment is much larger than for the other two
states. In particular for men the covariances have about the same magnitude as the variance for
unemployment or being out of the labour force. For women, the covariances differ more from each
other and we see that, for given observed characteristics, self-employed individuals are also more
likely to be out of the labour force.
2.4.3 Second stage — dynamic models
The dynamic models always outperform their static counterparts: Likelihood ratio tests reject
the null hypothesis that the dynamic factors play no role, i.e. the lagged labour states are always
jointly significant (p-value of 0.0000 for all).
Second, the Big-Five factor markers are jointly significant. Moreover, if we replace the big
five with the EP distance or the health index, we find that the EP distance or the health index
enter significantly (using LR tests, even at a 0.1% level).Hence adding either personality traits or
information on an individual’s health improves the model fit compared to a model with only the
core personal and household characteristics. Comparing the two models with personality traits,
Akaike’s information criterion suggests that we should choose the model with the Big-Five factor
markers over the one with the EP distance for both men and women.20 The lagged health index
does not enter significantly in the self-employment equation of the dynamic model either. In the
following, we will therefore focus on the model including the Big-Five. 21
Third, when we test for the joint significance of the inverse Mills ratio we fail to reject the
null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero at any conventional significance
level (p-values 0.188 for women and 0.395 for men). The results for the regressions without the
Heckman correction are shown in Table 2.5 for women and Table 2.6 for men.22 They indeed do
not differ much from the results with the Heckman correction. This suggests that correcting for
attrition bias is not essential once we estimate the dynamic model.
How do the results change from the static models once we include dynamic effects? For women,
age loses its significance in the self-employment equation while for men, age remains significant
20See the corresponding regression results in Appendix 2.E, Table 2.E.12 (pooled), 2.E.13 (women), and 2.E.14
(men). The coefficient on the EP distance is always insignificant in the self-employment equation.
21The results for the model with the lagged health index can be found in Appendix 2.E, Table 2.E.15 (pooled),
2.E.16 (women), and 2.E.17 (men).
22The regression resuls with the Heckman correction are in Appendix 2.E, Tables 2.E.8 (women), 2.E.9 (men), and
2.E.10 (pooled). The pooled regression results without the Heckman correction are in Table 2.E.11.
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Table 2.5: Dynamic model with Big-Five factor markers and no Heckman correction, women
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -6.98*** -6.56*** -5.49***
(0.8184) (0.6488) (0.4526)
Age 0.01 0.03*** 0.05***
(0.0096) (0.0082) (0.0063)
Has partner 0.29 -0.67*** 0.35**
(0.2415) (0.1886) (0.1692)
Has child -0.34 -0.23 -0.43**
(0.299) (0.2331) (0.192)
Middle education -0.11 -0.8** -0.9***
(0.5784) (0.3503) (0.2933)
High education 0.18 -1.53*** -1.41***
(0.6016) (0.3807) (0.3122)
Household size 0.13 0.04 0.05
(0.1201) (0.0977) (0.0812)
F1: extraversion 0.03 -0.06 -0.04
(0.0972) (0.0895) (0.0665)
F2: agreeableness -0.07 0.03 0.01
(0.1107) (0.0907) (0.0698)
F3: conscientiousness -0.05 -0.14* -0.14**
(0.099) (0.0839) (0.0653)
F4: emotional stability -0.1 -0.35*** -0.21***
(0.0894) (0.0827) (0.0609)
F5: openness for experience 0.25** 0.23*** 0.11
(0.1004) (0.0895) (0.0713)
Last state: self-employed 4*** 1.07** 1.13***
(0.2327) (0.4764) (0.2906)
Last state: unemployed 0.13 2.96*** 1.76***
(0.5087) (0.2809) (0.2164)
Last state: not in LF 0.61** 1.56*** 2.14***
(0.2611) (0.1973) (0.1042)
Initial state: self-employed 4.92*** 1.41** 2.3***
(0.5324) (0.5596) (0.36)
Initial state: unemployed 3.47*** 3.35*** 3.18***
(0.693) (0.5308) (0.4772)












Nr. of Individuals: 3267
Loglikelihood: -6089.36
Regression including year fixed effects.
(Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1024
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Table 2.6: Dynamic model with Big-Five factor markers and no Heckman correction, men
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -6.82*** -8.77*** -6.25***
(0.7965) (0.9056) (0.5853)
Age 0.02** 0.08*** 0.07***
(0.0099) (0.0117) (0.0087)
Has partner -0.08 -0.34 -0.32
(0.2537) (0.3139) (0.2259)
Has child -0.28 -0.07 -0.11
(0.3129) (0.4071) (0.2749)
Middle education -0.09 -0.62 -1.12***
(0.5254) (0.4082) (0.3191)
High education 0.27 -1.38*** -1.99***
(0.5303) (0.4576) (0.3549)
Household size 0.18 -0.1 -0.07
(0.1278) (0.1811) (0.1269)
F1: extraversion 0.28** -0.03 -0.03
(0.1097) (0.1277) (0.0855)
F2: agreeableness -0.14 0.02 -0.05
(0.0927) (0.1225) (0.0823)
F3: conscientiousness -0.19** -0.12 -0.15*
(0.0958) (0.1119) (0.0884)
F4: emotional stability -0.25** -0.33*** -0.36***
(0.1026) (0.116) (0.0825)
F5: openness for experience 0.24** 0.15 0.08
(0.1035) (0.1187) (0.085)
Last state: self-employed 4.17*** 0.36 0.74*
(0.2254) (0.7462) (0.3905)
Last state: unemployed 0.24 2.65*** 1.26***
(0.5737) (0.3338) (0.3108)
Last state: not in LF 0.57* 0.66** 1.59***
(0.3281) (0.2959) (0.1751)
Initial state: self-employed 4.75*** 2.7*** 2.28***
(0.5798) (0.7191) (0.4486)
Initial state: unemployed 2.6*** 4.13*** 3.76***
(0.9068) (0.5922) (0.5508)












Nr. of Individuals: 2647
Loglikelihood: -4067.57
Regression including year fixed effects.
(Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 25
CHAPTER 2. A DYNAMIC MULTINOMIAL MODEL OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT
at the 5%-level. The coefficient on household size for women, and on the dummy for having at
least one child for men are no longer significant in the self-employment equation either.
Concerning the factor markers, we find that only the fifth factor, openness for experience,
remains significant for women. It still has a positive sign. We find an increase in the probability
for a woman to be self-employed over being an employee by a factor of 1.28 if her score on
openness for experience increases by one standard deviation. For men, we also find that the
coefficients on the factor markers decrease in magnitude, with the largest change occurring in the
fifth factor, translating to a 40% smaller increase in the relative probability for self-employment.
Its impact is now also of approximately the same size as for women, and the p-value increases
to 0.023. For men we also find a change in the other factor markers: Agreeableness is no longer
significant but emotional stability and conscientiousness are. Their signs are negative and
thus opposite to what we would expect based on the arguments underlying the EP distance.
Regarding conscientiousness this is, however, not entirely surprising, considering that we already
saw in section 2.2.3 that the self-employed in the LISS panel are on average scoring lower on
conscientiousness than employees. Finally, the coefficient on extraversion remains statistically
significant (also at the 5% level) and has, as expected, a positive sign. For men, an increase
in the score for extraversion by one standard deviation increases the relative probability to be
self-employed by a factor of 1.32 compared to being employed.
Looking at the lagged labour market state variables we find persistence for both genders:
Having been in a given labour state one period earlier increases the probability to be in that
state – i.e. the diagonal in the block of coefficients for lags shows the largest values. This is what
we would expect given the pattern of the transition probabilities in Table 2.2. The coefficient on
lagged self-employment in the self-employment equation stands out as the largest of all, implying
stronger state dependence in self-employment than in other labor market states.
We find that all coefficients for the lags are positive, implying that given that non-employees
are more likely to end up in any of the other three states than employees. It should also be noted
that in terms of the relative size of coefficients, the lagged labor market state dummies are much
more important than household characteristics or personality traits. 23
Finally, the estimated variances of the unobserved heterogeneity terms become substantially
smaller once we include the dynamics. The variance in the unobserved heterogeneity for the
self-employed is still larger than for the other two states but by a much smaller factor. The same
holds for the estimated covariances. These show that, keeping observed explanatory variables
constant, self-employed women are more likely to be out of the labour force than the unemployed,
whereas the opposite holds for men.
23Initial values are also strongly significant with substantial coefficients. This indicates that the individual effects
are correlated with the initial observation, as expected.
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Table 2.7: Simulated transition probabilities (in %), men
Labour state All individuals 45 to 60 year old
past \ current 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0: employee 93.58 1.59 1.29 3.54 92.15 1.53 1.63 4.69
1: self-employed 7.33 90.11 0.82 1.74 5.95 90.81 1.14 2.1
2: unemployed 22.22 2.78 44.7 30.3 22.18 2.33 43.58 31.91
3: not in labour force 25.03 2.51 8.68 63.77 22.62 2.1 9.71 65.57
Total 74.14 12.99 3.06 9.8 69.01 14.32 3.91 12.76
Based on dynamic model with Big-Five factor markers, 15310 observation pairs (n=2694).
Source: LISS Panel, missing values for personal/household characteristics are extrapolated.
2.5 Simulations
This section presents two different types of simulations. We first show the simulated transition
probabilities for the complete LISS panel. Then we show simulated employment paths for
benchmark individuals, to illustrate the implications of mobility into and out of self-employment.
We only present simulations based on the model specification with the Big-Five factor markers.
2.5.1 Transition probabilities
To correct for attrition, we simulate under the counterfactual assumption that none of the
individuals leave the sample. For those who do in reality, we need to impute the values of the
covariates. We assume that, apart from age, personal and household characteristics remain the
same.24 The missing Big-Five factor marker values are completed with the same mean values
used to fill in the initial gaps as described in section 2.2.3. We then, for each individual i, draw
one vector of unobserved heterogeneity components µi from the multivariate normal distribution
(with mean zero and covariance matrix given by L̂L̂ᵀ). In each time period for each individual and
labour state, we then draw independent error terms εi jt from a Type 1 extreme value distribution.
Taking the first labour market state that we observe for an individual as given, we then simulate
individuals’ labour market state outcomes for the following time periods.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show the simulated transition probabilities for men and women, based on
the dynamic model with Big-Five factor markers and no Heckman correction.25 The left panels
show the results for all men and women and the right panels show the results for the 45 to 60
year old subsamples. Comparing the total shares of all labour market states with the shares in
Table 2.2, we find that the simulations for the whole sample lead to results that are similar to
what we observed initially in the data.
We also see that our simulations, in particular for women, overestimate the probability that
individuals remain self-employed. As a consequence, the transitions out of self-employment
24This assumption is not too farfetched. All covariates have relatively small within variation.
25We choose the model without Heckman correction since we could not reject the null hypothesis that the correction
terms all have coefficient zero.
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Table 2.8: Simulated transition probabilities (in %), women
Labour state All individuals 45 to 60 year old
past \ current 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0: employee 91.61 1.57 1.34 5.48 89.98 1.5 1.62 6.9
1: self-employed 8.18 87.54 0.81 3.47 7.12 86.97 1.33 4.58
2: unemployed 18.39 1.61 40.65 39.35 16.9 1.94 38.78 42.38
3: not in labour force 15.72 1.82 6.81 75.66 14.47 1.83 6.22 77.48
Total 66.72 8.87 3.68 20.73 60.63 8.91 4.17 26.29
Based on dynamic model with Big-Five factor markers, 19138 observation pairs (n=3325).
Source: LISS Panel, missing values for personal/household characteristics are extrapolated.
into other labour market states are underestimated but the general pattern seen in the data is
nevertheless reproduced. Overall, it looks like we fare slightly better for men than for women in
terms of replicating the observed transition probabilities.
The right panels with the results for 45 to 60 year old individuals show that when we consider
older individuals, we observe approximately the same probabilities as for the complete samples
to remain in self-employment. Hence, even for this older age group, where one generally assumes
that projections are less prone to errors due to the smaller time horizon on which forecasts
are made, we find that the assumption that the self-employed stay self-employed has clear
limitations.
2.5.2 Individual simulations
By simulating the employment paths for the chosen benchmark individuals, we show how the
transition probabilities translate into individual probabilities of remaining in the same labour
market state for a longer time period. If we would simply take the probability of remaining
in self-employment calculated above to the power 10, we would conclude that 38.14% of men
and 24.76% of women remain self-employed for 10 years. This, however, would ignore that the
probabilities depend with covariates that change over time (e.g., age, time dummies).
We therefore simulate the employment paths from 2008 until 2017, for benchmark individuals
who are self-employed in 2007. We fix age to 45 years at the start and set other personal and
household characteristics equal to the median by gender for the self-employed in 2007. Thus the
benchmark individuals have a partner and one child. The self-employed male benchmark has
high education, the female has medium education. The median values for the Big-Five factor
markers corresponding to these personal characteristics (for age ranging from 45 to 54 years) are
presented in Table 2.E.3 in Appendix 2.E.
Next we take 500 draws of the benchmark individual’s unobserved heterogeneity vector µi,
and then proceed in the same way as with the forward simulations for the transition probabilities,
















































2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Year
Male
Employee Self−employed Unemployed Not in LF
Figure 2.3: Simulated employment paths by gender: self-employed in 2007 (median characteris-
tics)
each labour market state. The resulting employment paths for the self-employed benchmark man
and woman are shown as sequence index plots in Figure 2.3.
The sequence index plots show all simulated employment paths. The paths are stacked
vertically on top of each other and each path is a (thin) horizontal line on which each year is
coloured according to the labour market state the path takes in that year. We order the paths by
labour market states, starting with the state in the first period, followed by the second period, etc.
The scale of the y-axis reflects cumulative shares (in percent). On the righthand side of Figure 2.3,
we can see that the benchmark male has a chance of approximately 60% to remain self-employed
throughout the ten years. For the benchmark female, this probability is only 35%. The main
reason for the difference is the larger probability to leave the labour force for women.
Are these the probabilities we need to evaluate mobility? We view them as lower bounds
on the probabilities of “persistent self-employment,” because individuals can also leave self-
employment for a short time and then return. If we are concerned about pension savings (our
initial motivation), which tend to be much lower for the self-employed than for employees, the
paths where self-employment is interrupted by a short employee spell are close to “persistent
self-employment,” since occupational pension wealth accumulated during the short employee
spell will be small. A static micro-simulation which keeps everyone who is self-employed always
in self-employment will then be a good approximation. We therefore also define an upper bound
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Year
Non−entrepreneurial Big−Five
Employee Self−employed Unemployed Not in LF
Figure 2.4: Simulated employment paths: male, self-employed in 2007
on the probability of “persistent self-employment,” counting all paths where at least half of the
time, five years, is spent in self-employment. This gives probabilities 80% for the male and 58.6%
for the female benchmark individual starting as self-employed in 2007.
These probabilities obviously depend on the characteristics of the benchmark individuals.
For example, if we change the male benchmark’s education level to intermediate education, the
lower and upper bounds for the male benchmark would fall to 48.6% and 72.2%. Similarly, if we
would change the female benchmark’s education to high education, her lower and upper bounds
of persistent self-employment would rise to 45.0% and 67.8%.
Finally, since we are interested how personality affects individual probabilities to remain
self-employed, we follow Obschonka et al. (2013) and define an “entrepreneurial” profile with
high levels of extraversion, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness, and a low level
of agreeableness. Taking the standardization of the factor markers into account we assign high
and low values 2.5 and -2.5. In addition, we define a “non-entrepreneurial” profile that takes the
opposite values. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 shows the sequence index plots for the corresponding male
and female benchmark individuals who are self-employed in 2007 (other characteristics are the
same as before).
As expected, the benchmark individuals with “entrepreneurial” Big-Five factor markers have
a larger probability to remain self-employed than the “non-entrepreneurial” ones. The differ-
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Figure 2.5: Simulated employment paths: female, self-employed in 2007
(59.2%) for the entrepreneurial male (female) and 38.4% (22.2%) for the non-entrepreneurial
male (female). The changes in the probabilities compared to Figure 2.3 are larger for the “non-
entrepreneurial” than for the “entrepreneurial” individuals, in line with the entrepreneurial
characteristics of the self-employed benchmark individuals used in these earlier figures.
Table 2.9 summarises the simulation results for each combination of education level and
personality profile. In the two rightmost columns, the table shows the lower and upper bounds
based on our earlier definitions. The other columns show the share of employment paths in
self-employment at a specific point in time.26 Note that the probability of self-employment
is always lower for a female individual in comparison to a male benchmark individual, also
in cases where both have exactly the same characteristics. Furthermore, a shift from high to
medium education increases the difference in probabilities between the “entrepreneurial” and
“non-entrepreneurial” case. In addition to this, the difference between the lower and upper bound
(the final two columns) within each case also increases. Finally, we also find that the share
of paths observed in self-employment in a year stabilizes after the fifth to sixth year in the
simulation.
These results point at the limitations of a static microsimulation approach for pension wealth
and income projections. If, for example, we take the most stable of the benchmark individuals, a
26See Figure 2.F.1 in Appendix 2.F for a graphic representation of the evolution of the shares over time and type of
benchmark individual.
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Table 2.9: Probability (in %) that different benchmark individuals who are self-employed in 2007,
are self-employed in later years
Big-Five in 2008 in 2009 in 2012 in 2017 10 years 5+ years
Male: high education
median 91.4 83.8 77.6 72.0 61.0 80.0
entrepreneurial 93.0 86.8 82.2 77.6 67.6 84.4
non-entrepreneurial 83.8 72.2 60.4 51.4 38.4 62.4
—— medium education
median 88.2 78.6 69.4 63.4 48.6 72.2
entrepreneurial 90.8 83.0 77.2 70.8 59.4 79.2
non-entrepreneurial 77.8 62.6 43.8 32.0 22.2 47.0
Female: high education
median 80.4 75.0 59.8 64.0 45.0 67.8
entrepreneurial 86.4 81.8 73.2 74.2 59.2 78.4
non-entrepreneurial 73.6 66.2 45.6 47.0 29.0 54.2
—— medium education
median 76.2 68.6 51.6 54.0 35.4 58.6
entrepreneurial 82.8 77.2 64.0 69.0 49.2 72.0
non-entrepreneurial 66.0 56.4 33.4 34.0 19.6 39.4
Based on dynamic model with Big-Five factor markers and no Heckman correction (n=500).
The benchmark individual is self-employed in 2007. The rightmost column gives the probability
that the individual is self-employed in at least 5 of the 10 years.
male with high education and “entrepreneurial” Big-Five factor marker levels (left panel of Figure
2.4), we still get chance of 12.6% to spend at least seven of the next ten years as an employee.
Given the context of the Dutch pension system, such an individual would accumulate pension
savings in the second pillar during at least seven of the ten years – and would therefore end up
in a better financial position than what a model assuming that self-employment is an absorbing
labour market state would predict. That is, a static micro-simulation would over-predict the share
of self-employed with (too) low pension savings.
2.5.3 The impact of the macro economy
As the number of self-employed in the Netherlands has increased in recent years, one might
wonder if changes in the macro economy have been drivers of this increase. Our model can
answer this question insofar that we estimate time effects for each year that capture the macro-
economic changes. The estimates of the time effects for the dynamic model with the Big-Five
factor markers and no Heckman correction are shown in Table 2.10. We find large positive effects
for the unemployment probability, in line with the notion that 2008 was the star of the economic
crisis. For self-employment, we find that most of the years do not differ significantly from the
base year (2008). The only significant time effects on self-employment are a negative effect for
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Table 2.10: Time effects; dynamic model with Big-Five factor markers and no Heckman correction
Women Men
Self-employed Unemployed Not in LF Self-employed Unemployed Not in LF
2009 0.26 0.66 -0.15 -0.58** 0.12 -0.05
(0.2429) (0.4434) (0.1574) (0.2700) (0.5510) (0.2134)
2010 -0.04 0.85** -0.13 -0.40 0.62 0.09
(0.2845) (0.4040) (0.1764) (0.3328) (0.5133) (0.2223)
2011 0.22 1.21*** 0.17 -0.06 0.93* -0.04
(0.3479) (0.4116) (0.1747) (0.3396) (0.5072) (0.2675)
2012 -0.20 1.17*** -0.00 -0.34 0.84 0.05
(0.3374) (0.4299) (0.1778) (0.3596) (0.5202) (0.2404)
2013 0.41 1.65*** 0.50*** -0.47 1.07** 0.41
(0.3451) (0.4025) (0.1727) (0.3629) (0.5355) (0.2490)
2014 0.51 2.16*** -0.09 -0.18 1.33*** 0.41*
(0.3241) (0.3719) (0.1631) (0.3354) (0.4988) (0.2329)
2015 0.38 2.05*** 0.26 -0.05 1.14** 0.11
(0.2800) (0.3789) (0.1638) (0.2794) (0.5290) (0.2359)
2016 0.77*** 1.98*** 0.15 -0.45 1.11** 0.18
(0.2807) (0.3863) (0.1733) (0.3237) (0.5486) (0.2491)
2017 0.55** 1.81*** -0.20 -0.51 1.55*** -0.21
(0.2759) (0.3794) (0.1809) (0.3315) (0.5140) (0.2637)
Time effects from the regressions shown in Table 2.5 and 2.6. 2008 is the base year.
(Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
men in 2009, and positive effects for women in the final two years (2016 and 2017). Keeping the
trend as shown in Figure 2.1 in mind, this finding is actually as expected as there is no visible
impact on self-employment by e.g. the Great Recession.
We can study the impact of macro variables further by repeating the simulation but leaving
out the time effects. This has the same effect as assuming that the macroeconomic situation
in 2008 holds for all years, which might be particularly interesting considering that the Great
Recession started in the second quarter of that year. Table 2.11 shows the simulation results for
this exercise.27 Comparing them with the results in Table 2.9 we observe that the changes for
women and men generally go in opposite directions: Without the year effects, the male benchmark
individuals would all have a higher probability of remaining self-employed while the female
individuals would have a lower probability. This is in line with the negative time effects for men
and the mainly positive time effects for women in Table 2.10. Still, the differences between the
probabilities of persistent self-employment (the final columns of Tables 2.11 and 2.9) accounting
and not accounting for the macro-economic developments are rather small compared to the
differences that can be explained by characterstics such as education level or an entrepreneurial
individual attitude.
27See Figure 2.F.2 in Appendix 2.F for a graphical representation.
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Table 2.11: Probability (in %) that different benchmark individuals who are self-employed in
2007, are self-employed in later years: macro-economic situation as in 2008
Big-Five in 2008 in 2009 in 2012 in 2017 10 years 5+ years
Male: high education
median 91.4 86.2 82.8 76.4 66.4 82.6
entrepreneurial 93.0 88.6 84.8 81.0 70.4 86.4
non-entrepreneurial 83.8 76.0 65.0 60.2 46.0 69.6
—— medium education
median 88.2 82.8 74.2 69.8 56.6 77.2
entrepreneurial 90.8 85.8 81.0 75.8 56.6 83.2
non-entrepreneurial 77.8 67.6 52.4 45.4 33.2 55.8
Female: high education
median 80.4 72.2 60.0 56.0 42.2 64.6
entrepreneurial 86.4 80.6 72.8 69.0 55.2 76.2
non-entrepreneurial 73.6 62.6 45.8 37.0 26.2 49.6
—— medium education
median 76.2 67.4 50.6 44.0 32.6 55.0
entrepreneurial 82.8 76.4 65.2 61.6 47.4 69.0
non-entrepreneurial 66.0 53.4 32.8 26.2 17.2 36.4
Based on dynamic model with Big-Five factor markers and no Heckman correction (n=500).
The benchmark individual is self-employed in 2007. The rightmost column gives the probability
that the individual is self-employed in at least 5 of the 10 years.
2.6 Conclusion
We have analyzed transitions into and out of self-employment and other labor market states for
individuals of working age in the Netherlands. We have used a dynamic multinomial logit model
with random individual effects. Our explanatory variables include the “Big Five” personality
characteristics, and we find that an entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial personality has a
large effect on the probabilities to stay or become self-employed. Expanding the static model to a
dynamic framework where the current labor market state has a causal effect on the next labor
market state, substantially improves the fit of the model and reduces the estiated importance
of unobserved heterogeneity. Still, we find substantial unobserved heterogeneity, particularly
among the self-employed.
There is clear evidence of persistence (state dependence) in self-employment, but self-
employment is not an absorbing state. The probability to remain self-employed in the next
year is on average around 90% for men and slightly lower for women. But the probabilities to
remain self-employed for a longer time period are much smaller, as illustrated by simulated
employment paths over multiple years for benchmark individuals. Our benchmark self-employed
male has an 80% chance to spend the majority of the next ten years in self-employment. This
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probability falls to 62% if the individual does not have an entrepreneurial personality, or even to
47% if, in addition, he has medium education rather than high education (the benchmark). For
the self-employed benchmark woman, the chances to spend the majority of the next ten years
in self-employment are only 59%, and this falls to below 40% if the woman does not have an
entrepreneurial personality.
With the ongoing pension reforms, there is a lot of recent interest in pension adequacy of
a heterogeneous population, with a focus on vulnerable groups such as the self-employed. Our
results suggest that future work on projecting pension incomes and pension adequacy should
account for the labour market dynamics and the transitions between labour market states in
which individuals do or do not (sufficiently) accumulate pension wealth. Combining the type of
model and dynamic simulations here with administrative data on how much pension wealth is
accumulated in a given labor market state, seems a fruitful avenue for future research.
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Appendices
2.A Self-employed individuals in the LISS panel
Among all longitudinal surveys, there are three instances within the LISS panel through which
we can identify self-employed individuals. First, information about an individual’s labour market
status is stored in the household box. When asked about their primary occupation the survey
responder is prompted with fourteen options. Of these, the third, “Autonomous professional,
free-lancer, or self-employed”, helps us to identify the self-employed. There are three problems
with using this information to define an individual’s labour market state. First, it does not enable
us to distinguish between SSEs and other self-employed. Second, the questionnaire gives no
instruction on how “primary” is defined. Hence individuals with more than one occupation may
rank these by hours, or by how much they identify themselves with each of them.28 Lastly, this is
further compounded by the fact that the survey is filled out by the household’s contact person.29
This can potentially lead to conflicting answers vis a vis individuals who answered themselves,
both for e.g. part-time (self-)employed and in particular also for DGAs.30
Second, we can identify self-employed individuals using either one of two annual core studies:
the Work and Schooling and the Economic Situation: Income study. Currently there are eleven
waves available for both, covering the years 2008-2018. There are usually slightly fewer indi-
viduals who answer the income survey compared to the work and schooling survey.31 Overall,
however, the two samples are comparable in size and the majority of individuals answer both.
In the Work and Schooling survey we can classify individuals according to their primary
occupation based on hours worked.32 This implies that the working population consists of all
individuals who indicate that they do paid work. We then split these individuals into employees
and self-employed, based on follow-up questions on their primary occupation. The self-employed
are therefore all individuals who answer that they are either self-employed/freelancer, or indepen-
dent professional or DGA.33 As an exception to the primary occupation rule, we also define those
28Even if the two coincide, the outcome may be different from how the person would be recorded in labour statistics.
Take an individual who works part-time for less than 50% and works in the household for the rest of the week. This
individual may well answer that the primary occupation is house work, leading to the classification “out of the labour
force”. But according to the official statistics of Statistics Netherlands (CBS), anyone working more than one hour per
week for pay would count as part of the working population.
29In most households with more than one adult member, several adults participate in the LISS panel.
30DGAs (“directeur grootaandeelhouder” in Dutch — majority shareholder director) are individuals who work for
an incorporated firm (either an NV or BV, i.e. a Ltd. or private Ltd. company in the British context) in a relatively
high administrative position while holding a large part (or the majority) of the firm’s shares. DGAs are treated as
employees from the perspective of the Dutch tax authority while they may see themselves, in case of being (one of) the
company owner(s), as self-employed.
31Numbers and response rates differ by survey wave. In 2014 for example, 7746 individuals were invited for the
income survey and 7957 individuals for the work and schooling survey, with response rates of 78.9% and 82.6%
respectively. In 2017, 6673 and 7256 individuals were selected with response rates of 80.3% and 80.4% respectively.
32If individuals work equal numbers of hours in two different jobs, they are asked to indicate the job that they
consider more important.
33See Appendix 2.B.1 for a discussion of the inclusion of DGAs.
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individuals as self-employed who indicate that they have their own business or have a partnership
as a secondary occupation next to being employed.34 Going back to the definition by primary
occupation, anyone who is not part of the working population and receives unemployment benefits
or is looking for a job is classified as unemployed; the remainder of individuals is classified as not
in the labour force. Because participants are asked about their primary occupation at the time
the survey is taken, this classification is a snapshot of the individuals’ situation at the moment of
data collection (which takes place around April and May of each calendar year).
Overall the LISS panel contains information on the labour status for almost 66,000 obser-
vations if we use the work and schooling data. Overall, we have overlapping information on
approximately 45,000 observations for the income and work studies.35
2.A.1 Comparing the self-employment share in the two definitions
Despite the timing being different in the Work and Schooling classification compared to the
income based classification the two should lead to a similar outcome. We expect small differences
to arise because individuals generally do not switch occupations in January only. But since we
have data over several years we will still pick-up the changes in labour market states in both data
sets. Table 2.A.1 shows a comparison of the assigned labour market state according to the income
based classification (“Income”), compared with the work and schooling based classification (“Work
and schooling”) as well as the classification based upon the household box with background
variables (“Background variables”).36 The rows show the share of matches with labour market
states in the “work and schooling” and “background variables” classifications for each labour
market state in the income based classification. If the classifications would match perfectly, we
would observe shares of 100% on the diagonal and zero elsewhere. As expected, we find that the
match for the unemployed is not that good. Focusing on the self-employed and employees, we see
that one fifth of the individuals who report income from self-employment activities are classified
as employees in the work and schooling survey. Similarly, 26% of those with self-employment
income is classified as an employee according to the background variables based classification.
Only 63% of those with self-employment income are classified as self-employed accoring to the
latter classification, compared to 71% for the work and schooling based classification.
The corresponding self-employment shares, calculated as the number of self-employed indi-
viduals per year as a fraction of the respective number of individuals in the working population
(i.e. the sum of employees and self-employed), in the two samples after these restrictions are
shown in Figure 2.A.1.
34This increases the total number of self-employed in the sample by approximately 21%, compared to a definition
based on primary occupation only.
35Note that there are almost 11,000 observations combined for the years 2007 and 2018 that we cannot use because
of the different timing of the two studies.
36The comparison is made for all observations in the corrected income sample excluding the corrected breaks (see
section 2.A.2).
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Table 2.A.1: Matching of labour market states across definitions (in % of income definition)
Work and schooling Background variables
Income 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0: Employee 95.36 1.22 1.64 1.79 91.81 0.76 1.88 5.55
1: Self-employed 20.30 71.02 2.74 5.95 26.26 63.77 2.71 7.26
2: Unemployed 9.18 1.39 34.21 55.22 8.94 1.59 39.53 49.94
3: Not in LF 15.69 2.66 10.18 71.48 14.31 2.61 8.21 74.87
Total 71.86 8.69 4.13 15.33 69.75 7.77 4.07 18.41
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Year
W&S sample (incl. DGAs)
Data source: LISS Panel − Work & Schooling, Income, Background Variables
 Total  Men  Women
Figure 2.A.1: Comparison of self-employment shares in working population of 25-60 year olds
across samples.
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There are two observations that we can make based on this figure. First, the share of self-
employed in the working population is lower than in the actual population shown in Figure 2.1.
While the share in the income based classification looks more or less equal in 2008, we have
to take into consideration that CBS classifies individuals with multiple occupations based on
the one in which they work most hours. Hence, as we also include part-time self-employed, the
share in the LISS panel, if it were representative, should actually be higher than the population
share.37 Second, we observe an upward trend in self-employment shares according to none of the
classifications in the LISS samples. These two observations hint that we may have to deal with
both initial selection (lower initial shares) and attrition bias (lack of upward trend) in the LISS
panel. We will discuss these issues in more detail below.
2.A.2 Filling in the gaps, selection, and attrition
The model based sample restriction, i.e. having at least two consecutive observations, not only
leads to a loss of data but also to a change in the evolution of employment shares over time in
the new sample. In both the income and work based sample we see a clear downward trend
after discarding the individuals with no sequence as well as any observations following a break
in a sequence. The left panel of Figure 2.A.2, in comparison with the left panel in Figure 2.A.1
illustrates this for the income survey based classification. Thus the restriction of the sample to
sequences creates (or worsens) attrition bias.
A closer look at the observations that are discarded because of the sequence restriction reveals
that only a third of these observations belong to individuals who only participate in one wave of
the income survey. That is, two thirds of the observations could be retained if we can correct for
the break in the corresponding sequence. Furthermore, these are the observations (rather than
the single wave answers) that are driving the downward trend shown in the left panel of Figure
2.A.2.
We take a conservative approach to filling in the breaks in sequences by imputing plausible
values. That is, we only fill in one-year breaks, which account for the majority of all the breaks in
the sequences. We however do not limit the correction to one break per individual but may fill in
several breaks as long as these are only one period long. Nor do we extend a series beyond what
we observe — that is, if an individual answers the work and schooling survey for more periods
than the income survey, we do not use these other periods from the work and schooling survey to
top up the income survey series. The procedure is as follows: we only consider the labour status
information from the work based definition to fill in gaps in the income sample and vice versa,
ignoring the information that is available in the background variables. We choose to do this
because the number of correct matches between our definitions and a classification based on the
background variables (as shown in Table 2.A.1) is quite low and we want to avoid generating
37Differences should not stem from the denominator — CBS includes anyone in the working population who works
at least one hour per week. Our definitions for the working population should therefore be comparable.
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2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Year
Corrected regression sample
Data source: LISS Panel − Work & Schooling, Income, Background Variables
 Total  Men  Women
Figure 2.A.2: Comparison of self-employment shares based on income before/after correction
false labour market state transitions due to filled in gaps. In the income survey sample, we
additionally make use of the question asked to self-employed individuals whether they were also
self-employed in t−2. We only use this information to adjust for self-employment because we
know that the work and schooling based sample misses 20% of the individuals that we categorise
as self-employed in the income classification. To avoid selection bias, we do not use this question
to fill in gaps for individuals without an answer in the work and schooling survey, because the
question is only asked to individuals who are self-employed in t−1.
Based on this strategy we end up filling up at least one gap for more than one thousand
individuals in the income survey sample. This in turn helps us to retain more than three thousand
observations that would otherwise have to be discarded. More importantly, the downward trend
in the self-employment shares is less pronounced after the correction. Figure 2.A.2 illustrates this
for the income based classification. The impact of the correction on the work based classification is
not that strong. This is likely because the number of additional observations that can be retained
is rather low compared to the number of observations that is affected by the sequence restriction.
Figure 2.A.3 shows the corrected regression samples for both definitions. We can see that
both samples display a slightly stronger downward trend in self-employment shares compared to
the raw data in Figure 2.A.1. This negative trend also seems to worsen during later years and
40






















2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Year
W&S sample (incl. DGAs)
Data source: LISS Panel − Work & Schooling, Income, Background Variables
 Total  Men  Women
Figure 2.A.3: Comparison of self-employment shares in corrected income and work panel
the effect is stronger in the work based classification. Because of this, and also due to the lower
self-employment shares, we choose the income based classification for our analysis. The results
discussed below, unless otherwise mentioned, are therefore for the income based classification
(and the sample corresponding to it).
2.B DGAs and the self-employed
2.B.1 DGAs in the work and schooling survey
We use question cwxxx121, where “xxx” denotes the indicator for the year and wave, to classify
individuals within the working population. The question’s text explains to the survey takers that
[a] director of a limited liability or private limited company (Dutch: NV or BV, respectively) is
generally on the payroll of that company. In that case, please enter that you [are an] employee in
permanent or temporary employment. A majority shareholder director, also, generally receives
an income as an employee. Nevertheless, if this [applies] to you, we request that you indicate
that you [are] a (majority shareholder) director.38 Hence, self-employed individuals who have
incorporated their company and act as its DGA should answer that they are DGAs, whereas e.g.
38Taken from the English version codebook of the Work and Schooling core study wave 10.
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the directors of Shell or Unilever should answer with the option that they are director of a limited
liability or private limited company. Therefore, including DGAs based on question cwxxx121 in
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2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Year
Work and Schooling incl. DGAs
Data source: LISS Panel − Work & Schooling, Income, Background Variables
 Total  Men  Women
Figure 2.B.1: Comparison of self-employment shares with and without DGAs in raw sample
Figure 2.B.1 illustrates this further. By comparing the left and the right panel we see that the
inclusion of DGAs shifts the shares more or less equally across all periods, which is consistent
with evidence presented in CBS (2014, p.13, figure 3.2.1). It does so mostly through increasing
the share of self-employed among the working men, which is consistent with the finding reported
by CBS in the same report that 80% of DGAs were men in 2012.39
2.B.2 DGAs in the income survey
In the income survey, question cixxx008 individuals are asked: Did you receive income as employee
in [t-1]? including the explanation that A [DGA] generally receives income as an employee as well
39The shares presented in Figure 2.B.1 are calculated for all individuals from 25 to 60 years of age. The sample is
further restricted to those for whom the covariates of the regression analysis are not missing. It is not conditional on
observations being available for at least two periods consecutively.
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and so please answer YES here. The question block on self-employment on the other hand makes
no special mention of DGAs. The section is however vague when asking inviduals [w]hich work
situation as described [. . . ] in [t−1] applied to you (or for a part of [t−1])? and offering statements
such as work as an entrepreneur or as a freelancer (alongside a job), or a company owner, or make
profit (or losses) through enterprise in some other way [...] in questions cixxx37 to cixxx044. DGAs
are therefore only included in our definition of the self-employed if they self-identify as one of
these options, otherwise they will be categorised as employees.
It is theoretically possible to identify DGAs through their wages because there is a legal
requirement for a DGA to earn at least 45000 euro (gross). This minimum salary for DGA is
substantially higher than the CPB’s estimate of model income at 34000 euro for 201740 and we
could therefore use reported income as an identification strategy. However, many individuals do
not report their gross income in the survey, and the income brackets provided are not indicative
enough as one bracket runs from 36000 to 48000.
2.C Model details
2.C.1 Correlation among the random effects
Following Train (2009, chapter 9), we use a Choleski transformation for the multivariate normals.
As Train (2009, p.238) writes, the advantage of using this approach is that “for any pattern
of covariance, there is some set of loadings from independent components that reproduces
that covariance”. We thus only have to make an assumption concerning the distribution of the
unobserved heterogeneity but not of the covariance. Hence,
(2.7) µi = ξᵀi L
ᵀ
where ξi is a J ×1 vector of independent standard normal distributed variables, and L is the
lower triangular Cholesky factorization of µi ’s covariance matrix W , such that LL
ᵀ =W .
Substituting (2.7) and (2.3) in (2.2), and writing the utilities in vectorised form we have
(2.8) y∗it = X itβ+ yit−1γ+ yi0δ+ξ
ᵀ
i L
ᵀ+εit i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 2, . . . ,T
where y∗it is a 1× J row vector of indirect utilities for individual i at time t, γ and δ are J × J
matrices of parameters, β is a k × J matrix of parameters, and L contains the parameters
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2.C.2 Likelihood function
The probability to observe a particular individual choosing labour state j at time t conditional on
ξi in the multinomial logit model is then given by
(2.9) Prob(yit = j|X it, yit−1, yi0,ξi)=
exp(yit−1γ j + yi0δ j + X itβ j +ξᵀi L
ᵀ
j )∑J





where L j is the jth row of L.
It follows that the conditional probability of observing a sequence of choices for individual i is





Prob(yit = j|X it, yit−1, yi0,ξi)Di jt
where Di jt is an indicator function denoting whether state j is chosen by the individual. The
unconditional probability, or likelihood function, is then given by
(2.11) Prob(yi|X i, yi0)=
∫
ξi
Prob(yi|X it, yit−1, yi0,ξi) f (ξi)dξi
where f (ξi) denotes the multivariate normal distribution of ξi with means zero. The log likelihood





2.C.3 Maximum Simulated Likelihood
The results of this section hold for both the static and the dynamic model. Note that in its
current form the multinomial logit model described by equations (2.9) – (2.12) is not identified
as there are too many parameters. For identification purposes we therefore take j = 0, that is
wage-employment, as the base category. β0, γ0, δ0 and the first column in L are normalised to
zero. The parameters for the other alternatives j = 1,2,3 must be interpreted relative to the base




l11l21 l221 + l222 ·
l11l31 l21l31 + l22l32 l231 + l232 + l233

and we estimate J−1= 3 coefficients for each variable.
Furthermore, the probabilities given by equation (2.11), i.e.
∫
ξi
in particular, have to be
simulated. As Train (2009, chapter 10) writes, logP̂ is not an unbiased estimator for logP
because of the non-linear log operation, even if P̂ is an unbiased estimator of P. Thus the bias in
the simulator for logProb(yi|X i, yi0) translates into a bias in the maximum simulated likelihood
41Note that dimensions are now reduced by 1, and all vectors and matrices are now of dimensions (·× J−1).
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estimator. This bias however diminishes as more draws are used in the simulation. Using a
large number of draws for ξi on the other hand increases the computational burden of the
estimation. One way to reduce this burden is, instead of using independent random draws, to
use an alternative method that provides better coverage of the support of the distribution of
the individual and therefore leads to greater accuracy for a given number of draws. This can be
achieved using Halton draws. Both Bhat (2001) and Train (2009, chapter 9.3.3) have shown that
e.g. 100 Halton draws can provide more precise results than 1000 random draws.
In order to simulate
∫
ξi
, we take 150 draws for each individual from a J −1-dimensional
Halton sequence in which we closely follow the method described in Train (2009, chapter 9.3.3).
Based on the discussion above, 150 draws for each individual should be sufficient. Furthermore
the panel is based on more than six thousand individuals, i.e. large in itself, which should
also lower the need for more draws. In addition we randomise the Halton draws following the
procedure described by Bhat (2003). As a base of the Halton sequences we use the primes 11,13
and 7.
Returning to the model, the probability of observing an individual’s observed sequence of
labour state choices in the simulation is given by








Prob(yi|X it, yit−1, yi0,ξi)Di jt
)Sit
The simulated loglikelihood function is thus given by














Prob(yi|X it, yit−1, yi0,ξi)Di jt
)Sit]
where R is the number of Halton draws taken to simulate
∫
ξi
, and Si jt is an indicator function
to control for the unbalanced panel, denoting whether an individual’s observation enters in the
estimation. That is, Si jt = 1 if yi, yit−1, X it are observed.
All model specifications for the correlated random effects models reported in section 2.4
are estimated using own code written in Matlab 2017a. We solve them as an unconstrained
minimisation problem using KNITRO as a solver and supplying the gradient as defined in the
next subsection. As the best guess for the starting values we first estimate a pooled multinomial
regression on the same covariates, including the lags, for each specification. The only difference
is the non-inclusion of the unobserved individual heterogeneity. For this step we make use of the
function “mnrfit” in Matlab’s statistics toolbox.
2.C.4 First order derivatives
Let for notational ease P(yi jtr)≡ Prob(yi jtr|X it, yit−1, yi0,ξi) and similarly for all other probabili-
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Furthermore let vector θ be a vector with κ elements containing the stacked columns of all
the coefficient matrices β,γ,δ, as well as a vector of all the elements of the Cholesky factorisation
[l11, l21, l22, l31, l32, l33]′. And lastly, let Vit be a vector of the covariates, where X i t, yit−1, yi0 are
stacked accordingly to the elements in θ. Note that e.g. for a covariate in X it its index κ in Vit is
jointly defined by k and j. The last rows in Vit are given by the vector [ξ1,ξ1,ξ2,ξ1,ξ2,ξ3]′.








































In order to explore whether an individual’s general health has an impact on their labour status,
we want to construct an objective measure of health. The survey-based LISS panel provides us
with a subjective measure of overall health: Individuals are asked to asses their own health
status in the Health core study. The answer-options provided are on a five-point Likert scale
ranging from poor to excellent. Studies have shown, however, that own health assessment in
surveys can be biased; see, e.g., Jürges (2007). Hence we do not use the self-assessed health
status directly. Instead we make use of the richness of the health survey and generate a linear
index based on an ordered probit regression with random effects: We regress the survey answers
on dummy indicators for the individual’s perceived change in health relative to the last year,
BMI based indicators for under- and overweight, as well as a set of indicators for self-assessed
difficulties with daily tasks, regularly taken medication, health problems and hospital visits
in the past year, etc. We run the regression with a sample consisting only of individuals in our
chosen age range that are also in the final regression sample. As a sensitivity check, we repeat
this including observations of those without a sequence (but still within the age range). The
results are robust to the sample chosen, and we choose to use the health index based on the
larger sample.
The health survey was not asked in 2014. We also miss some years for some individuals in
the sample. We fill in these gaps but take a different approach than with the factor markers. We
assume that health follows a dynamic process. We regress the health index, as an AR(1) process,
on its lag and control for unobserved heterogeneity. We then take the estimated coefficients to
calculate missing values. Because health may be endogenous to labour market state choices, we
will use the one period lag of the health index in our model.
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Table 2.D.1: Regression results for health index
Regression sample only incl. single observations
Health in general Health in general
Health compared to t−1: poor -1.555*** -1.536***
(0.0692) (0.0674)
— moderate -0.585*** -0.581***
(0.0238) (0.0231)
— very good -0.0120 -0.0166
(0.0225) (0.0217)
— excellent 0.455*** 0.421***
(0.0443) (0.0421)
Hinder in daily life (index) -0.290*** -0.282***
(0.0114) (0.0110)
Long-standing disease 0.264*** 0.279***
(0.0210) (0.0203)
Regularly pain in joints -0.101*** -0.107***
(0.0200) (0.0193)
— Hearth problems -0.185*** -0.194***
(0.0471) (0.0456)
— Breathing problems -0.166*** -0.163***
(0.0362) (0.0350)
— Coughing, flu, etc. -0.208*** -0.194***
(0.0217) (0.0210)
— Stomach/intestinal problems -0.207*** -0.210***
(0.0249) (0.0241)
— Headaches -0.107*** -0.113***
(0.0209) (0.0202)
— Fatigue -0.253*** -0.245***
(0.0198) (0.0191)
— Sleeping problems -0.0814*** -0.0864***
(0.0219) (0.0213)
Other recurrent complaints -0.249*** -0.244***
(0.0259) (0.0251)
No recurrent complaints 0.119*** 0.113***
(0.0231) (0.0223)
Taking medicine for:
— high blood pressure -0.123*** -0.131***
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Table 2.D.1: Regression results for health index (continued)
Regression sample only incl. single observations
Health in general Health in general
(0.0291) (0.0283)
— diabetes -0.311*** -0.327***
(0.0507) (0.0495)
— joint pain/infection -0.166*** -0.173***
(0.0355) (0.0345)
— hormonal osteoporosis -0.371*** -0.325**
(0.137) (0.135)
Not taking any medicine 0.231*** 0.214***
(0.0252) (0.0243)












Constant cut1 -4.397*** -4.305***
(0.123) (0.120)
Constant cut2 -1.964*** -1.888***
(0.115) (0.112)
Constant cut3 0.725*** 0.778***
(0.114) (0.112)
Constant cut4 1.960*** 2.013***
(0.115) (0.112)
Observations 28926 30669
Including year fixed effects and controls for depression & anxiety, difficulty with actions,
other medication, and eduction. Standard errors in parentheses.




Table 2.E.1: Observed transition probabilities (in %) excluding/including corrections
Labour state Excluding corrections Including corrections
past \ current 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0: employee 93.34 1.35 1.07 4.24 93.06 1.55 1.16 4.22
1: self-employed 7.93 87.76 0.65 3.66 8.68 87.28 0.60 3.44
2: unemployed 18.09 2.30 46.38 33.22 21.01 2.07 43.64 33.28
3: not in labour force 16.80 1.94 6.17 75.09 16.96 1.89 6.34 74.81
overall 69.92 10.30 3.03 16.75 69.94 10.75 3.03 16.29
Based on pooled samples with 24061 and 265510 observation pairs respectively (n=6019).
Source: LISS Panel, own calculations.
Table 2.E.2: Simulated transition probabilities (in %), pooled
Labour state without Heckman correction with Heckman correction
past \ current 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0: employee 92.43 1.57 1.40 4.59 91.45 1.56 1.49 5.49
1: self-employed 7.32 88.55 0.91 3.22 6.96 87.96 1.00 4.08
2: unemployed 21.56 1.88 43.13 33.43 20.77 1.64 40.29 37.29
3: not in labour force 16.92 2.06 6.95 74.06 16.3 2.03 6.25 75.42
Total 69.32 10.52 3.49 16.67 66 10.20 3.56 20.24
Based on dynamic model with Big-Five factor markers, 34448 pairs (n=6019).
Source: LISS Panel, missing values for personal/household characteristics are extrapolated.
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Table 2.E.3: Personal characteristics for individual simulation
Employee Self-employed
Female Male Female Male
median median median high low median high low
Age in 2008 45 45 45 45
Partner Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr. of children 1 1 1 1
Medium education Yes Yes Yes No
High education No No No Yes
F1 0.0018 0.0913 0.3166 2.5 -2.5 0.2073 2.5 -2.5
F2 0.4373 -0.5206 0.2526 -2.5 2.5 -0.4403 -2.5 2.5
F3 0.0217 0.1470 0.9095 2.5 -2.5 -0.1899 2.5 -2.5
F4 0.0722 0.3549 -0.3043 2.5 -2.5 0.5378 2.5 -2.5
F5 -0.3563 -0.2132 -0.3008 2.5 -2.5 1.1217 2.5 -2.5
Note: “high” denotes the “entrepreneurial” and “low” the “non-entrepreneurial” benchmark individual.
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Table 2.E.4: First stage Heckman regression results, women
Model Baseline Health index EP distance Big5 Factors
Self-employed in t−1 -0.14** -0.11* -0.13** -0.11*
(0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Unemployed in t−1 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.10
(0.088) (0.088) (0.087) (0.087)
Not in labour force in t−1 0.07 0.08* 0.07 0.07*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Has partner -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Has child -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Middle eduction 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04
(0.081) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080)
High education 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.06
(0.084) (0.081) (0.082) (0.084)
Household size -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Days until answered -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(within call) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Answered in first call 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.30***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Interaction term -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01**







F4: emotional stability -0.04**
(0.016)






Constant 0.39*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.47***
(0.117) (0.113) (0.128) (0.116)
Observations 16,868 16,605 16,679 16,679
Number of nomem_encr 4,045 3,848 3,869 3,869
ρ 0.145 0.0870 0.102 0.0979
σu 0.412 0.309 0.336 0.329
LL -6559 -6252 -6336 -6307
Dependent variable: Indicator variable for labour state observed in t.
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 2.E.5: First stage Heckman regression results, men
Model Baseline Health index EP distance Big5 Factors
Self-employed in t−1 -0.23*** -0.19*** -0.21*** -0.19***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048)
Unemployed in t−1 -0.12 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08
(0.111) (0.113) (0.110) (0.111)
Not in labour force in t−1 0.12* 0.13* 0.15* 0.16**
(0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063)
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Has partner 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Has child -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.064) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Middle eduction 0.21* 0.20* 0.22* 0.20*
(0.089) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087)
High education 0.27** 0.23** 0.26** 0.25**
(0.091) (0.089) (0.089) (0.091)
Household size -0.06* -0.05 -0.05* -0.05
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Days until answered -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(within call) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Answered in first call 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.17** 0.17**
(0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056)
Interaction term -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00







F4: emotional stability 0.02
(0.019)






Constant 0.23* 0.33** 0.43*** 0.34***
(0.131) (0.127) (0.142) (0.131)
Observations 13,824 13,578 13,675 13,675
Number of nomem_encr 3,242 3,059 3,104 3,104
ρ 0.203 0.137 0.158 0.160
σu 0.505 0.398 0.433 0.436
LL -5046 -4766 -4865 -4860
Dependent variable: Indicator variable for labour state observed in t.
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 2.E.6: First stage Heckman regression results, pooled
Model Baseline Health index EP distance Big5 Factors
Self-employed in t−1 -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.15***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Unemployed in t−1 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.04
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068)
Not in labour force in t−1 0.08** 0.09** 0.09** 0.10**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.08
(0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
Has partner 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.03
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Has child -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Female x partner -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05
(0.057) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055)
Female x has child 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
(0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Middle eduction 0.14* 0.12* 0.12* 0.12*
(0.060) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059)
High education 0.17** 0.14* 0.14* 0.15*
(0.061) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061)
Household size -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Days until answered -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(within call) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Answered in first call 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.25***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Interaction term -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01**







F4: emotional stability -0.02
(0.012)






Constant 0.34*** 0.44*** 0.46*** 0.47***
(0.090) (0.087) (0.096) (0.089)
Observations 30,692 30,183 30,354 30,354
Number of individuals 7,287 6,907 6,973 6,973
ρ 0.170 0.107 0.126 0.124
σu 0.452 0.346 0.379 0.376
LL -11614 -11026 -11212 -11183
Dependent variable: Indicator variable for labour state observed in t.
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 2.E.7: Static model with Big-Five factor markers, pooled
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -19.65*** -7.79*** -4.15***
(0.9777) (0.8237) (0.628)
Age 0.17*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.0124) (0.0103) (0.0085)
Female -1.22*** 0.61** 0.63**
(0.4002) (0.2832) (0.2654)
Has partner 0.21 -0.81*** -1.04***
(0.3082) (0.2764) (0.2508)
Has child -1.55*** -0.96*** -1.06***
(0.2993) (0.292) (0.2435)
Female x partner -0.39 0.15 1.77***
(0.3974) (0.3123) (0.2928)
Female x has child 1.26*** 0.84*** 0.49*
(0.3829) (0.3041) (0.2633)
Middle education 0.01 -1.43*** -1.98***
(0.5194) (0.3255) (0.263)
High education 0.95* -2.8*** -3.43***
(0.5407) (0.3519) (0.2905)
Household size 0.37*** 0.16 0.3***
(0.1122) (0.1027) (0.0756)
F1: extraversion 0.26** -0.09 -0.06
(0.1113) (0.0908) (0.0684)
F2: agreeableness -0.24** 0.12 0.07
(0.0995) (0.0807) (0.0651)
F3: conscientiousness 0.14 -0.35*** -0.54***
(0.1048) (0.0903) (0.0705)
F4: emotional stability -0.31*** -0.59*** -0.5***
(0.0976) (0.0826) (0.0628)
F5: openness for experience 0.5*** 0.33*** 0.21***
(0.0989) (0.086) (0.0691)












Nr. of Individuals: 5914
Loglikelihood: -12989.71
Regression including year fixed effects.
(Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.E.8: Dynamic model with Big-Five factor markers, women
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -6.72*** -6.12*** -4.5***
(1.0592) (0.9536) (0.6593)
Age 0.01 0.03*** 0.04***
(0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0078)
Has partner 0.3 -0.65*** 0.38**
(0.2423) (0.1892) (0.1699)
Has child -0.34 -0.22 -0.41**
(0.3001) (0.2332) (0.1926)
Middle education -0.12 -0.81** -0.92***
(0.5824) (0.3518) (0.2951)
High education 0.18 -1.55*** -1.44***
(0.6075) (0.3824) (0.3139)
Household size 0.13 0.05 0.06
(0.1203) (0.0984) (0.0816)
F1: extraversion 0.03 -0.06 -0.03
(0.0974) (0.0899) (0.0667)
F2: agreeableness -0.07 0.04 0.01
(0.1112) (0.0916) (0.0701)
F3: conscientiousness -0.07 -0.18* -0.23***
(0.1161) (0.1021) (0.0776)
F4: emotional stability -0.09 -0.34*** -0.19***
(0.0926) (0.0853) (0.0627)
F5: openness for experience 0.26** 0.25*** 0.14*
(0.1032) (0.0913) (0.0728)
Last state: self-employed 4.02*** 1.11** 1.21***
(0.2397) (0.4859) (0.2955)
Last state: unemployed 0.11 2.92*** 1.69***
(0.5094) (0.2832) (0.218)
Last state: not in LF 0.6** 1.54*** 2.09***
(0.2675) (0.2003) (0.1068)
Initial state: self-employed 4.93*** 1.42** 2.3***
(0.5339) (0.5624) (0.362)
Initial state: unemployed 3.48*** 3.35*** 3.18***
(0.6971) (0.5318) (0.4812)
Initial state: not in LF 2.85*** 3.18*** 4.28***
(0.3806) (0.2937) (0.2389)












Nr. of Individuals: 3267
Loglikelihood: -6086.96
Regression including year fixed effects.
(Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.E.9: Dynamic model with Big-Five factor markers, men
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -7*** -7.74*** -5.11***
(1.2323) (1.4295) (0.9316)
Age 0.03* 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.0139) (0.0166) (0.0115)
Has partner -0.08 -0.36 -0.34
(0.2575) (0.3142) (0.2256)
Has child -0.28 -0.08 -0.12
(0.3137) (0.4079) (0.2754)
Middle education -0.07 -0.75* -1.26***
(0.5538) (0.4333) (0.3313)
High education 0.29 -1.53*** -2.15***
(0.5674) (0.492) (0.3739)
Household size 0.18 -0.07 -0.03
(0.1304) (0.185) (0.1285)
F1: extraversion 0.28** -0.03 -0.03
(0.1105) (0.1276) (0.0855)
F2: agreeableness -0.15 0.03 -0.04
(0.093) (0.1227) (0.0822)
F3: conscientiousness -0.19* -0.16 -0.19**
(0.1) (0.1281) (0.092)
F4: emotional stability -0.25** -0.33*** -0.37***
(0.104) (0.116) (0.0827)
F5: openness for experience 0.24** 0.15 0.08
(0.1036) (0.1209) (0.0848)
Last state: self-employed 4.15*** 0.48 0.86**
(0.2447) (0.7504) (0.4071)
Last state: unemployed 0.23 2.69*** 1.3***
(0.5791) (0.3341) (0.312)
Last state: not in LF 0.57* 0.59* 1.5***
(0.3311) (0.3118) (0.1862)
Initial state: self-employed 4.75*** 2.7*** 2.29***
(0.5798) (0.7324) (0.4488)
Initial state: unemployed 2.61*** 4.14*** 3.76***
(0.9214) (0.5955) (0.5501)
Initial state: not in LF 2.1*** 4.03*** 4.3***
(0.5243) (0.4125) (0.3502)












Nr. of Individuals: 2647
Loglikelihood: -4066.08
Regression including year fixed effects.
(Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.E.10: Dynamic model with Big-Five factor markers, pooled
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -6.81*** -7.17*** -4.89***
(0.7856) (0.7682) (0.5285)
Age 0.02* 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0063)
Female -0.04 0.48** 0.33*
(0.262) (0.2256) (0.1885)
Has partner 0.05 -0.35 -0.37**
(0.2356) (0.2375) (0.1859)
Has child -0.25 -0.28 -0.23
(0.2619) (0.2505) (0.1949)
Female x partner 0.22 -0.3 0.73***
(0.3025) (0.268) (0.2181)
Female x has child -0.16 0.19 -0.1
(0.2704) (0.2548) (0.1969)
Middle education -0.13 -0.79*** -1.12***
(0.3972) (0.2647) (0.2138)
High education 0.21 -1.53*** -1.78***
(0.4078) (0.2901) (0.2322)
Household size 0.17* 0 0.03
(0.0876) (0.0846) (0.0663)
F1: extraversion 0.15** -0.04 -0.03
(0.0728) (0.0714) (0.0515)
F2: agreeableness -0.11 0.04 -0.02
(0.0708) (0.0695) (0.0502)
F3: conscientiousness -0.14* -0.15* -0.21***
(0.077) (0.0772) (0.0577)
F4: emotional stability -0.17*** -0.36*** -0.28***
(0.0655) (0.0652) (0.0481)
F5: openness for experience 0.26*** 0.19*** 0.11**
(0.0711) (0.0716) (0.0538)
Last state: self-employed 4.06*** 0.93** 1.14***
(0.1651) (0.3819) (0.2277)
Last state: unemployed 0.3 2.75*** 1.55***
(0.3483) (0.2023) (0.1664)
Last state: not in LF 0.63*** 1.19*** 1.89***
(0.1985) (0.1604) (0.0885)
Initial state: self-employed 4.95*** 1.76*** 2.16***
(0.3848) (0.3905) (0.2708)
Initial state: unemployed 2.92*** 3.78*** 3.44***
(0.5375) (0.3869) (0.3484)
Initial state: not in LF 2.51*** 3.53*** 4.27***
(0.2842) (0.23) (0.1894)












Nr. of Individuals: 5914
Loglikelihood: -10201.11
Regression incl. year fixed effects; (Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.E.11: Dynamic model with Big-Five factor markers and no Heckman correction, pooled
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -6.98*** -7.67*** -5.89***
(0.5708) (0.5313) (0.3637)
Age 0.02** 0.05*** 0.06***
(0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0049)
Female -0.05 0.46** 0.28
(0.2604) (0.223) (0.1864)
Has partner 0.05 -0.34 -0.35*
(0.2342) (0.2374) (0.1855)
Has child -0.26 -0.29 -0.26
(0.2604) (0.2499) (0.1942)
Female x partner 0.21 -0.32 0.7***
(0.3007) (0.2678) (0.2174)
Female x has child -0.16 0.2 -0.07
(0.2689) (0.2547) (0.1959)
Middle education -0.12 -0.75*** -1.04***
(0.3894) (0.2615) (0.2114)
High education 0.23 -1.47*** -1.69***
(0.3974) (0.2856) (0.2292)
Household size 0.17* -0.01 0.01
(0.0873) (0.0832) (0.0657)
F1: extraversion 0.15** -0.05 -0.03
(0.0724) (0.0713) (0.0514)
F2: agreeableness -0.11 0.04 -0.02
(0.0707) (0.0692) (0.0501)
F3: conscientiousness -0.13* -0.11* -0.14***
(0.0692) (0.0659) (0.0511)
F4: emotional stability -0.17*** -0.37*** -0.29***
(0.0651) (0.0647) (0.0477)
F5: openness for experience 0.26*** 0.18*** 0.09*
(0.0704) (0.0705) (0.0533)
Last state: self-employed 4.04*** 0.86** 1.04***
(0.1567) (0.3751) (0.2224)
Last state: unemployed 0.29 2.77*** 1.58***
(0.3482) (0.2017) (0.166)
Last state: not in LF 0.64*** 1.22*** 1.95***
(0.1961) (0.1567) (0.085)
Initial state: self-employed 4.95*** 1.77*** 2.16***
(0.3845) (0.3913) (0.2694)
Initial state: unemployed 2.91*** 3.77*** 3.43***
(0.5352) (0.3865) (0.3468)












Nr. of Individuals: 5914
Loglikelihood: -10204.73
Regression incl. year fixed effects; (Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
58
2.E. ADDITIONAL TABLES
Table 2.E.12: Dynamic model with EP distance, pooled
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -6.4*** -7.59*** -5.26***
(0.8093) (0.7696) (0.5423)
Age 0.01 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.0084) (0.0086) (0.0063)
Female -0.07 0.42* 0.23
(0.2531) (0.2191) (0.1849)
Has partner 0.02 -0.43* -0.45**
(0.2352) (0.2338) (0.1843)
Has child -0.26 -0.25 -0.21
(0.2613) (0.2499) (0.1942)
Female x partner 0.19 -0.24 0.76***
(0.3007) (0.2651) (0.2175)
Female x has child -0.21 0.16 -0.12
(0.2694) (0.253) (0.1961)
Middle education -0.15 -0.8*** -1.16***
(0.3865) (0.2634) (0.2141)
High education 0.31 -1.45*** -1.79***
(0.391) (0.2839) (0.2275)
Household size 0.17* -0.01 0.03
(0.0869) (0.0847) (0.0663)
EP distance -0.01 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.0107) (0.01) (0.0077)
Last state: self-employed 4.05*** 0.93** 1.15***
(0.1656) (0.3738) (0.227)
Last state: unemployed 0.32 2.78*** 1.54***
(0.3499) (0.2008) (0.1665)
Last state: not in LF 0.63*** 1.18*** 1.89***
(0.1961) (0.1592) (0.0878)
Initial state: self-employed 5.03*** 1.81*** 2.21***
(0.3845) (0.3856) (0.2715)
Initial state: unemployed 3.03*** 3.87*** 3.52***
(0.5154) (0.391) (0.3535)
Initial state: not in LF 2.6*** 3.63*** 4.35***
(0.2821) (0.2321) (0.191)












Nr. of Individuals: 5914
Loglikelihood: -10235.85
Regression including year fixed effects.
(Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 59
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Table 2.E.13: Dynamic model with EP distance, women
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -6.56*** -6.67*** -4.93***
(1.1146) (0.955) (0.6893)
Age 0.01 0.02** 0.04***
(0.011) (0.0104) (0.0077)
Has partner 0.26 -0.68*** 0.33**
(0.2409) (0.188) (0.1683)
Has child -0.36 -0.22 -0.42**
(0.295) (0.2315) (0.1916)
Middle education -0.1 -0.79** -0.93***
(0.5728) (0.3503) (0.2922)
High education 0.31 -1.41*** -1.39***
(0.5916) (0.3738) (0.3054)
Household size 0.13 0.02 0.06
(0.1194) (0.0984) (0.0814)
EP distance -0.01 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.0149) (0.0121) (0.0096)
Last state: self-employed 4.05*** 1.11** 1.24***
(0.2398) (0.4806) (0.2958)
Last state: unemployed 0.13 2.93*** 1.67***
(0.5064) (0.2805) (0.2167)
Last state: not in LF 0.62** 1.53*** 2.09***
(0.2641) (0.198) (0.1058)
Initial state: self-employed 4.88*** 1.39** 2.29***
(0.5319) (0.5559) (0.3634)
Initial state: unemployed 3.49*** 3.45*** 3.26***
(0.6774) (0.5306) (0.4821)
Initial state: not in LF 2.84*** 3.29*** 4.34***
(0.3742) (0.2959) (0.2398)












Nr. of Individuals: 3267
Loglikelihood: -6103.72
Regression including year fixed effects.
(Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.E.14: Dynamic model with EP distance, men
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -6.41*** -8.03*** -5.5***
(1.2027) (1.4117) (0.9209)
Age 0.02 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.0138) (0.0163) (0.0114)
Has partner -0.14 -0.45 -0.43*
(0.2534) (0.309) (0.2221)
Has child -0.31 -0.1 -0.1
(0.308) (0.4019) (0.2749)
Middle education -0.13 -0.79* -1.34***
(0.542) (0.4341) (0.3337)
High education 0.3 -1.53*** -2.22***
(0.5467) (0.485) (0.3705)
Household size 0.2 -0.05 -0.03
(0.1243) (0.1839) (0.1286)
EP distance -0.02 0.05** 0.05***
(0.0164) (0.0202) (0.0143)
Last state: self-employed 4.13*** 0.52 0.89**
(0.2476) (0.7188) (0.4014)
Last state: unemployed 0.26 2.71*** 1.34***
(0.5869) (0.3345) (0.3126)
Last state: not in LF 0.56* 0.59* 1.49***
(0.3306) (0.3079) (0.185)
Initial state: self-employed 4.88*** 2.76*** 2.37***
(0.5861) (0.7407) (0.4359)
Initial state: unemployed 2.71*** 4.22*** 3.81***
(0.8558) (0.5976) (0.5513)
Initial state: not in LF 2.24*** 4.1*** 4.4***
(0.5159) (0.4169) (0.3523)












Nr. of Individuals: 2647
Loglikelihood: -4086.93
Regression including year fixed effects.
(Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.E.15: Dynamic model with health index, pooled
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -6.59*** -7.15*** -4.7***
(0.7895) (0.7363) (0.5164)
Age 0.01 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0062)
Female -0.18 0.38* 0.2
(0.2633) (0.2148) (0.1829)
Has partner 0.08 -0.33 -0.38**
(0.2354) (0.2251) (0.1789)
Has child -0.21 -0.35 -0.3
(0.2619) (0.239) (0.1901)
Female x partner 0.1 -0.25 0.74***
(0.3062) (0.2561) (0.212)
Female x has child -0.11 0.27 -0.03
(0.2716) (0.2429) (0.1915)
Middle education -0.03 -0.65** -1.02***
(0.4027) (0.256) (0.2116)
High education 0.48 -1.16*** -1.53***
(0.4098) (0.2767) (0.2248)
Household size 0.17* 0.02 0.06
(0.0881) (0.0825) (0.0665)
Health Index, lagged -0.09 -0.35*** -0.31***
(0.0538) (0.0381) (0.0333)
Last state: self-employed 4.02*** 0.83** 1.14***
(0.1637) (0.369) (0.2253)
Last state: unemployed 0.24 2.87*** 1.5***
(0.3559) (0.1968) (0.1669)
Last state: not in LF 0.67*** 1.17*** 1.92***
(0.2016) (0.1588) (0.0877)
Initial state: self-employed 5.15*** 1.95*** 2.2***
(0.3908) (0.3749) (0.2668)
Initial state: unemployed 2.88*** 3.43*** 3.24***
(0.5244) (0.3676) (0.3439)
Initial state: not in LF 2.5*** 3.42*** 4.16***
(0.2853) (0.2266) (0.1894)












Nr. of Individuals: 5866
Loglikelihood: -10143.69
Regression including year fixed effects.
(Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1062
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Table 2.E.16: Dynamic model with health index, women
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -6.72*** -6.4*** -4.58***
(1.0301) (0.9) (0.6442)
Age 0.01 0.02** 0.03***
(0.0107) (0.01) (0.0076)
Has partner 0.28 -0.6*** 0.38**
(0.2386) (0.1841) (0.1686)
Has child -0.27 -0.18 -0.39**
(0.2992) (0.2266) (0.1924)
Middle education -0.14 -0.63* -0.79***
(0.5481) (0.341) (0.2925)
High education 0.27 -1.14*** -1.15***
(0.5643) (0.3677) (0.3071)
Household size 0.12 0.06 0.08
(0.1221) (0.0966) (0.0828)
Health Index, lagged -0.11 -0.37*** -0.3***
(0.0687) (0.0492) (0.0451)
Last state: self-employed 4.03*** 1.02** 1.21***
(0.2416) (0.477) (0.2947)
Last state: unemployed 0.02 3.02*** 1.63***
(0.5083) (0.2589) (0.2162)
Last state: not in LF 0.56** 1.51*** 2.07***
(0.2706) (0.1971) (0.1058)
Initial state: self-employed 4.88*** 1.56*** 2.34***
(0.5248) (0.5445) (0.3602)
Initial state: unemployed 3.51*** 3.19*** 3.12***
(0.6573) (0.4869) (0.4818)
Initial state: not in LF 2.86*** 3.11*** 4.22***
(0.3674) (0.2854) (0.2365)












Nr. of Individuals: 3248
Loglikelihood: -6054.79
Regression including year fixed effects.
(Non-robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.E.17: Dynamic model with health index, men
Self-employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force
Constant -6.43*** -7.44*** -4.86***
(1.2339) (1.4121) (0.9146)
Age 0.01 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.0138) (0.0163) (0.0113)
Has partner -0.04 -0.38 -0.33
(0.2483) (0.3068) (0.2179)
Has child -0.29 -0.17 -0.16
(0.3058) (0.3943) (0.2729)
Middle education 0.11 -0.73* -1.26***
(0.5824) (0.4305) (0.322)
High education 0.61 -1.29*** -2.01***
(0.5893) (0.4788) (0.3591)
Household size 0.21* -0.02 -0.01
(0.1262) (0.1811) (0.1282)
Health Index, lagged -0.07 -0.3*** -0.31***
(0.0843) (0.0664) (0.0556)
Last state: self-employed 4.18*** 0.54 0.95**
(0.2419) (0.7238) (0.4074)
Last state: unemployed 0.42 2.68*** 1.35***
(0.5715) (0.3352) (0.311)
Last state: not in LF 0.73** 0.63** 1.55***
(0.3211) (0.3019) (0.1798)
Initial state: self-employed 4.87*** 2.5*** 2.05***
(0.5846) (0.7152) (0.4329)
Initial state: unemployed 2.32** 3.79*** 3.38***
(0.9402) (0.5778) (0.5303)
Initial state: not in LF 1.76*** 3.85*** 4.21***
(0.5156) (0.406) (0.3476)












Nr. of Individuals: 2618
Loglikelihood: -4042.31
Regression including year fixed effects.
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Figure 2.F.1: Share of employment paths spent in self-employment for different Big-Five factor
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Figure 2.F.2: Share of employment paths spent in self-employment for different Big-Five factor











LABOUR MARKET TRAJECTORIES OF THE SELF-EMPLOYED IN THE
NETHERLANDS
This chapter is based on the identically entitled article published in De Economist,
co-authored with Arthur van Soest
This paper employs sequence analysis to study the labour market trajectories of theself-employed. Using Dutch administrative data on more than 50,000 individualsincluding 13,000 with self-employment experience between 1989 and 2017, we find
seven different clusters with distinct life-cycle patterns of several types of self-employment,
wage employment, and non-employment. We find large heterogeneity across clusters in terms
of income, wealth, and pension accumulation. In particular, the clusters of individuals with
short self-employment spells but little labour market attachment in other periods are an
economically vulnerable group, whereas those who are persistently self-employed are not
worse off than employees.
3.1 Introduction
The self-employment rate in the Netherlands has risen substantially in recent years, from 11.6%
in 2003 to 16.8% in 2016.1 This increase has raised interest in the income vulnerability of the
self-employed and their impact on the social security system. In particular, they are an important
potentially vulnerable group when it comes to retirement income, since, like in many other
countries, they are not obliged to accumulate the same occupational pensions that employees
1OECD data; see https://data.oecd.org/emp/self-employment-rate.htm.
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accumulate.2 Policy makers are therefore concerned that the self-employed are not building up
enough pension wealth until their retirement (See SZW, 2016, section 3.1). Indeed, Mastrogiacomo
(2016) shows that the self-employed have the same pension ambitions as employees but tend to
fall short on their goals. Similar results are found by other studies on retirement preparedness of
the Dutch; see, e.g., De Bresser and Knoef (2015) or Knoef et al. (2016).
Mastrogiacomo et al. (2016) emphasize the large heterogeneity in wealth holdings of the
self-employed. This raises the question how to characterize them, dividing them, for example,
into groups that differ distinctly in their income, wealth or pension entitlements. Population data
published by Statistics Netherlands show that the rise in the number of self-employed is due
to the growth in solo self-employed (SSE), self-employed that work on their own and have no
employees in their business. Earlier studies like Bosch and Van Vuuren (2010) or SER (2010)
found that the SSE are themselves quite heterogeneous in terms of personal characteristics and
background. This is in line with the international literature on entrepreneurship (Blanchflower,
2000; Parker, 2004). So far only few studies have differentiated between SSE and other self-
employed. An exception is Mastrogiacomo et al. (2016) who show that heterogeneity in business
wealth of the self-employed is mostly driven by SSE, while entrepreneurs who own a larger firm
are more homogeneous. Zwinkels et al. (2017) focus on the heterogeneity of SSE in particular: the
variation in their calculated pension wealth is larger than for employees. Given the heterogeneity
of SSE it is questionable if a bisection of the self-employed into SSE and other self-employed
individuals is sufficient to understand the heterogeneity in how the self-employed prepare for
retirement. Bolhaar et al. (2016) split the SSE into two groups based on their business activity
but do not find many differences. Zwinkels et al. classify the SSE into several groups based on
income sources and household composition. They find that households consisting of only SSE in
particular will often have a low replacement rate after retirement.
Unlike most of the existing studies, the current paper analyses individuals labour market
trajectories over a large number of years. It uses sequence analysis to construct different clusters
of self-employment based on these trajectories. Sequence analysis was introduced in sociology by
Abbott (1983) and became a popular way to study e.g. life-course and career trajectories in the
social sciences. It is particularly well suited for the analysis of self-employment and pensions,
since pension savings are typically determined by individuals’ complete labour market trajectories.
We show for example that a large share of the self-employed remain in self-employment for only
a few years, while studies on pension preparedness of the Dutch often assume that individuals
remain in the same labour market state going forward. The only exception we are aware of is
Mastrogiacomo et al. (2016) who distinguish long-term from short-term entrepreneurs.
Some related studies also use sequence analysis. Zacher et al. (2012) use data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel and find that compared to those who are only self-employed for
a short time, individuals who remain continuously in self-employment are more likely to be
2See online Appendix 3.D for more information on the institutional background of the Dutch pension system.
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male, from older cohorts, and have a higher risk taking propensity. Humphries (2016) studies the
1970 cohort of Swedish men and distinguishes between incorporated and unincorporated self-
employment. He finds clusters that differ both in income and wealth accumulation, in line with
Levine and Rubinstein (2017) who found that in the US, the legal form chosen by self-employed
explains most of the variation in income. Visser (2018) uses sequence analysis to investigate
whether careers in the Netherlands have become more complex for individuals born in the early
1940s compared to those born in the 30s. Munnell et al. (2019) follow individuals in the US from
age 50 to 62 to assess how they use non-traditional jobs. They find that individuals who are more
frequently employed in non-traditional work during their late career are more likely to have
lower retirement income and higher rates of depression. Tophoven and Tisch (2016) analyse the
implications of work trajectories for accrued statutory pension entitlements by the age of 42 for
different cohorts in Germany. Their study does not offer any insights for the self-employed, since
they are not included in the statutory pension system. Lastly, Madero-Cabib and Fasang (2016)
study cohorts born in 1920–1950 in Germany and Switzerland to examine how work and family
life affect financial well-being in retirement. Analysing labour market and family trajectories
jointly, they find that breadwinner policies (i.e. supporting a system where men do and women
do not do paid work) in combination with liberal pension policies later in life, as in Switzerland,
intensify pension penalties for typical female work-family life courses.
Our study is descriptive and does not aim at identifying causal mechanisms. Our main aim
is to analyse the heterogeneity of labour market careers involving self-employment. In order to
partition individuals into distinct groups, we use optimal matching to first calculate dissimilarity
measures for all observed employment paths. In a second step we cluster the individuals based
on the dissimilarity measures. We then study the characteristics of the clusters, i.c. their income,
wealth, and pension investments. Like other studies on the Dutch self-employed, we use data from
Statistics Netherlands’ Income Panel (IPO), following nine five-year birth cohorts over 29 years.
Our sample consists of more than 50,000 individuals, of which more than 13,000 self-employed.
Our definition of self-employment is similar to the one of Zwinkels et al. (2017), but there are
small differences. We include all freelancers and all those with income from their own enterprise,
even those with low income.
We find the following clusters involving self-employment: (1) self-employed with weak
labour market attachment, (2) self-employed who spend a large part of their trajectory as
benefit recipients, (3) employees with short self-employment spells, (4) employees that switch
to self-employment later in their career, (5) always pure self-employed, (6) always hybrid
self-employed (combining self-employment with income from another source), and (7) DGAs
(“directeur-grootaandeelhouder”, directors and majority share holder of their firms). We find that
DGAs are the “positive” outliers among the self-employed. They earn more, have higher wealth,
and save more for retirement through the (voluntary) third pillar. At the other end we find the
first three clusters, whose members do not spend a long period in self-employment. They have
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large gaps in their occupational pension accumulation and are not more likely than employees
to participate in a third pillar solution. Similar findings hold for the late career switchers. The
pure and hybrid self-employed have a slightly higher disposable income than employees and
accumulate also significantly more non-pension wealth than employees. Like DGAs, these two
clusters have a rather low risk of not having sufficient means after retirement.
Our study is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe the different data sources and
give our definition of self-employment. Section 4.3 introduces the methods and presents the
self-employment clusters that we find. Section 3.4 discusses the differences between the clusters
with respect to demographic characteristics, income and wealth, while Section 3.5 investigates
pension accumulation across clusters. Section 4.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
This paper combines several sources of Dutch administrative data provided by Statistics Nether-
lands (CBS). These are all longitudinal data sets with annual-level data. The core is the Income
Panel Study (IPO), which follows a representative sample of the Dutch population over time.
Attrition only occurs if individuals decease or move abroad. As such, IPO contains information
on more than 90,000 individuals of all ages. These are the so called “core individuals” (in Dutch:
“kernpersonen”).3
The main advantage of IPO over other data such as integral income data sets covering the
complete Dutch population, is the long time period covered. IPO starts in 19894 and ends in
2014 – when it was replaced by integral population data – and hence covers a period of 26 years,
whereas available integral income data currently only cover 15 years. This allows us, for example,
to differentiate between those who have always been self-employed and those who switch to
self-employment later in life. We extend the time horizon of IPO by three years (2015-2017) by
linking the IPO individuals to their records in the integral income data set (INPATAB).5 Hence
our analysis of trajectories covers the years 1989–2017.
For all these years IPO records detailed information on the individuals’ income from different
sources and demographic characteristics such as age, gender, and marital status. There are two
breaks in the series due to tax reforms, but neither of them has an impact on our analysis.6
The integral data set with which we extend IPO also provides more detailed information on the
self-employed starting from 2005: the type of self-employment (i.e., whether the individual is solo
self-employed (SSE) or not), and the industry in which the individual is active. We also also link
3In addition, IPO contains information on all members of the core persons’ households. Because these additional
individuals are no longer tracked if they leave the core person’s household, we do not include them in the analysis.
4There are earlier waves in 1977, 1981, and 1985, but the 1977 sample is unrelated to the later years and the
samples in 1981 and 1985 are much smaller.
5We also replace the (provisional) income data in IPO 2014 by the (definitive) data from INPATAB The differences
matter for the self-employed in particular, as their tax information becomes available later than that of employees.
6Our models include year dummies to account for a general shift in taxable income. See online Appendix 3.E for
more details on the income data and the breaks in IPO.
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Table 3.1: Overview of cohorts in sample
Cohort Birth years Age Years sequenced T Cohort N SE: N (%)
1 1936–1940 49/53–62/66 1989–2002 14 4275 721 (17)
2 1941–1945 44/48–62/66 1989–2007 19 4744 988 (21)
3 1946–1950 39/43–62/66 1989–2012 24 6233 1552 (25)
4 1951–1955 34/38–62/66 5530 1476 (27)
5 1956–1960 29/33–57/61 1989–2017 29 5947 1774 (30)
6 1961–1965 24/28–52/56 6432 2028 (32)
7 1966–1970 24/28–47/51 1994–2017 24 6732 2074 (31)
8 1971–1975 24/28–42/46 1999–2017 19 5803 1607 (28)
9 1976–1980 24/28–37/41 2004–2017 14 5141 1142 (22)
Total 50837 13362 (26)
the individuals to data on household wealth (VEHTAB) and (for a subsample) to accrued pension
rights in the second pillar (“Pensioendeelnemingen”).
We divide the IPO core individuals into five-year birth cohorts and limit our analysis to those
for whom we have at least fourteen years of data during their working age. We consider the
range 24–66 as individuals’ working age. This allows us to form symmetric cohorts preceding and
following the three whose observation window falls completely on their working age.7 Table 3.1
gives an overview of the nine cohorts that we retain. The oldest cohort includes individuals born
in 1936–1940, and the youngest those born in 1976–1980. Cohorts 1 to 4, and partially cohort
5, fall into what Mastrogiacomo (2016) refers to as the old self-employed that are a last group
of high income and wealth individuals; the remaining cohorts allow us to analyse whether the
newer generations of self-employed are indeed different.
We limit our analysis to individuals who remain in the Netherlands for the whole (cohort-
specific) period of interest. We exclude both immigrants and emigrants if they enter or leave
the Netherlands in the years we study, since we do not observe them before or after their move.
Similarly, we drop everyone who temporarily leaves the country. All in all, this leaves us with
approximately 70% of all individuals from the cohorts we consider – a sample of slightly less than
51,000 individuals.
3.2.1 Definition of labour market states
In order to construct employment trajectories we need to define possible labour market states.
Each individual can only be in one state in a given year. The definition of the states is similar to
the socio-economic categories (SEC) that CBS provides in IPO. Like the SEC, our definition is
7We will take into account that individuals retire before age 66 when analysing pension savings. Note that for
individuals born after 31 March 1952 the official retirement age is 66 years.
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based on observed incomes. We use different categories to differentiate between those who are
exclusively self-employed with non-zero income from self-employment only (referred to as “pure
self-employed”)8 and “hybrid self-employed” who, in addition to income from self-employment,
also receive income from another source. The SEC in IPO makes this distinction until 2000 only.
Individuals who do not receive any income are categorized as having no income. Individuals
with non-zero income from entrepreneurial activity are categorized as pure self-employed or
hybrid self-employed (self-employed individuals with additional income from employment or
pension income). All the other individuals are categorized according to their largest non-zero
income as either employees (total income from employment in the private and public sector),
freelancers (income from “other work”),9 DGAs (income as DGA10), benefit recipients (based on
the sum of all social benefits received,11, pensioners (sum of state and occupational pensions), or,
finally, if all these incomes are zero but IPO indicates that the individual has an income,12 as
other income recipients.
The rightmost column in Table 3.1 shows that the shares of individuals in each cohort who
have spent at least one year in self-employment vary between 17% and 32%, with an overall
average of 26%. This is much larger than the average percentage in self-employment at a given
point in time, which is 11%. The reason is mobility into and out of self-employment. Our analysis
will focus on distinguishing between those who remain in self-employment persistently and those
who only spend short periods in self-employment.
3.2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.2 shows the demographic characteristics of our sample overall and by labour market state.
Even though our sample selection procedure discriminates against emigrants and immigrants,
these groups are still represented fairly well. For the year 2000, CBS Statline reports a share of
82.51% Dutch, 3.43% first generation and 5.18% second generation Western immigrants, and
5.59% first generation and 3.29% second generation non-Western immigrants for all ages. The
only group that is strongly under-represented are second generation non-Western immigrants,
perhaps because our sample excludes cohorts born after 1980 while CBS Statline includes all
individuals.
Freelancers and DGAs are less frequently of non-Western origin than pure and hybrid self-
employed. The self-employed are on average older than employees and are also more frequently
8The income (“profit from business activity”) can also be negative.
9The difference between self-employed and freelancers is made by the Dutch tax authority. Only the former are
recognised as “entrepreneurs” and can benefit from several tax rebates. See online Appendix 3.C.
10We apply a correction in 1992 when we define DGAs using the IPO variable SEC, because DGA income is always
zero in 1992 (for unknown reasons).
11Unemployment benefits (WW and “wachtgeld”) sickness and disability benefits (“ziekte wet”, “arbeidsongeschik-
theid (inkomensverzekering)”, “particuliere verzekering ivm ziektekosten/arbeidsongeschiktheid”), “ANW”, “ABW”,
and other benefits (“IOAW”, “IOAZ”, “Wajong”, etc.). The latter includes both unemployment (“IOAZ”) and disability
(“Wajong”) benefits and mixtures (“IOAW”, ).
12This would e.g. be the case for an individual who only has income from returns on investments.
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No income 47.24 3.76 2.88 5.79 87.23 7.79 4.98 9.68
Employee 41.81 55.32 62.54 36.68 87.37 7.91 4.73 62.19
Pure SE 45.20 66.24 71.53 27.58 90.35 6.12 3.53 5.78
Hybrid SE 45.72 64.00 80.76 33.52 88.23 7.89 3.89 2.65
Freelancer 46.34 13.33 15.18 11.01 90.01 7.33 2.66 1.21
DGA 47.73 77.92 72.94 20.63 91.01 7.30 1.69 1.56
Benefits 47.65 43.08 66.71 54.94 75.50 10.13 14.37 11.47
Pensioner 61.72 51.56 64.70 27.84 87.79 9.40 2.81 5.07
Other 39.43 40.66 67.24 61.36 81.28 10.05 8.66 0.40
Overall 44.45 49.39 57.97 34.15 86.27 8.12 5.61
Note: The statistics are calculated over all individual-year observations for each labour market state
for a total of 1,228,203 observations. Demographic characteristics are taken from IPO 1989–2014.
† Includes singles, divorced and widowed individuals.
male. Freelancers stand out in particular: they tend to be female and most of them can rely on
a partner as the household’s breadwinner (defined as the adult with the highest gross income).
There is less of a gender difference between pure and hybrid self-employed where roughly two
thirds of the observations are for men. Among DGAs, almost three quarters are men. The three
types of self-employed are more frequently than employees the breadwinner of their household
and are less often single.
Figure 3.1 plots the distribution of labour market states over time for all individuals in our
sample between age 24 and 60.13 The graph confirms what we would expect: (female) labour
market participation increases over time: the share of individuals without income declines. The
share of self-employed increases. While the share of freelancers fluctuates somewhat over time,
the shares of the other three self-employment types are all increasing. The total share of self-
employed individuals in the sample rises steadily from approximately 6.6 percent in 1989 to 16.5
percent in 2017.
Figure 3.2 shows the share of self-employed individuals in the sample as a fraction of the
working population (self-employed and employees), by cohort and for all cohorts.14 The decline
in the contribution of older cohorts to the self-employment share is partly by construction, as
individuals older than 60 are not considered for the calculation of the shares. Hence each cohort
13We do not include individuals above age 60 because they, in particular for the older cohorts in our sample, have
the option to choose early retirement.
14As in Figure 3.1 the analysis is limited to individuals between age 24 and 60. The age restriction is more
important here because (early) retirement is not taken up at the same rate by employees and self-employed.
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Figure 3.2: Self-employment share and contributions of cohorts
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fades out over five years. Similarly, the trough in the early 2000s is due to the youngest cohort,
which enters the sample later than that the oldest cohort leaves; in addition, the share of self-
employed is lower among individuals at the beginning of their careers. We have no explanation for
the sharp increase in the self-employment rate in 1996. The plot shows that until the beginning of
the 2000s, all cohorts contribute approximately equally to the self-employment share. Thereafter
we see that the contribution of the younger cohorts 6 – 9 is increasing over time; these cohorts
mainly drive the rise in self-employment.
How do the self-employed differ from individuals in other labour market states? Table 3.3
shows the sample distribution of taxable income at the individual level, and of disposable
household income. To make values comparable, we adjust household income using the CBS
equivalence scales, convert all values to euro and deflate with CPI data from The World Bank
World Development Indicators (base year 2010). Two general observations can be made: First,
women’s taxable income is on average lower than men’s. Second, women’s disposable income
is generally higher than their taxable income while the opposite holds for men. This is as we
would expect considering that the majority is married/living with a partner, and women less often
participate in the labour market and are more likely to work part-time.15 This is also reflected
in the median and the 25th and 75th percentiles of taxable income: Median taxable income for
female employees, self-employed (full-time and hybrid) and DGAs is between 55 and 60% of males
and similar ratios are observed for the quartiles. This can also be observed for pensioners, in line
with the fact that occupational pensions are related to earnings before retirement.
Comparing taxable income of different groups shows that the DGAs earn much more than
employees or other self-employed. This is partially due to the minimum salary requirement for
DGAs imposed by the tax rules. Because it would be fiscally attractive for DGAs to pay themselves
dividends instead of a salary, the tax rules set a minimum salary (“gebruikelijkloonregeling”)
that was 45000 euros in 2017.16 Individuals would generally not incorporate their business if
they could not afford to pay themselves this salary. This is in line with the findings by Levine and
Rubinstein (2017) and Humphries (2016). The other types of self-employed (who are generally not
incorporated), have lower median incomes than employees have. Finally, the differences between
the labour states become smaller at the 75th percentile, showing that the dispersion in income
among the self-employed is larger than among employees.
Closer inspection of the differences in taxable income between men and women shows that
the largest difference is found for freelancers. For female freelancers, the median taxable income
is less than 20% of that of employees, whereas for male freelancers the median income is 72%
that of employees. This stands in stark contrast with hybrid self-employed women, whose median
taxable income is 87% of that of employees and whose third quartile is even higher than that of
female employees. The same holds for men, which makes the hybrid self-employed the second
15The income data presented in Table 3.3 is not adjusted for FTE since our data do not contain information on
hours worked.
16Exceptions exist for new enterprises, part-time workers, or firms that make a structural loss.
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Table 3.3: Taxable individual and disposable household income, wealth and sample share by
gender and labour state
Women Men
Median Q1 Q3 Share (%) Median Q1 Q3 Share (%)
Individual taxable income
No income† 0 0 0 17.91 0 0 0 0.71
Employee 20457 12925 28754 59.03 33142 26253 43312 74.55
Pure SE 10701 2195 24074 4.03 19996 8193 38220 8.07
Hybrid SE 17847 8466 30015 1.91 28833 15672 46116 3.26
Freelancer 3513 1642 8840 2.12 23925 9342 43091 0.32
DGA 31161 18152 49364 0.69 56338 40593 80695 2.52
Benefits 13772 9557 16906 12.35 16570 13338 22803 9.13
Pensioner 20260 9272 31605 1.49 32393 24600 44071 1.11
Other 0 0 10909 0.47 0 0 4346 0.33
Disposable household income
No income 17815 14083 23348 18.71 11302 1395 17606 0.68
Employee 23457 18525 29715 58.61 22944 18084 28998 75.06
Pure SE 25255 17444 36209 3.84 23950 16306 33759 7.83
Hybrid SE 25336 18061 34730 1.78 25066 17977 33551 3.23
Freelancer 20073 15792 26480 2.13 19408 13414 27244 0.31
DGA 35564 25788 48590 0.67 31219 23236 42497 2.36
Benefits 14358 11468 20234 12.25 14275 11281 19606 9.02
Pensioner 23127 17958 30108 1.50 21859 17001 28517 1.13
Other 12684 5443 18966 0.51 8643 3579 16922 0.38
Wealth (in thousands)
No income 74 8 172 10.48 46 1 197 0.65
Employee 40 3 117 65.62 38 2 114 72.57
Pure SE 99 19 234 4.66 89 16 217 9.24
Hybrid SE 72 9 198 2.71 66 6 181 3.80
Freelancer 68 11 158 2.34 28 1 134 0.29
DGA 288 106 619 0.96 218 79 530 3.62
Benefits 2 0 44 11.29 3 0 52 8.76
Pensioner 108 17 252 1.78 107 13 230 1.02
Other 23 1 158 0.16 29 1 180 0.06
Note: All values are in euro and deflated with CPI data from The World Bank World Development Indicators
(base year 2010). Disposable income and wealth are measured at the household level and additionally adjusted
with the CBS equivalence scale. The statistics are calculated over all individual-year observations for each labour
market state for all individuals in the sample aged 24–60. Taxable income is available for all years (563,259 and
549,279 observations for women and men respectively). Disposable household income is only available for the years
1989–2014 (518,086 and 505,583 observations for women and men respectively). Household wealth is available for
2006–2014 (168,138 and 163,067 observations for women and men respectively). No adjustment has been made to
income for FTE.
† While it may seem counter intuitive, individuals with no income may still have (positive) taxable income. That is
because home owners get taxed on a hypothetical income that they could earn if they were to let their homes.
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Table 3.4: Share of individuals (in %) contributing to pension pillars
Women Men
2nd Pillar 3rd Pillar N 2nd Pillar 3rd Pillar N
Employee 67.74 6.51 332831 78.28 16.81 409571
Pure SE 0.00 12.68 22808 0.00 26.12 44584
Hybrid SE 51.08 9.57 10756 57.04 20.88 17971
Freelancer 2.97 1.41 11939 4.90 15.27 1775
DGA 3.88 10.01 3895 2.58 25.32 13845
Benefit recipient 5.62 1.58 69764 7.93 3.87 50196
Pensioner 12.83 3.94 8433 20.73 9.20 6096
Other 0.00 3.19 2791 0.00 3.94 1955
Note: Observations are counted as individuals per year per labour market state. The reported shares and
observations are for all individuals in our sample aged 24–60.
most successful group of self-employed after DGAs. The inter-quartile range of taxable income is
largest for the pure self-employed and for freelancers, indicating large income dispersion in these
groups.
A different picture is found for disposable household income. Adjusted for household size,
the values are very similar across labour states, except for DGAs and freelancers. The higher
taxable income of DGAs and lower income of freelancers are also reflected in their household’s
disposable incomes. Disposable household income is substantially higher than personal income
for women and vice versa for men, indicating that women are less frequently the breadwinner in
the household. This holds in particular for the lower half of the income distribution of freelance,
hybrid and pure self-employed women. Moreover, the dispersion of disposable income is larger for
most self-employment types and while the median values of pure and hybrid self-employed are
relatively close to the median of employees, the third quartile is much larger.
The lower panel of Table 3.3 reports household wealth adjusted for household size. Wealth is
measured net of debts and includes financial wealth, real estate, firm wealth (for non-incorporated
self-employed), substantial interest shares (i.e. firms in which the household owns > 5% - hence
potentially wealth in firms of incorporated self-employed as well as DGAs), and other wealth.
The dispersion of wealth is larger for the self-employed than for employees. Once more, DGAs are
outliers, with much more wealth than any other group of self-employed.17 For all self-employed
except male freelancers, the quartiles of household wealth are higher than those of employees.
Self-employed women have higher median wealth than employees.
Table 3.4 shows the shares of individuals that make a contribution to the second pillar
(occupational pensions) and third pillar (voluntary private pensions). By definition, the pure
17Furthermore, unlike unincorporated individuals, capital in a DGA’s firm does not show up in the household
wealth statistics. Hence the wealth figures for DGA’s are a lower bound.
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self-employed make no contribution to the second pillar. Contributions by pure self-employed
(e.g., voluntary payments to the pension fund of an old employer) are recorded as third pillar
contributions. The same rules also apply to the other self-employed, but as we can see in Table
3.4 both DGAs and freelancers still have a small share of individuals that contribute to a pension
fund – they have an employment contract with an income above the fund’s franchise.
The share with contributions to the second pillar is much larger for hybrid self-employed, as
expected. Still, compared to employees, a larger share of hybrid self-employed is not contributing
to an occupational pension. This is because among the hybrid self-employed, there are more
individuals whose earnings as an employee are below the franchise or work for a company
without occupational pension. For the same reasons, we do not see a 100% share for employees,
particularly for women.
Men are more likely to contribute to either pillar than women. The differences are particularly
large for the third pillar. For example, 25% of male pure self-employed make a contribution to
the third pillar, compared to half as many women. Contributions to the third pillar are more
common among the pure self-employed than for DGAs or hybrid self-employed. The freelancers
are once more the worst performing group among the self-employed, with the largest difference
between genders. While female freelancers make almost no contributions to the 3rd pillar, their
male counterparts still do so in 15% of all cases.
3.3 Labour market trajectories over the life cycle
This section describes the analysis of labour market trajectories. First, we show how self-
employment spells vary across individuals’ working lives. Then we introduce sequence analysis
and explain the optimal matching algorithm with which we calculate so-called edit distances
between all pairs of trajectories. Finally, we explain how clustering can be used as a tool to build
a data-driven classification of labour market trajectories.
3.3.1 Visualisation of employment trajectories
An employment trajectory is an individual’s sequences of labour market states over time. Figure
3.3 shows the distribution of those states over time for the individuals of the 1961–1965 birth
cohort (cohort 6) who are categorised as self-employed in at least one of the 29 years in which we
observe them. The figure shows that the share of individuals who are self-employed at a given
point in time is increasing over time, in accordance with Figures 3.1 and 3.2. In addition, the
share of benefit recipients in this subsample is smaller than in the overall population shown
in Figure 3.1. Furthermore, the shares of all types of self-employed increase but the share
of full-time self-employed increases most. The same patterns are also observed across other
cohorts (not shown), though less pronounced in the oldest cohorts who often had attractive early
retirement options. The graph does not show, however, what kind of labour market careers the
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of labour market states over time of cohort born in 1961-1965 (self-
employed)
self-employed have had or will have. For example, are the individuals that are self-employed
early in their career also self-employed in later years? How much mobility is there into and out of
self-employment? If so, what are the labor market states from which they enter self-employment,
etc.?
One way to answer these questions is to plot all labour market trajectories. Figure 3.4
essentially does that and shows a so-called index plot18 of the trajectories of the same individuals
as in Figure 3.3. The individual’s paths are stacked vertically on top of each other and each path
is a (thin) horizontal line on which each year is coloured according to the individual’s labour
market state in that year.19 The figure conveys two messages. First, only a small share spends the
majority of the 29 years in self-employment. Overall, a quarter of the individuals spend no more
than three years in self-employment, less than half spend more than ten years in self-employment,
and only around one third spend more than half of the 29 years in self-employment.20 Second,
the trajectories vary a lot across individuals and two trajectories of different individuals are
hardly ever exactly the same. We want to know whether this large variation in trajectories can
18Index plots were first introduced by Scherer (2001). We construct all index plots in this paper using the program
SQ (Brzinsky-Fay et al., 2006) in Stata.
19To protect the privacy of the persons in the sample we consciously overplot all our index plots so that zooming in
does not reveal the individual trajectories and individuals cannot be recognised.
20Note that we only use one observation per year, so that short spells or short interruptions of self-employment are
not always accounted for.
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help us to better understand the large variation in income, wealth and pension savings of the
self-employed.
3.3.2 Sequence analysis and optimal matching
In order to have a better picture of how the trajectories differ, we turn to sequence analysis, a
methodology that has been used in sociology for some years to study sequences of social events. It
was first introduced in the field of social sciences by Abbott (1983) and further developed in, e.g.,
Abbott and Forrest (1986); Abbott and Hrycak (1990); Abbott (1995). Sequence analysis takes
a holistic approach, not only taking account of the types of states that individuals experience
over time, but also of their duration. It studies the complete sequence in order to understand
the importance of different patterns that the trajectories may have. As argued by Studer and
Ritschard (2016, p. 481), sequence analysis thus stands in contrast to, e.g., survival or event
history analysis that focus on specific events rather than an overall view off the trajectories.
Sequence analysis compares all sequences pair-wise in order to find sequences that display
similar patterns. In our case, the aim is to group individuals that share a similar history of labour
market states at similar times and in a similar order. The first step is to compute a dissimilarity
measure for all unique sequence pairs. Studer and Ritschard (2016) provide an overview of the
dissimilarity measures that are used in the field. We use the most common measure for discrete
sequences: Optimal Matching (OM).21 OM provides a measure of “edit distance” between each
pair of sequences: Given a pair of sequences, OM computes the least costly way in which one
sequence can be converted into the other one. The operations used for this conversion are (1)
substitutions, (2) deletions, and (3) insertions. Each of these is associated with a cost and the edit
distance is the minimum cost at which the conversion can be achieved.
Consider the hypothetical example given by Table 3.5, which shows four individuals with
different labour market trajectories. For the sake of simplicity, it covers only 8 years and three
labour market states: employment (E), self-employment (S), and not working (N). Let us also
assume unit costs for all operations. For trajectories 1 and 2 the computation is straightforward.
The two trajectories only differ from each other in year 3. Substituting E with N at the third
position in the first trajectory is the fastest manner to transform it into the second. The edit
distance between the second and first trajectories is thus equal to 1. On the other hand, trajec-
tories 2 and 3 only coincide in the last four years. Relying on substitution only would require
four substitutions, resulting in a total cost of 4. Alternatively, using also insertion and deletion,
we can achieve the same transformation with fewer steps. The solution with the fewest steps
involves deleting the first period in trajectory 3, shifting the whole sequence one position to the
left. Next the N, which is now in first position, is substituted with an E. Finally, an S is inserted
in the seventh position. This gives an edit cost of 3 between trajectories 2 and 3.
21OM was originally developed in computer science and in biology. We use the package SADI in Stata (Halpin,
2017).
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Figure 3.4: Index plot of cohort born in 1961-1965 (self-employed)
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Table 3.5: Hypothetical labour market trajectories
Year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Trajectory 1: E E E S S S S E
Trajectory 2: E E N S S S S E
Trajectory 3: S N E N S S S E
Trajectory 4: S S S S E E E E
Our example used unit costs for all operations. It is easy to see that the optimal outcome
and the distances between trajectories will change if costs are chosen differently. This raises
the issue how the costs for the operations should be defined. A popular solution is to derive
the substitution costs from observed transition rates. Low costs are then assigned to frequently
observed transitions, and higher costs to rare transitions. Studer and Ritschard (2016) point out,
however, that observed transition rates are generally low and the resulting substitution costs are
close to 2. Because of this, the approach does not produce results that differ much from those
obtained with fixed state-independent costs.
There is less discussion on the setting of insertion and deletion, or “indel” costs in the
literature.22 Most applications use the same value for insertion and deletion and the only
choice therefore concerns the value that should be assigned to indel versus substitution costs.
To understand this, consider the last of the example trajectories in Table 3.5. If we compare
trajectories 1 and 4 we can see that both individuals spend half of their time in self-employment
and the rest in employment. The shortest way to transform trajectory 4 into trajectory 1 involves
six steps: either six substitutions or three deletions at the end of trajectory 4 together with
three insertions at the beginning. If substitution and indel costs are the same, the algorithm is
indifferent between the two. If insertion and deletion however are cheaper than substitution,
indel operations will be the preferred way to make these two trajectories alike, etc. Thus as
indel operations become cheaper compared to substitutions, OM will place less importance on
the timing and more on the sequencing of events. Moreover, note that as soon as indel costs are
less than half of substitution costs, any substitution is more costly than two indel operations
achieving the same result.
Based on these considerations we decided to set substitution costs equal to 2 for all labour
market state transitions, and we set the indel costs equal to 1.5. We then apply OM separately to
each cohort, where before OM, we split each cohort into two samples separating those individuals
that are at least one year self-employed from those that are never self-employed. The latter group
will be used as a control group to which we compare the self-employed.23
22Hollister (2009) offers a good discussion of indel costs. However, her proposed solution (localised OM) has its own
problems as discussed by Studer and Ritschard (2016).
23We set the indel costs equal to 1 for the non-self-employed sub-sample. We choose the lower cost because we care
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3.3.3 Clusters of self-employment
The result of OM is a matrix containing all pairwise distances. The distance measures can be
used to group all individuals into clusters using machine learning; see, e.g., Zacher et al. (2012),
Madero-Cabib and Fasang (2016), Tophoven and Tisch (2016), Visser (2018), Munnell et al. (2019),
or Humphries (2016). We follow this approach and use Ward’s Method (Ward, 1963) to cluster the
trajectories.24
Ward’s Method produces a tree of potential groupings. In practice, the researcher has to
choose how many clusters to use. This is not a straightforward decision – no “hard” statistical
criteria exist and different criteria often lead to different numbers of clusters. Nevertheless,
the applications in the literature show that clustering has its merits. In our application, it
provides a tool to separate individuals with long periods in self-employment from those with
short self-employment spells and helps to automatically distinguish groups that spend their
time in different types of self-employment. We will choose cluster solutions that match ex-ante
expectations of self-employment types. For example, we expect different clusters for long-term
(hybrid) self-employed, freelance workers, and DGAs.
As with OM we apply the clustering algorithm to each cohort separately. Ward’s Method does
not split up all cohorts in the same manner. If we would choose the number of clusters based
upon popular criteria, we typically would get 5 or 6 clusters according to the Calinski-Harabasz
index, and 6 to 8 according to the Average Silhouette Width (see Studer (2013) for a discussion
of several measures). These clusters would not be the same across cohorts. Instead of strictly
following the criteria, we choose a clustering that is harmonized across cohorts. We start with a
rather fine partitioning into twelve groups for each cohort (Ward’s solution). This is the smallest
partitioning that gives a meaningful grouping. Based on the Ward solution, we then build seven
clusters of self-employment trajectories. As we will show below, this allows for a sufficient level of
distinction between the different clusters while maintaining parsimony and manageability. We
will use the clustering of the self-employed in cohort 6 as an example to illustrate this.25
Figure 3.5 presents the same trajectories as shown in Figure 3.4, but now broken down
into Ward’s twelve groups. Several groups mainly contain one type of self-employed: Group 4
is dominated by hybrid self-employment, groups 8 and 9 are DGAs, and groups 11 and 12 are
dominated by pure self-employment. Similarly, group 5 are individuals whose main income in
most years are social benefits. We also see that timing of sequences matters: group 3 consists of
individuals that start as self-employed and then switch to employment later, whereas groups 6
and 7 do the opposite. Finally, groups 1, 2 and 10 consist of more volatile trajectories which have
less about the timing of e.g. unemployment spells and more about their length.
24Ward’s Method is a hierarchical agglomerative method. The algorithm starts by taking each sequence as its own
cluster. It then identifies which two clusters can be merged with the smallest increase in variance within clusters.
This is repeated until all sequences are merged into one large group. See Chapter 3 in Aldenderfer and Blashfield
(1984) for details and comparison to other algorithms.
25The mapping for each cohort from Ward’s twelve groups solution to our seven clusters is given in online Appendix
4.C.
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Figure 3.5: Index plot by clusters of cohort born in 1961-1965 (self-employed)
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short self-employment spells.
This leads to seven larger clusters involving self-employment that we construct from the 12
Ward groups (denoted in “[ ]”):
1. Weak labour market attachment / freelancer [1, 2] – In the older cohorts this cluster
predominantly consists of individuals that spend a large share of their trajectory without
any income. In younger cohorts this is less the case and most trajectories either start or
end with a long spell without income. The predominant self-employment type observed in
these trajectories is freelancer.
2. Benefit recipients [5] – This cluster contains the individuals who receive some type of benefit
for most of the observed period.
3. Mostly employed with short SE spells [3, 10] – Almost no cohorts have a distinct cluster of
individuals that start as self-employed and then switch to employment. We therefore also
include these individuals in the cluster with short spells.
4. Employees that switch to SE later on [6, 7] – We do not differentiate between hybrid and
(full-time) self-employed in this cluster.
5. Always pure SE [11, 12] – In particular in the younger cohorts (observed from age 30
or younger) this also includes trajectories where few of the initial years are spent in
employment.
6. Always hybrid SE [4] – This cluster is defined similarly to the preceding cluster but for
hybrid self-employed.
7. DGAs [8, 9] – For DGAs we do not differentiate with respect to the timing. Most DGAs
either spend the whole trajectory in this state or the second half. Since DGAs are a small
(and special) group, we merge both types into one cluster.
For the “control group” of individuals who are never self-employed, we follow a similar strategy.
Their clusters are built on the six groups solution of Ward’s Method.26 We retain four main
clusters: 8) Weak labour market attachment (no SE); 9) Benefit recipient (no SE), 10) Employee
with long spells as benefit recipient and 11) Employee (including short spells as benefit recipient).
For cohorts 1–4 we also include a separate cluster 12) Pensioner, which consists of individuals
that are pensioners for most of the years that we observe them.
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Table 3.6: Demographic characteristics across clusters in sample
in %
Cluster Age Men Bread-
winner





1 45.10 6.12 12.06 12.33 89.32 6.98 3.70 3.97
2 45.89 43.09 60.66 45.53 77.50 9.37 13.12 1.28
3 42.99 47.59 54.98 31.95 86.47 9.25 4.28 8.55
4 41.38 59.81 69.12 39.52 89.13 6.03 4.84 3.41
5 44.33 67.26 69.58 31.65 89.86 6.49 3.65 5.65
6 43.87 58.12 70.49 31.76 88.53 7.96 3.51 1.48
7 44.48 78.07 74.27 27.06 90.85 7.39 1.77 2.68
without self-employment
8 50.02 2.27 7.32 9.71 86.80 8.31 4.89 7.54
9 46.42 38.65 63.65 53.01 74.84 9.99 15.17 8.32
10 46.27 41.87 55.63 37.08 83.13 8.67 8.20 9.45
11 43.12 59.77 66.20 36.53 87.83 7.84 4.33 47.00
12 55.60 43.80 70.36 39.27 85.27 11.91 2.82 0.68
Overall 44.45 49.39 57.97 34.15 86.27 8.12 5.61
Note: The statistics are calculated over all 1,228,203 individual-year observations for each cluster.
† Includes singles, divorced and widowed individuals.
3.4 Differences among self-employment clusters
In this section we compare demographic characteristics, income and wealth of individuals across
the clusters identified in Section 4.3. Table 3.6 shows the demographic characteristics across
the twelve clusters involving (1-7) and not involving (8-12) self-employment. The patterns are
largely similar to those for the labour market states shown in Table ??. For example, both clusters
with weak labour market attachment (clusters 1 and 8) have a high proportion of women who
frequently also have a partner that acts as the main income earner in their household. Similarly,
women are also the majority (around 60%) in the clusters of benefit recipients (clusters 2 and 9).
In the other self-employment clusters, the gender imbalance is less pronounced than in Table ??.
It is slightly in favour of women in the cluster of individuals with short self-employment spells
(3), whereas the other self-employment clusters contain more men than women. In particular,
the DGA cluster (7) remains predominantly male (around 80%).For late switchers (4) and hybrid
self-employed (6) the share of men is lower in Table 3.6 than in Table ??. This can be explained
26The Ward’s four groups solution already leads to meaningful clusters for cohorts 6 and 8. To better account for
individuals who retire early in cohorts 1-4, we nevertheless use a finer break down.
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Figure 3.6: Self-employment share and contributions of clusters
by the distribution of the length of self-employment spells.27 Men generally spend more time in
self-employment than women and hence make up a larger share of the self-employed observations
in Table ??. For similar reasons we see a lower share of breadwinners in clusters 4–7, reflected in
the relatively low share of breadwinners among individuals with short SE spells.
We find similar differences for marital status. Individuals in clusters 1 and 8 are mostly
married. For immigration status, there is no significant difference across clusters, and the share
of both western and non-western immigrants (first and second generation) is slightly larger in
the low attachment and benefit recipient clusters.
Average age is similar across clusters by construction, as all individuals are observed for a
similar period in their lives. Still, the increase of self-employment in younger cohorts is reflected
in a lower average age for the self-employment clusters (3–7). Furthermore we see the increase in
labour market participation among women in younger cohorts reflected in a higher average age
of cluster 1 in comparison to cluster 8. In the latter cluster, most individuals do not participate in
the labour market and that cluster’s sample share is decreasing over cohorts.
Self-employment over time
Figure 3.6 shows the same overall self-employment shares as Figure 3.2 and adds the contribu-
tions that different clusters make to the self-employment rate. Only about half of the share is
27We consider any sequence of consecutive years in any of the four types of self-employment as a spell. See Table
3.A.1 in Appendix 3.A for a detailed overview.
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due to the clusters in which individuals spend most of their working years in self-employment
(hybrid and pure self-employed and DGAs).The share of individuals who become self-employed
later in their career (cluster 4) is growing substantially over time, to approximately a quarter of
the self-employment share in recent years. Finally, a constant share of approximately three to
five percentage points is always attributed to the clusters of individuals that do not remain in
self-employment (clusters 1–3). These findings are similar if we look at the cohorts separately
(details available upon request).
Table 3.A.1 in Appendix 3.A shows that in most clusters, around three out of four individuals
have only one self-employment spell, while roughly one in five have two. The exception is the
cluster with weak labour market attachment where a larger share has more spells.In clusters 1,
2 and 3 the median spell length is only 2 to 3 years, whereas individuals in the other clusters
have a median spell length of at least 7 years. For pure and hybrid self-employed, the top 25%
spend almost all of the observed period in self-employment. The distribution of self-employment
spell lengths hardly changes across cohorts.28
Income
The upper and middle sections of Table 3.7 show individual taxable income and disposable
household income (adjusted for household size) by gender and cluster. Comparing the results to
Table ?? we see that most of the results for the clusters are similar to those for the corresponding
labour market status. We still find that self-employment is different for men and women. Women
who switch to self-employment after a career as an employee have higher incomes than other self-
employed clusters, with the exception of DGAs. Furthermore, women with short self-employment
spells also do relatively well in terms of income. The same holds for men where this is in fact the
best earning cluster.
Disposable income for the household gives smaller differences among clusters. For women the
starkest contrast is between individuals with short self-employment spells and the other groups.
For men, both pure and hybrid self-employed have larger interquartile ranges than switchers
and individuals with short spells.
To better understand the relation between our clusters and income, we estimate the following
model:
(3.1) yit =β0 + X ′itβx +L′itβl +W ′iβc +C′iγ+T ′δ+εit
Here Yit is the income variable of interest.29 X it is a vector with characteristics of individual i
28See Table 3.A.2 in Appendix 3.A for spell lengths across cohorts.
29As a robustness check we also use taxable income in box 1 (income from work and housing) as the dependent
variable. Data on taxable income by source is available since 2001. Overall, the results obtained for this specification
are very similar to those for total taxable income. Considering that the large majority have very little taxable income
in box 2 (income from substantial business interest) or 3 (income from savings and investments), this is not surprising.
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Table 3.7: Taxable individual and disposable household income, wealth and sample share (%) by
gender and cluster
Women Men
Median Q1 Q3 (%) Median Q1 Q3 (%)
Taxable individual income
Weak LM attach. (SE) 1141 0 8584 7.39 16631 939 31880 0.51
Benefit recipient (SE) 12483 5077 17226 1.44 16729 10824 26467 1.07
Short SE spells 15677 6320 25832 9.13 32622 23061 47380 8.49
Employee to SE 19032 7847 30509 2.84 29333 19381 42109 4.31
Pure SE 11219 1890 23401 3.66 20731 9249 34621 7.64
Hybrid SE 16450 6338 26802 1.26 28899 16177 45410 1.72
DGA 26444 12857 44002 1.16 50669 33345 74614 4.28
Weak LM attach. 0 0 0 13.07 759 0 18402 0.34
Benefit recipient 14045 9142 18232 9.91 18376 13729 25069 6.17
Long benefit rec. 14945 7575 22412 10.97 27625 20199 35272 7.68
Employee 21582 14253 29846 38.58 33405 26522 43299 57.31
Pensioner 21092 10535 31060 0.59 33879 26184 41556 0.47
Disposable household income
Weak LM attach. (SE) 19033 14737 25157 7.45 18004 11953 24937 0.50
Benefit recipient (SE) 16560 12295 22428 1.45 15488 11485 22242 1.08
Short SE spells 22496 16947 29572 9.08 23251 17446 30770 8.42
Employee to SE 24604 17667 33326 2.78 22791 16929 30515 4.25
Pure SE 23559 16195 33522 3.67 23074 15848 31791 7.65
Hybrid SE 24132 17468 32340 1.25 24325 17298 32523 1.72
DGA 33470 23234 46698 1.17 30053 22136 41097 4.28
Weak LM attach. 19114 14930 24874 13.58 15221 10733 21973 0.34
Benefit recipient 15943 12112 22024 9.93 15037 11676 20211 6.23
Long benefit rec. 20039 15035 26552 11.00 19714 15130 25199 7.85
Employee 23500 18599 29695 37.99 23009 18199 28928 57.16
Pensioner 23193 18389 30735 0.64 21420 17354 26831 0.52
Household wealth (in thousands)
Weak LM attach. (SE) 69 12 156 6.96 27 0 118 0.50
Benefit recipient (SE) 5 0 95 1.39 1 0 32 0.93
Short SE spells 58 5 150 9.71 39 1 129 8.90
Employee to SE 52 6 163 3.25 47 3 127 4.88
Pure SE 93 15 233 3.71 95 15 240 7.73
Hybrid SE 92 8 240 1.40 82 7 227 1.72
DGA 267 86 593 1.12 192 68 474 4.31
Weak LM attach. 65 5 156 8.57 44 1 138 0.28
Benefit recipient 3 0 58 8.98 2 0 25 5.12
Long benefit rec. 25 1 107 10.81 17 1 97 6.49
Employee 39 3 114 43.99 40 2 115 59.05
Pensioner 147 20 270 0.12 89 7 158 0.09
Note: All values are in euro and deflated (WDI CPI, base year 2010). Disposable income and wealth are
adjusted for household size (CBS equivalence scale). The statistics are calculated over all individual-year
observations by cluster for all individuals in the sample aged 24–60. Taxable income is available for all years,
disposable household income for the years 1989–2014, and household wealth for 2006–2014. No adjustment
has been made to income for FTE. The sample sizes are the same as in Table 3.3.
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in period t such as age and its square, civil status and country of origin controls,30 as well as
dummy variables for whether the individual is their household’s main income earner, whether
self-employed individuals are solo self-employed (SSE).31
Table 3.8: Panel regression – taxable income
taxable income (in thousands)
women men
LM state: pure SE -1.84 -1.81 -13.27*** -12.64***
(1.212) (1.225) (1.274) (1.265)
hybrid SE 1.28 1.29 -5.94*** -6.05***
(1.121) (1.123) (1.600) (1.567)
freelancer -1.58 -0.90 0.42 1.12
(1.104) (1.108) (2.354) (2.354)
DGA 10.61*** 9.28*** 14.86*** 11.09***
(1.660) (1.753) (2.119) (2.137)
cluster: weak LM attach. (SE) -9.18*** -10.49***
(0.198) (1.399)
benefit recipient (SE) -6.85*** -8.54***
(0.316) (0.735)
short SE spells -2.66*** 3.89***
(0.272) (0.854)
employee to SE -0.02 1.11
(0.421) (0.636)
pure SE -2.28*** -4.64***
(0.492) (0.614)




is SSE -6.39*** -6.37*** -6.51*** -6.49***
(1.099) (1.099) (1.605) (1.597)
unknown SSE status -3.51*** -3.59*** 1.28 0.92
(1.053) (1.056) (1.660) (1.664)
breadwinner 5.36*** 5.31*** 4.68*** 4.55***
30We take singles as the base category and include indicators for married, widowed and divorced individuals.
The base category for the country of origin variable is native Dutch (both parents born in the Netherlands); we also
distinguish first and second generation immigrants of Western and non-Western origin.
31The SSE information is not available for all years. We also include a dummy variable that captures the cases
where the SSE status is unknown.
90
3.4. DIFFERENCES AMONG SELF-EMPLOYMENT CLUSTERS
Table 3.8: Panel regression – taxable income (continued)
taxable income (in thousands)
women men
(0.134) (0.134) (0.171) (0.171)
main income source: profit -0.45** -0.52*** 6.29*** 6.21***
(0.156) (0.156) (0.627) (0.622)
freelancer -0.79 -0.95 -7.74*** -8.73***
(1.078) (1.096) (2.081) (2.107)
constant 5.99* 2.14 -22.11*** -26.24***
(2.458) (2.335) (4.675) (4.577)
Non-SE clusters X X
Observations 576376 576376 563348 563348
Individuals 25965 25965 25441 25441
σu 8.159 8.118 18.873 18.819
σe 11.200 11.200 34.411 34.411
R2 within 0.205 0.206 0.068 0.069
R2 overall 0.299 0.327 0.118 0.129
R2 between 0.451 0.472 0.232 0.260
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Regression including year and cohort fixed effects, and controlling for individual’s demographic charac-
teristics, non-self-employed labour market states, and other main income sources.
Table 3.9: Panel regression – disposable household income
disposable household income (in thousands)
women men
LM state: pure SE 3.18*** 3.14*** 0.11 0.26
(0.791) (0.794) (0.609) (0.605)
hybrid SE 4.18*** 4.12*** 1.95** 1.87**
(0.766) (0.763) (0.683) (0.664)
freelancer 1.18 1.42* -1.25 -0.95
(0.724) (0.724) (1.029) (1.029)
DGA 7.52*** 6.17*** 4.98*** 3.35***
(1.022) (1.042) (0.742) (0.788)
cluster: weak LM attach. (SE) -3.02*** -4.15***
(0.215) (0.828)
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Table 3.9: Panel regression – disposable household income (continued)
disposable household income (in thousands)
women men
benefit recipient (SE) -4.25*** -4.13***
(0.323) (0.357)
short SE spells -0.59** 1.07***
(0.197) (0.270)
employee to SE 0.99** 0.50
(0.335) (0.270)
pure SE -0.80* -1.38***
(0.355) (0.297)




is SSE -3.58*** -3.57*** -3.09*** -3.06***
(0.732) (0.731) (0.550) (0.547)
unknown SSE status -3.56*** -3.62*** -1.12 -1.28*
(0.702) (0.701) (0.632) (0.636)
breadwinner -5.13*** -5.14*** -4.75*** -4.80***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.101) (0.100)
main income source: profit 3.53*** 3.49*** 3.65*** 3.60***
(0.220) (0.221) (0.251) (0.250)
freelancer 0.17 -0.00 -1.06 -1.47
(0.643) (0.651) (1.015) (1.024)
constant 27.09*** 25.80*** 23.32*** 21.54***
(1.861) (1.811) (1.996) (1.953)
Non-SE clusters X X
Observations 577212 577212 564003 564003
Individuals 25965 25965 25441 25441
σu 7.182 7.164 7.576 7.556
σe 10.642 10.642 14.332 14.332
R2 within 0.142 0.142 0.080 0.081
R2 overall 0.178 0.191 0.109 0.119
R2 between 0.248 0.274 0.191 0.221
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Regression including year and cohort fixed effects, and controlling for individual’s demographic charac-
teristics, non-self-employed labour market states, and other main income sources.
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Finally, we include dummy variables indicating the household’s main income source in each
period. These include income as entrepreneur (profit) and income from “other work” (freelancers),
as well as wage income (as base category), no income, benefits, pension, asset income, and other.
L it is a set of labour market state dummies, while Wi controls for the clusters. The coefficients
of the labour market states give the direct (current) impact, whereas the cluster coefficients say
how income varies with different labour market careers, keeping current labour market state
(and demographics etc.) constant. We take employees as the base category for labour market state,
cluster, and main income source. Results should therefore be interpreted relative to employees.
Ci and T capture cohort and year fixed effects, respectively.
As a baseline, we first estimate equation (3.1) without the cluster information. For both
income measures, the year effects first increase over time and then decrease, returning to the
2006 levels in the last few years of IPO. For taxable income of males, the younger cohorts (5,
6, 7, 9) do significantly better than the older cohorts (particularly reference cohort 4). On the
other hand, disposable household income is higher for cohorts 2 and 3, suggesting that older
individuals have around 700–1000 euros more, ceteris paribus.
Table 3.8 shows the other regression results for men and women with taxable income as the
dependent variable.32 The results for disposable household income are shown in Table 3.9.
For all specifications, the cluster dummies are jointly significant. Furthermore, the estimates
for the other coefficients (e.g. the effects of current labour market status) do not change much.
DGAs have significant and positive coefficients for their cluster as well as their labour market
state in all specifications. That is, individuals in the DGA cluster earn more, ceteris paribus, than
other employees, even if they are not currently self-employed, and earn even more once they
become self-employed. This is in line with the result on incorporated individuals in Humphries
(2016). Similarly, for the clusters with weak labour market attachment or benefit recipients, we
find large negative coefficients.
The picture is less clear for other self-employed clusters. For example, we find negative cluster
effects for the pure self-employed (larger in absolute terms for men), but the direct effects of
the labour market states differ by gender and income measure: While there is no significant
effect on women’s taxable income, we find a large negative effect for men. Vice versa, we find no
significant effect on men’s disposable household income but a strong positive effect for women,
which dominates the negative cluster effect.
Hybrid self-employed generally have insignificant cluster coefficients. We find positive direct
effects of hybrid self-employment for both genders on disposable household income, but a negative
direct effect on men’s taxable income. Similarly, we find no significant cluster effect for individuals
that become self-employed later in their career except in the disposable income regression for
32Because of the large number of controls, we only present a subset of the coefficients. The coefficients for other
labour market states and cluster variables are almost all statistically significant at the 0.001%-confidence level with
expected (negative) signs; complete results are available upon request.
93
CHAPTER 3. LABOUR MARKET TRAJECTORIES OF THE SELF-EMPLOYED
women where the effect is positive. This cluster effect is small compared to the direct effects we
estimate.
Finally, we find opposite signs for the cluster with short self-employment spells for both
income measures. Women in this cluster earn less than employees while men earn more. In
periods where men are self-employed, this will generally mean that they earn a lower taxable
income, as the cluster effect is smaller than the direct effect.
On average, self-employed individuals earn less in terms of individual taxable income, but
with the exception of freelancers, they have a slightly larger disposable household income. Since
the difference between taxable and disposable income of employees includes pension contributions,
the higher disposable income of self-employed individuals may not mean they are better off if
they do not save for their pension. Furthermore, solo self-employment has a large significantly
negative coefficient.
Wealth
The lower panel of Table 3.7 reports household wealth adjusted for household size by cluster. As
for the values by labour market status, the clusters with the self-employed have higher wealth at
each quartile. Wealth still has high variation within clusters, as shown by the large inter-quartile
ranges. Median household wealth of individuals with short SE spells or with a switch from
employment to self-employment later in their career, is much lower than median wealth of pure
and hybrid self-employed, for both men and women. Overall, differences across clusters are larger
for the higher quartiles than for the first quartile. Household wealth of women in a given cluster
is generally higher than that of men, probably because of the partner’s income.
We estimate equation (3.1) with household wealth as the dependent variable, adding an
additional control variable based on the standard industrial classification that is available for
the self-employed starting from 2005: a dummy variable with value one for individuals active in
the agricultural, forestry, or fishery sector. This aims at identifying farmers whose main wealth
component often is their land. Table 3.10 shows the results.33
We find negative year effects starting around 2009/2010, which can be attributed to housing
wealth – There are no significant year effects in the regression that excludes owner-occupied
housing from wealth. Interestingly, we do not find any significant cohort effects on household
wealth. This stands in contrast to Mastrogiacomo et al. (2016) who suggest that younger cohorts
are less wealthy. While our regression sample excludes the oldest two cohorts due to data
availability, we would have expected cohort effects for, e.g., cohort 3 and 4.
33As a robustness check, we also split wealth into wealth in owner-occupied housing and wealth without owner-
occupied housing. The results are largely similar to those for total household wealth. These regressions also reveal
that differences between self-employed clusters and employees are higher for non-housing wealth than for housing
wealth (details available upon request).
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Table 3.10: Panel regression – household wealth
household wealth (in thousands)
women men
LM state: pure SE 78.73*** 69.88*** 62.32*** 42.57***
(16.862) (17.222) (8.308) (8.327)
hybrid SE 72.46*** 66.00*** 44.73*** 30.05***
(17.759) (17.926) (8.641) (8.569)
freelancer 57.83*** 53.92*** 21.20 6.02
(15.564) (15.547) (17.625) (17.651)
DGA 248.38*** 188.13** 156.72*** 105.26***
(63.751) (60.112) (16.441) (15.060)
cluster: weak LM attach. (SE) 14.50 25.82
(8.672) (20.602)
benefit recipient (SE) -38.08*** -31.85***
(10.466) (8.220)
short SE spells 18.45** 37.28**
(5.791) (11.954)
employee to SE 25.94* 16.26*
(10.589) (7.362)
pure SE 42.41*** 84.93***
(12.457) (7.924)




is SSE -52.67*** -50.13** -19.20 -14.41
(15.867) (15.736) (10.865) (10.711)
unknown SSE status -52.22** -52.49** -41.33*** -40.51***
(19.979) (19.775) (11.563) (11.626)
breadwinner -4.25 -4.01 -5.97* -5.82*
(2.698) (2.700) (2.564) (2.558)
main income source: profit 5.63 4.73 -0.20 -2.56
(3.699) (3.699) (6.702) (6.667)
freelancer 19.45* 18.11 -4.36 -4.88
(9.360) (9.501) (15.257) (15.356)
constant 182.10 195.62 34.23 -2.53
(162.372) (165.986) (79.195) (77.596)
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Table 3.10: Panel regression – household wealth (continued)
household wealth (in thousands)
women men
Non-SE clusters X X
Observations 168055 168055 162981 162981
Individuals 21186 21186 20621 20621
σu 484.498 484.428 279.246 279.119
σe 220.149 220.149 151.313 151.313
R2 within 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.008
R2 overall 0.039 0.050 0.085 0.103
R2 between 0.044 0.062 0.099 0.123
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Regression including year and cohort fixed effects, and controlling for individual’s demographic characteris-
tics, agricultural sector, non-self-employed labour market states, and other main income sources.
As for income, we find that the cluster dummies are jointly significant. Unlike for income
however, we find almost no differences between genders in signs and significance. All self-
employed clusters except the first two have significant and positive coefficients. Current self-
employment labour market states also have significantly positive coefficients, except freelancers
for men. These direct effects have a clear ranking – DGAs have the highest household wealth
and hybrid self-employed the lowest. The pattern of the cluster effects is clearer than for income:
For both genders, pure and hybrid self-employed clusters have coefficients that are around twice
as large as those of short self-employment spells or late switchers.
Compared to women, self-employed men seem to be in a better financial position. The
magnitude of the coefficients for males who are always self-employed is around twice that of
females. The results from the wealth regression therefore suggest that men who are always
self-employed tend to accumulate more wealth than employees, and that this may partially
offset shortages in their pension accumulation. The questions that remain are whether the
approximately one hundred thousand euro extra that we find for them is sufficient to bridge the
gap in pension accumulation, and how the other clusters fare with less wealth.
3.5 Pensions of the self-employed
In this section we analyse the pension accumulation of the self-employed, considering pension
investments in the second pillar (mandatory occupational pensions) and the third pillar (voluntary
private pensions). We do not consider the first pillar as our sample is restricted to individuals
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Table 3.11: Percentage contributing to second and third pension pillar
Women Men
2nd Pillar 3rd Pillar N 2nd Pillar 3rd Pillar N
Weak LM attach. (SE) 13.14 0.95 41698 25.17 7.49 2805
Benefit recipient (SE) 13.83 2.02 8120 18.40 8.03 5892
Short SE spells 49.61 5.94 51543 67.09 17.53 46710
Employee to SE 44.91 8.69 16007 52.41 18.32 23745
Pure SE 8.59 11.24 20739 10.55 22.85 42192
Hybrid SE 39.13 6.47 7136 48.82 20.23 9496
DGA 21.89 9.94 6561 25.46 25.02 23525
Low LM attach. 5.13 0.25 73707 12.25 3.01 1861
Benefit recipient 18.18 1.76 55894 20.86 3.63 33943
Long benefit rec. 42.14 3.91 61851 53.57 10.97 42238
Employee 69.32 7.10 217481 77.96 17.07 314903
Pensioner 9.88 5.60 3340 17.77 9.52 2605
Note: Observations are counted as individuals per year per cluster. The reported shares and observations are
for all individuals in our sample aged 24–60.
who spend (almost) their complete working life in the Netherlands and therefore receive the full
public pension.
Table 3.11 shows the share of individuals who make contributions to the second and third
pillar in a given year, by gender and cluster. Women contribute less often than men in the same
cluster, in line with Table 3.4. The cluster of DGAs contributes more often than what Table 3.4
would suggest. Approximately half of the DGA cluster spends the first half of their career as
employees and accumulate an occupational pension during that time (Table 3.4), but they do not
pay occupational pension premiums when they are DGA (Table 3.4). Self-employed individuals in
the cluster with weak labour market attachment and those who are benefit recipients during
most of their working life are comparable to their non-self-employed counterparts, though self-
employed men in these groups prepare somewhat better for retirement through the third pillar.
For men, the difference between shares of the short self-employment spells cluster and the cluster
of employees is what we would expect given the median length of their self-employment spells.34
For women the gap of approximately 20 percentage points is larger than expected. Neither men
nor women bridge the gap in the second pillar by participating in the third pillar – Their 3rd
pillar participation does not differ from that of employees. The same applies to the cluster that
becomes self-employed later in their career, who have an even larger participation gap in the
second pillar. A similar result holds for the clusters of pure and hybrid self-employed. Men in
these clusters participate in the third pillar more often, but these differences are small compared
34As a rough calculation we would expect a gap of around 4.5 percentage points per year in self-employment, since
we have approximately 22 years of observations per individual on average.
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to the differences in second pillar participation. For women, if they cannot count on a partner’s
pension, the outlook is even bleaker, considering that their third pillar participation is very low.
The administrative data on pension participation (“pensioendeelnemingen”) contain infor-
mation on second pillar entitlements. It covers the years 2005–2014 and is based on an annual
survey among a representative sample of pension funds. Not all these funds are present in every
year due to non-response. Because the data do not cover all pension funds we do not know whether
an individual for whom we do not observe a pension account never participated or whether their
pension fund is not in the sample. Moreover, if someone has more than one pension fund, the
observed entitlement may not be their total entitlement. Moreover, due to the fluctuations in
sampled pension funds across years, the time series of each individual gives excessive noise,
preventing the use of panel data models.
To account for these data issues, we proceed as follows. We first add up the pension enti-
tlements over all observed funds for each individual within a year. We then deflate monetary
values and take the median by individual across all years. Overall, this gives pension information
for about half of the individuals in our sample. Table 3.12 reports sample statistics by cluster
and gender for three variables.35 The first is pension contribution years, converted to full-time
equivalents. The second variable is the pension annuity to which individuals are entitled given
their accumulated pension rights at the time of reporting (calculated by the pension funds). Third,
the current capital entitlement is reported (also based on pension funds’ calculations).
Note that all three variables refer to pension rights accumulated at the time of the survey,
which is, for most individuals, quite a long time before retirement. Pension accumulation between
the survey date and retirement will most likely be lower for self-employment clusters than for
employees, so that the ultimate gaps will be larger than those considered here.
Table 3.12 shows the same picture for all three variables. Employees have much higher
medians than any of the self-employed clusters and women almost always have lower values
than men. The two self-employed clusters with weak ties to the labour market are comparable
to their non-self-employed counterparts. For all other self-employed clusters we find large gaps
in comparison with the employees’ values, particularly for men. For the cluster with short self-
employment spells, the gap in contribution years corresponds approximately to the median
self-employment spell length for women. For men the gap is much larger, in particular for the
third quartile. The pure self-employed, who by definition spend at best a few years in employment,
have almost no pension entitlements and will need to rely on a third pillar annuity or on other
private wealth.
Table 3.13 reports the results of a regression that shows the ceteris paribus associations
between the pension accrual variables and the clusters, similarly to the income and wealth
regressions. We use the same demographic characteristics as in the income regressions and take
their values from the last year in which we have information on an individual’s second pillar
35Since we exclude individuals older than 60, cohorts 1 and 2 are not included.
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Table 3.12: Occupational pension entitlements
Women Men
Median Q1 Q3 (%) Median Q1 Q3 (%)
Pension contribution years
Weak LM attach. (SE) 2.40 0.88 5.40 5.23 5.25 1.31 9.62 0.41
Benefit recipient (SE) 2.50 0.96 7.02 1.22 4.66 1.69 9.13 0.84
Short SE spells 6.25 2.74 10.62 10.88 8.65 3.17 17.78 8.87
Employee to SE 6.60 2.92 11.90 3.32 9.47 3.74 17.13 4.62
Pure SE 2.55 0.94 5.80 2.10 4.98 1.77 10.00 4.80
Hybrid SE 4.87 2.11 9.00 1.48 7.23 2.75 16.80 1.56
DGA 4.57 1.49 10.63 0.85 6.86 2.25 14.64 3.23
Weak LM attach. 2.80 1.00 5.75 4.76 5.44 2.53 16.58 0.19
Benefit recipient 5.13 1.60 11.38 7.39 7.73 1.86 19.85 4.43
Long benefit rec. 6.70 2.90 12.36 11.66 10.84 3.33 23.44 7.43
Employee 9.95 5.60 15.40 50.73 14.42 5.05 27.82 63.20
Pensioner 18.43 8.17 27.91 0.39 34.99 29.84 38.25 0.42
Pension annuity (in thousands)
Weak LM attach. (SE) 0.31 0.09 1.07 5.33 0.84 0.17 3.96 0.42
Benefit recipient (SE) 0.40 0.10 1.74 1.27 0.70 0.14 1.81 0.90
Short SE spells 1.65 0.48 3.93 10.87 3.36 0.80 8.35 8.93
Employee to SE 2.12 0.60 4.83 3.33 3.19 0.94 6.26 4.70
Pure SE 0.43 0.11 1.31 2.24 0.81 0.19 2.29 5.14
Hybrid SE 1.55 0.36 3.19 1.49 2.92 0.70 7.54 1.56
DGA 0.87 0.18 3.39 0.85 1.44 0.34 5.53 3.30
Weak LM attach. 0.36 0.11 1.13 4.92 0.54 0.17 2.85 0.20
Benefit recipient 0.95 0.16 2.94 7.57 1.05 0.17 4.19 4.55
Long benefit rec. 1.54 0.47 3.75 11.79 3.17 0.64 7.58 7.41
Employee 3.43 1.48 6.23 49.94 5.89 1.92 11.90 62.50
Pensioner 5.03 1.49 9.34 0.41 14.75 10.10 20.00 0.40
Capital entitlement (in thousands)
Weak LM attach. (SE) 2.07 0.59 6.90 5.32 4.56 0.87 19.90 0.42
Benefit recipient (SE) 2.88 0.54 11.83 1.27 3.73 0.74 10.26 0.90
Short SE spells 10.04 2.82 25.40 10.87 15.72 3.82 46.98 8.92
Employee to SE 10.84 3.28 30.88 3.33 14.37 4.53 33.77 4.70
Pure SE 2.51 0.62 7.81 2.24 3.90 0.96 10.74 5.14
Hybrid SE 8.46 2.43 17.48 1.49 12.77 2.71 38.19 1.56
DGA 6.22 1.25 16.90 0.85 7.18 1.84 30.51 3.30
Weak LM attach. 2.40 0.66 7.70 4.92 2.22 0.56 14.22 0.20
Benefit recipient 6.41 0.89 21.84 7.57 5.46 0.83 27.54 4.55
Long benefit rec. 10.17 2.91 27.68 11.79 17.48 3.10 50.48 7.41
Employee 17.59 7.23 40.28 49.94 27.66 7.71 71.47 62.50
Pensioner 31.49 11.86 71.67 0.41 82.62 52.28 131.28 0.40
Note: All values are in euro and deflated with CPI data from The World Bank World Development
Indicators (base year 2010). The statistics are calculated over individuals by cluster for the median values
observed for individuals in the sample aged 24–60. (Total observation count pension contribution years:
13,648 (w), 14,450 (m), pension annuity: 14,046 (w), 14,845 (m), capital entitlement: 14,047 (w), 14, 847
(m).) Observation counts differ across measurements of pension fund participation due to not all pension
funds reporting all values for all individuals’ accounts. Pension contribution years are measured in FTE
years.
99
CHAPTER 3. LABOUR MARKET TRAJECTORIES OF THE SELF-EMPLOYED
Table 3.13: Regression – accruals in 2nd pillar
Annuity (in thousands) Capital (in thousands)
women men women men
cluster: weak LM attach. (SE) -3.91*** -4.94*** -26.83*** -30.38***
(0.168) (1.060) (1.383) (7.568)
benefit recipient (SE) -3.78*** -5.69*** -26.15*** -35.10***
(0.327) (0.728) (2.690) (5.197)
short SE spells -1.88*** -1.29*** -12.57*** -8.45***
(0.122) (0.243) (1.003) (1.734)
employee to SE -1.35*** -2.71*** -8.42*** -14.16***
(0.218) (0.380) (1.799) (2.710)
pure SE -3.66*** -6.04*** -24.09*** -36.91***
(0.262) (0.389) (2.161) (2.776)
hybrid SE -3.11*** -2.41*** -22.23*** -13.33**
(0.308) (0.577) (2.536) (4.120)
DGA -2.46*** -3.89*** -18.36*** -26.98***
(0.392) (0.385) (3.228) (2.746)
weak LM attach. (no SE) -3.70*** -5.13*** -25.45*** -31.10**
(0.172) (1.535) (1.420) (10.959)
benefit recipient (no SE) -2.78*** -4.21*** -17.44*** -23.60***
(0.157) (0.374) (1.289) (2.671)
long spells as benefit recipient -2.20*** -3.49*** -14.43*** -22.61***
(0.121) (0.283) (0.998) (2.023)
pensioner -0.01 0.61 3.89 2.91
(0.571) (1.099) (4.699) (7.848)
breadwinner 1.96*** 1.73*** 14.16*** 10.96***
(0.091) (0.201) (0.749) (1.437)
main income source: profit 0.41*** 0.70* 2.87** 3.32
(0.120) (0.276) (0.987) (1.972)
freelancer -0.33 -2.16 -1.46 -15.58
(0.707) (1.469) (5.822) (10.491)
constant -1.91 1.29 51.70* 126.57***
(3.120) (5.285) (25.686) (37.733)
Observations 14046 14845 14047 14847
R2 adjusted 0.206 0.226 0.233 0.262
RMSE 4.213 8.096 34.693 57.802
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Regression including cohort fixed effects, and controlling for individual’s demographic characteristics, for when we
last observe an individual.
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accrual. We add year effects based on the last year we observe an individual in the pension data
to control for level differences due to different timing in observations. Because of the limitations
of the data, we do not include the labour market state dummies.
Table 3.14: Probit regression – participation in 3rd pillar
participates in 3rd pillar (in thousands)
women men
Pays into 2nd pillar 0.52*** 0.48*** 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
LM state: pure SE 1.01*** 0.87*** 0.54*** 0.51***
(0.068) (0.071) (0.047) (0.049)
hybrid SE 0.54*** 0.52*** 0.22*** 0.18***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.048) (0.048)
freelancer 0.06 0.23** 0.13 0.15
(0.080) (0.084) (0.091) (0.089)
DGA 0.87*** 0.62*** 0.50*** 0.26***
(0.092) (0.091) (0.049) (0.050)
cluster: weak LM attach. (SE) -0.47*** -0.25*
(0.062) (0.112)
benefit recipient w/ SE -0.38*** -0.19*
(0.095) (0.077)
short SE spells -0.05 0.02
(0.033) (0.025)
employee to SE 0.02 0.02
(0.048) (0.034)
pure SE 0.09 0.02
(0.051) (0.032)




is SSE -0.34*** -0.32*** -0.25*** -0.24***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.042) (0.042)
unknown SSE status -0.46*** -0.45*** -0.12*** -0.13***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.036) (0.036)
breadwinner 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.12***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
main income source: profit 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.17*** 0.16***
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Table 3.14: Probit regression – participation in 3rd pillar (continued)
participates in 3rd pillar (in thousands)
women men
(0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025)
freelancer 0.04 0.03 0.29*** 0.28***
(0.071) (0.073) (0.047) (0.047)
constant -4.72*** -4.83*** -4.54*** -4.73***
(0.376) (0.377) (0.272) (0.272)
Non-SE clusters X X
Observations 467380 467380 548536 548536
Individuals 24017 24017 25411 25411
log likelihood -87366.566 -86542.144 -208083.694 -207264.314
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Regression including year and cohort fixed effects, and controlling for individual’s demographic characteristics,
non-self-employed labour market states, and other main income sources.
Table 3.15: Tobit regression – contributions to 3rd pillar
contributions to 3rd pillar (in thousands)
women men
Pays into 2nd pillar 4.77*** 4.40*** 2.35*** 2.28***
(0.320) (0.303) (0.164) (0.163)
LM state: pure SE 9.92*** 9.03*** 5.53*** 5.32***
(0.796) (0.828) (0.455) (0.477)
hybrid SE 5.72*** 5.42*** 3.15*** 2.64***
(0.759) (0.779) (0.458) (0.457)
freelancer -0.13 1.43 2.17** 2.06*
(0.767) (0.796) (0.819) (0.818)
DGA 7.70*** 3.95*** 4.74*** 1.36**
(0.923) (0.894) (0.443) (0.451)
cluster: weak LM attach. (SE) -4.05*** -2.13*
(0.627) (0.977)
benefit recipient (SE) -3.65*** -1.31
(0.917) (0.726)
short SE spells -0.45 0.51*
(0.294) (0.204)
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Table 3.15: Tobit regression – contributions to 3rd pillar (continued)
contributions to 3rd pillar (in thousands)
women men
employee to SE 0.04 0.11
(0.442) (0.284)
pure SE 0.22 -0.03
(0.496) (0.295)




is SSE -3.10*** -2.92*** -2.97*** -2.86***
(0.634) (0.630) (0.399) (0.395)
unknown SSE status -3.25*** -3.16*** -0.47 -0.64
(0.534) (0.534) (0.346) (0.346)
breadwinner 1.91*** 1.84*** 1.09*** 1.02***
(0.209) (0.206) (0.154) (0.154)
main income source: profit 1.30*** 1.22*** 2.11*** 2.02***
(0.270) (0.269) (0.222) (0.220)
freelancer 0.62 0.43 3.01*** 2.94***
(0.689) (0.697) (0.428) (0.427)
constant -46.87*** -47.57*** -43.86*** -45.61***
(4.364) (4.386) (2.674) (2.695)
Non-SE clusters X X
var(e.c_p3pen_defl) 102.08*** 101.48*** 94.56*** 93.77***
(12.240) (12.172) (6.949) (6.919)
Observations 577333 577333 564127 564127
Individuals 25965 25965 25441 25441
log likelihood -149235 -148545 -426205 -425207
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Regression including year and cohort fixed effects, and controlling for individual’s demographic
characteristics, non-self-employed labour market states, and other main income sources.
Both regressions show the same picture and the cluster coefficients confirm what we have
learned from Table 3.12. Self-employed who mostly receive benefits are worse off than their non-
self-employed counterparts. Among the other self-employed clusters the pure self-employed are
worst off and will on average receive substantially lower pension annuities after their retirement
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– in the case of men a good 500 euro less per month. The cluster effect for career changers
shows that the estimated average gap in pension capital for men is of similar magnitude to the
corresponding coefficient estimated in the wealth regression, suggesting that this group may be
particularly ill-prepared for retirement.
To investigate whether self-employed individuals use of the third pillar to counter-balance
gaps in the second pillar, we analyse the probability of making a payment into the third pillar
using a probit model, and estimate a tobit model to understand how much they invest. In both
models we use the same controls as in the income regressions as well as a dummy that takes
value one when a positive employee contribution to the second pillar is observed.
Table 3.14 shows the results of the probit model. The dependent variable is a dummy that
takes value one if a payment to a tax-deductible third pillar pension plan is observed and zero
otherwise. Since individuals with no income do not make contributions to the third pillar, these
individuals are excluded. Four results stand out: first, individuals who make a contribution to
the second pillar in the same year are more likely to save in the third pillar. Second, among the
different self-employed clusters, only DGAs are more likely to make a third pillar contribution
than employees, whereas we find significantly negative effects for the weak labour market
attachment and benefit clusters (1 and 2). Third, current solo self-employed contribute less often
than others. Finally, individuals that live in households deriving their main income from pure
or hybrid self-employment (main income source: profit) are more likely than their other self-
employed peers to make payments to the third pillar. The results of the tobit regressions are shown
in Table 3.15. The results are largely in line with the probit results. Again, we find a positive
association with contributing to the second pillar. As before, DGAs are the positive outliers. They
are the only cluster with a large positive (and significant) coefficient, contributing much more
than employees. The coefficients on labour market status tell us that once individuals are active
as self-employed, their payment to the third pillar increases compared to employees. Furthermore,
pure self-employed have the largest coefficients – they make the largest contributions to the third
pillar. Again, we also find a negative effect for SSE.
3.6 Conclusion
To analyse the heterogeneity in labour market trajectories of the self-employed in the Netherlands,
we have classified the self-employed into different clusters using sequence analysis. We have
identified the following seven distinct clusters of self-employment across all cohorts considered:
(1) self-employed with weak labour market attachment, (2) self-employed that spend a large
portion of their trajectory as benefit recipients, (3) employees with short self-employment spells,
(4) employees that switch to self-employment later in their career, (5) always pure self-employed,
(6) always hybrid self-employed, and (7) DGAs (director and major shareholder).
Unlike cross-sectional studies, sequence analysis provides a holistic view that incorporates
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the whole labour market trajectory of each individual. We find that half of the individuals that are
ever self-employed, (those in clusters 1–3) remain so for only a few years. In any given calender
year, approximately one third of the self-employment rate can be attributed to these short-term
self-employed.
For wealth, we find no statistically significant cohort effects within clusters. This suggests
that the finding in earlier studies that the current self-employed are less wealthy than those
in older cohorts is due to a shift in the share of different clusters in the total self-employed
population rather than to a shift within clusters. In line with this, we find that the share of
individuals that become self-employed later in their career has increased over time, and this
cluster has accumulated less wealth than the other self-employed.
In terms of income, wealth, and pension accumulation, we show that clusters 1 and 2 are
worse off than employees and do not differ a lot from their counterparts amongst the never
self-employed. Their average income is lower than that of employees, also in the periods when
they are self-employed, they accumulate less wealth, and, particularly, do not invest in voluntary
(or mandatory) pensions. Policies targeted at the self-employed only are unlikely to affect their
post-retirement outcomes – These individuals would benefit more from policies targeted at
everyone at the lower end of the labour market.
Individuals in cluster 3 have unexpectedly large gaps in their occupational pension savings.
They accumulate more financial wealth than employees, but this will probably not be sufficient
to cover these gaps. Similar results are found for those who change to self-employment halfway
through their career (cluster 4). Compared to employees, they neither invest more in a voluntary
pension nor in other (non-pension) wealth. On the other hand, their income is similar to that of
employees. This suggests that further research into the adequacy or inadequacy of their pensions
is necessary.
The long-term self-employed, clusters 5–7, hold larger amounts of wealth than employees or
clusters 3 and 4. Clusters 5 and 7 have almost no accruals in the second pension pillar, but the
majority of them may still be well prepared for their retirement.
There is substantial difference by gender: the wealth differential between self-employed
clusters and employees is much larger for men than for women. Women in the self-employment
clusters also have less pension accruals in the mandatory occupational pensions and participate
less in voluntary private pensions. They may often be able to rely on a partner as main earner in
the household, as long as the couple remains intact. Studying household composition dynamics
(i.c. divorce or widowhood) and its consequences for pension adequacy is left for future research.
Our findings on DGAs replicate results found for incorporated self-employed in the US and
Sweden. Given that we still find large variation in wealth within our clusters and that there
are different unincorporated business structures in the Netherlands, it seems worthwhile to
study if using more information on the legal form can help to further differentiate among clusters
of self-employed. The same holds for the solo self-employed. We find that they are worse off
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than the other self-employed but the short time period for which their information is available,
did not allow to study them in detail. More work on this seems useful. Finally, better data on
pension accruals is needed. Because of the current data limitations our results give us only a
lower bound on accumulation of an occupational pension. Integral pension data is needed for a





Table 3.A.1: Number of self-employment spells and their length by cluster
Number of spells Spell length (years) Sample
1 spell 2 spells 3 or more median Q1 Q3 share
Women
Weak LM attach. 65.82 23.72 10.46 2 1 5 27.30
Benefit recipient 72.99 21.55 5.46 2 1 4 5.34
Short SE spells 76.36 18.74 4.89 2 1 4 33.24
Employee to SE 76.37 19.02 4.61 7 3 11 10.65
Pure SE 76.25 19.19 4.56 15 7 21 14.47
Hybrid SE 72.17 22.33 5.50 11 5 19 4.74
DGA 55.76 29.14 15.11 8 3 13 4.27
Men
Weak LM attach. 55.17 30.17 14.66 3 1 6 1.69
Benefit recipient 72.47 21.60 5.92 2 1 5 4.19
Short SE spells 74.41 19.56 6.03 3 1 5 29.06
Employee to SE 76.59 17.56 5.85 7 4 11 14.73
Pure SE 78.78 16.86 4.35 17 8 23 28.85
Hybrid SE 69.87 22.10 8.04 11 5 20 6.54
DGA 50.98 32.49 16.54 8 3 14 14.93
Note: Shares calculated by gender within the subsample that has at least one self-employment spell. We define
any series of years spent consecutively in any type of self-employment (hybrid and pure self-employment,
freelancer and DGA) as a self-employment spell. The spell ends once an individual spends at least one year
not in self-employment. Hence individuals may have more than one self-employment spell.
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Table 3.A.2: Number of self-employment spells and their length by cohort
Number of spells Spell length Sample
1 spell 2 spells 3 or more median Q1 Q3 share
Women
Cohort 1 76.87 18.51 4.63 2 1 7 4.31
Cohort 2 68.22 24.89 6.89 3 1 9 6.91
Cohort 3 68.21 23.78 8.01 3 1 10 12.26
Cohort 4 68.10 21.31 10.59 3 1 9 11.74
Cohort 5 69.29 21.89 8.82 3 1 9 14.79
Cohort 6 71.39 21.72 6.89 3 1 9 16.03
Cohort 7 75.00 19.31 5.69 3 1 8 15.10
Cohort 8 75.65 19.43 4.92 3 2 7 11.22
Cohort 9 82.73 15.86 1.41 3 2 7 7.64
Men
Cohort 1 69.09 25.68 5.23 7 2 13 6.43
Cohort 2 67.84 22.86 9.29 7 2 16 7.86
Cohort 3 65.87 22.44 11.69 7 2 17 11.00
Cohort 4 67.51 23.35 9.14 8 3 18 10.39
Cohort 5 68.15 21.98 9.88 6 2 15 11.83
Cohort 6 71.62 20.65 7.73 7 3 15 14.36
Cohort 7 74.95 19.17 5.87 7 2 14 15.92
Cohort 8 76.94 18.38 4.68 6 2 12 12.80
Cohort 9 81.06 16.30 2.64 5 2 10 9.41
Note: Shares calculated by gender within the subsample that has at least one self-employment
spell. We define any series of years spent consecutively in any type of self-employment (hybrid
and pure self-employment, freelancer and DGA) as a self-employment spell. The spell ends
once an individual spends at least one year not in self-employment. Hence individuals may
have more than one self-employment spell. Cohort 1: birth years 1936–1940, ..., cohort 9:
birth years 1976–1980.
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Table 3.A.3: Demographic characteristics across clusters; observations with pension participation
in %
Cluster Age Men Bread-
winner





1 50.23 6.43 12.81 13.35 88.78 7.08 4.13 3.83
2 50.16 40.85 61.05 53.46 75.74 9.20 15.07 1.21
3 47.50 47.46 55.20 31.86 85.91 9.12 4.97 8.91
4 45.28 59.06 74.52 36.80 88.63 5.81 5.56 3.73
5 47.34 66.82 73.30 33.40 88.73 6.83 4.43 5.66
6 46.97 56.55 75.59 34.46 87.42 8.42 4.17 1.51
7 49.10 78.35 71.69 25.35 90.36 7.60 2.04 2.71
without self-employment
8 53.70 2.77 8.20 12.48 85.37 7.94 6.68 5.91
9 49.03 36.71 63.48 59.31 72.70 9.59 17.71 7.42
10 50.84 39.09 53.97 40.33 82.00 8.37 9.63 9.04
11 46.48 57.94 64.99 36.34 87.47 7.68 4.85 49.65
12 62.76 44.24 71.73 43.24 85.96 10.97 3.07 0.42
Overall 47.92 49.30 58.80 35.48 85.71 7.93 6.36
Note: The statistics are calculated over all individual-year observations for each labour market state.
† Includes singles, divorced and widowed individuals.
3.B Cluster correspondence across cohorts
The upper part of Table 4.C.1 gives an overview of how we sort the different groups based on
Ward’s algorithm into the seven clusters of self-employed across all cohorts as used in our analysis.
The lower part lists the clusters for the individuals that are never self-employed based on their
6-group Ward solution.
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3.C. SELF-EMPLOYED AND THE INCOME TAX
3.C Self-employed and the income tax
The Dutch system distinguishes between three types of self-employed: director and major share-
holder (DGA), entrepreneur and freelancer. Both the chosen legal form and – in the case of the
latter two – the recognition by the tax authority as entrepreneur determine how their profits are
taxed.
The legal distinction is between incorporated and unincorporated businesses. DGAs are
incorporated while entrepreneurs and freelancers are unincorporated. DGAs and their firm are
two separate legal entities. DGAs pay income taxes on the salary they receive from their business,
while the profits from their firm are subject to the lower corporate tax. Since it would be attractive
for DGAs to pay themselves dividends instead of a salary, the law requires a minimum salary for
DGAs (“gebruikelijkloonregeling”) which was 45,000 euro in 2017. Exceptions are made for new
enterprises, part-time workers or firms that make a structural loss.
Entrepreneurs and freelancers on the other hand are the same legal entity as their business.
They do not receive a separate wage and the profit of their business is taxed under the income tax.
If the tax authority recognises the self-employed as an entrepreneur (“IB ondernemer”) they are
allowed to make certain deductions from their profit before taxes. Their income is registered as
profit from company (“winst uit onderneming”). Those not recognised as entrepreneurs will fill in
their income in the tax returns as “income from other work” (“inkomen uit overige arbeid”). This
is also how we distinguish between the two groups in the income data (based on tax records).
In order to qualify as an entrepreneur for the income tax, several conditions from a set of
conditions need to be met. The set includes: the business needs to have a significant profit and
cannot make a structural loss; independence of the business (i.e. no dependence on one client
only, work can be chosen freely); the company should be advertised externally, and the owner
carries the entrepreneurial risk. There is no specific set of rules that is decisive and the decision
is made on a case-by-case basis.36
Freelancers are (almost) always solo self-employed while DGAs and the self-employed may
also be employers.
3.D The Dutch pension pillars
The Dutch pension system essentially consists of three pillars: (1) the state pension as defined
by the general old age pensions act (“Algemene Ouderdomswet”, abbreviated AOW), (2) the
occupational pension system which is regulated by the pension law, and (3) individual private
pensions.
The first pillar is a pay-as-you go system, funded by government funds and payroll taxes.
Everyone living and/or working in the Netherlands during the 50 years before they reach their
36Someone who is not an entrepreneur for the income tax may still have to pay value added taxes on their products
or services.
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statutory pension age is entitled to AOW. Individuals build up rights to 2% of the full pension for
each of those 50 years. The full pension is tied to the minimum wage. Married and cohabiting
couples each receive 50% of the minimum wage and those who live alone receive a pension slightly
above 70% of the minimum wage. Until 2016 the statutory pension age was 65. In of 2012 the
Dutch government announced that the pension age would rise to 67 and beyond if life expectancy
would increase.
The second pillar consists of occupational pensions that are collective pension schemes.
They are linked to either companies or specific industries and managed by pension funds or
insurance companies. The government can enforce participation in a pension fund if a company
decides to provide a pension scheme to its employees. Similarly, the government can mandate
an industry-wide pension fund. The majority of second pillar pensions are built up via employer
based pension plans. In total about 90% of all employees are required to contribute to a pension
plan37. Examples of industry-specific pension funds are painters and independent professionals
like e.g. general physicians. The majority of the self-employed, however, is not active in sectors
with a mandatory pension scheme.
The third pillar is formed by voluntary saving schemes, usually taking the form of an annuity
or life insurance and provided as commercial savings products. The third pillar is meant to bridge
gaps in the first and second pillar – Payments in a third pillar product are tax-deductible for
individuals that have low pension accruals (resulting in a projected pension that is less than 70%
of their average income from work).
3.E Additional details on income data
IPO
The core of our analysis uses the Income Panel Study (IPO), which follows a representative
sample of the Dutch population over time. When IPO was started as a panel in 1989 the sample
was drawn from the population aged 10 years and older. From 1991 until 1993 the sample was
refreshed with individuals aged 15 years and older, as well as with immigrants. As of 1993 the
sample includes all ages and individuals from the pool of newborns and immigrants are added to
the sample every year to account for births and immigration. To add younger individuals for the
years before 1993, a number of household members of existing sample participants were added.
IPO records detailed information on the individuals’ income from many different sources
for all the years. Because tax records are the main source of information, a first break in the
series occurs due to the major reform in the Dutch tax system in 2001, when a new tax law
(Wet inkomestenbelasting 2001) was introduced. The new law mostly lead to minor changes in
recorded income figures and to a different break down of income source categories. A second
break occurs in 2011, when a revision in the income statistics took place. This break lead to a
37See https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/pensioen/opbouw-pensioenstelsel
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better measurement of income. For most income sources, these changes are small. Exceptions are
the market rental value of real estate and income from substantial business interest. Because we
do not use either of these two income sources to define an individual’s labour market state, this
break has no impact on our results.
To analyse the consequences of the break due to the 2001 tax reform for our labour market
states, we exploit the fact that IPO provides datasets in both the pre- and post-reform format for
the year 2000. We find that less than 2% of all individuals are categorised differently after the
reform (6.6% of the self-employed and hybrid self-employed). The differences mostly result from
better data sources underlying the more recent IPO, raising the number of individuals classified
as self-employed.
IPI and INPATAB
Because the technological advances in computation and data storage facilities made the use of
integral data much easier CBS started providing integral individual income (IPI) starting from
the year 2003. With the income statistics revision in 2011 IPI was then replaced by a new integral
income data set: “INPATAB”. Both IPI and INPATAB are also mostly based on tax records and
cover the same income variables as IPO with some minor differences. Unlike IPO the integral
datasets do not contain any demographic and household characteristics. They therefore do not
contain information on disposable or gross household income. One advantage of IPI and INPATAB
is that they, starting from 2005, include information on whether self-employed individuals are











SELF-EMPLOYMENT CAREERS AND FINANCIAL WELL-BEING IN
OLD AGE IN EUROPE
This chapter is based on the identically entitled working paper
This paper uses data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe toidentify different life-cycle patterns of self-employment in Europe for the cohorts bornbetween 1931 and 1955. I explore how the different self-employment types are related
to individuals’ financial well-being in old age. I find in particular that individuals that spend a
long part of their career in self-employment have lower household income and pension income
once they are 60+ years old. This result is also reflected in the results from an analysis of
indicators on financial well-being.
4.1 Introduction
A decade ago Choi (2009) came to the conclusion for most OECD countries’ pension provision
for the self-employed is a matter of practical implementation of existing schemes rather than
overhauling pension rules for these schemes. Ten years on, sufficiency of the pensions of the
self-employed is however in many countries still an issue. For example, the 2017 OECD report
on pensions argues that in order to decrease income inequality in old-age countries should,
among other things, [increase] pension coverage, especially for the self-employed. (OECD, 2017,
p.29) Their newest report also points out that In several OECD countries, all or some types of
self-employed workers are exempt from enrolling in earnings-related pensions that are mandatory
for dependent employees, increasing the risk of low old-age income.(OECD, 2019, p.66) Similarly,
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policy makers in Europe are also concerned with the self-employed: The European Commission’s
report on EU pension adequacy, for example, points out that the retired self-employed have a
higher risk of income poverty and are more exposed to financial hardship. (European Commission,
2018, p.16)
Because pension entitlements are not just dependent on a country’s institutions but also on
an individual’s decisions and actions throughout their working life, the analysis of individual
outcomes in old-age should take account of the whole labour market history of the individual.
One method that lends itself for such a task is sequence analysis, a method from sociology first
introduced by Abbott (1983). With the help of sequence analysis I therefore construct different
clusters of self-employment, based on individuals labour market trajectory between ages 15 and
60’, using the retrospective Job Episodes Panel from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE).
There exist different studies that use sequence analysis to relate career patterns with mea-
sures of well-being after retirement. Most of these studies however focus on the later years in
individuals’ careers and do not look at the whole trajectory. Munnell et al. (2019) e.g. study
individuals in the US from age 50 to 62 using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to asses
how these individuals use non-traditional jobs and how their late career trajectories relate to
income and depression. The authors find that those who consistently worked in non-traditional
jobs end up with less retirement income and are also more likely to be depressed than other
workers. McDonough et al. (2017) also use data from the HRS, to study trajectories between ages
52 and 69 for the cohort born 1931–1941. They study the association between these trajectories
and self-rated health in the early 70s. They find, for example, that stable employment patterns
are associated with better health outcomes for older women.
Other studies use sequence analysis to relate the early labour market years to later outcomes.
Tophoven and Tisch (2016) e.g. use administrative data from Germany to study work trajectories
and their implications for accrued statutory pension entitlement by the age of 42 for two baby
boomer cohorts in comparison with two older cohorts. The authors find that individuals with
late entry into employment as well as those with diversified and unstable employment patterns
have lower levels of statutory pension entitlements. However, because the self-employed are not
included in the German statutory pension system, this study does not offer any insights for the
self-employed.
I am not the first to make use of the information contained in SHARE’s retrospective inter-
views. Van Winkle and Fasang (2017) use an older version of the Job Episodes Panel and focus on
the early careers of individuals and their complexity. They analyse employment trajectories from
age 15 to 45 for men and women born between 1918 and 1963. They find that changes across
cohorts are negligibly small, compared with a sizeable variation of complexity in employment
trajectories across countries.
More similar to the study presented here, Ponomarenko (2016) also uses data from SHARE.
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She studies how cumulative disadvantages of non-employment and non-standard work affect
careers and subjective well-being of older Europeans, showing that labour market inactivity and
unemployment have significant negative effects on subjective well-being in old-age for men only.
While she also studies trajectories from ages 15 to 60, the author uses an older release of SHARE
and therefore only includes the thirteen countries present in SHARE Wave 3. Because the focus
of her study is on non-employment and non-standard work, she does not differentiate between
employees and self-employed.
The study by Madero-Cabib and Fasang (2016) goes one dimension further. They take both
careers and family life courses from ages 20 to 59 of cohorts born 1920–1950 in West Germany
and Switzerland into account and do a multichannel sequence analysis. This allows them to
examine how work and family life jointly affect financial well-being in retirement. They find that
breadwinner policies (i.e. supporting a system where men do and women do not do paid work)
in combination with liberal pension policies later in life, as in Switzerland, intensify pension
penalties for typical female work-family life courses. However, for the same reason as the study
by Tophoven and Tisch (2016), they do not offer any insights for the self-employed.
Most closely related to the current study is the one by Pettinicchi and Börsch-Supan (2019).
They also use the newest release of SHARE and study the difference in outcomes for formerly
traditionally employed and formerly self-employed individuals. They find that the formerly
self-employed report a higher degree of financial distress and have lower incomes. The key
difference between their study and mine is the categorisation of self-employed. While Pettinicchi
and Börsch-Supan (2019) take individuals past into account their classification is made manually.
They classify all individuals as self-employed who have worked longer as self-employed than
in traditional employment.1 In this respect, their definition is probably closest to the clusters
I identify as long term self-employed. Furthermore, their analysis only includes descriptive
statistics, while I also add perform regression analysis controlling for additional factors such as
current labour market status.
Using sequence analysis, I define nine clusters of self-employed: (1) always self-employed
individuals, (2) those that become self-employed in their 20s and (3) 30s, (4) late career self-
employed, (5) self-employed that switch to employment halfway in their trajectory, (6) those
with short self-employment spells, (7) individuals with weak labour market attachment, (8)
pensioners, and (9) those with mostly missing information on their trajectories. Similar to the
results by Pettinicchi and Börsch-Supan (2019), I find that the first three clusters, the long term
self-employed, have lower income, both in terms of household income as well as pension income,
and are also more likely than employees to report having difficulties making ends meet.
This paper continues as follows. Section 4.2 describes the different data sources and defines
the labour market states. Section 4.3 describes the method and presents the self-employment
clusters I find. Section 4.4 presents the results on differences of the clusters with respect to
1They also deal differently with individuals with missing job episode information.
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income variables and subjective measures of financial well-being. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Data
This paper uses data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).
SHARE is a multidisciplinary and cross-national longitudinal micro data set of individuals aged
50 or older and their households, covering, among other topics, health and socio-economic status.
The first wave of SHARE was collected in 2004/2005 and has since then been repeated every
other year with the latest wave, number 7, taking place in 2017. As of Wave 7, SHARE covers
all members of the European Union as well as Israel and Switzerland.2 The first part of the
analysis uses the Job Episodes Panel (JEP),3 which is a generated retrospective panel based
on the life history interviews conducted in Waves 3 and 7, to build a data driven taxonomy of
labour market trajectories. The second part the analysis uses data from Waves 1, 2 and 4 to 7
(Börsch-Supan, 2019a,b,c,d,e,f) to examine the correlation between labour market trajectories
and financial outcomes for individuals aged 60 and older.4
The sample consists of all individuals in the JEP born from 1931 until 1955, divided into
five-year birth cohorts. Older cohorts are excluded because the early years of their labour market
trajectories took place during the last years of the second world war. Younger cohorts on the other
hand are excluded because they have not yet reached statutory retirement age in most countries
by 2017, and only few among them have already gone into (early) retirement. In addition, I
decide to focus the analysis on outcomes past age 60 which would exclude cohorts born after 1957
either way. Overall, the sample for the analysis of labour market trajectories includes 62,708
individuals.5
While the second part of the analysis focuses on individuals when they are at least 60 years
old, the first part of the analysis includes all individuals belonging to the five cohorts, irrespective
of whether they are included in the subsequent analysis or not. This guarantees that the sample
contains a representative sample of trajectories.
While the JEP contains information for all individuals from their birth onwards, I compare
their labour market trajectories during the years when they are between ages 15 and 60. These
age thresholds coincide with the end of education and entry into retirement, respectively, for the
many of the individuals in the sample. Looking at the distribution of the age of individuals at
the end of their education, I find that half of the individuals in the sample finish their education
between 15 and 20. (See Table 4.D.1 in Appendix 4.D.) Similarly, the distribution of the age at
2Ireland has however only participated in Wave 2 and Wave 3.
3DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.jep.700, see Brugiavini et al. (2013), Antonova et al. (2014) and Brugiavini et al. (2019) for
methodological details.
4Wave 3 only consisted of the retrospective survey and did not collect the variables analyzed in the second part.
5Note that the sample selection does not take into account whether additional information other than the labour
market trajectory is available for the individual. The main purpose of the sample is to have as many different
trajectories as possible such that the clusters I find are indeed representative for the careers of individuals.
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retirement shows a median age of 58 for women and 60 for men among those for whom retirement
is already observed. (See Table 4.D.2 in Appendix 4.D.)
4.2.1 Definition of labour market states
I take the definition of an individual’s labour market state at a given point in time directly
from the JEP. Labour market states are therefore coded according to what individuals identify
themselves as their main “situation” in a year. I consider the following labour market states:
in education, employee, self-employed, unemployed or disabled, not in the labour force, retired,
other, and unknown.6 Two points should be noted regarding these labour market states: first,
the definition of self-employment also includes individuals working for their family’s business.
The data does not allow to differentiate them from self-employed individuals who have their
own enterprise.7 Second, the “unknown” category not only includes individuals that refuse to
disclose their labour market state in a given year or those that no longer remember what they
did, but also all the labour market states that are coded as missing in the JEP.8 The latter are
the majority in this category.
Table 4.1 reports the distribution of labour market states by cohorts based on this definition,
as well as the share of observations for the younger cohorts that we miss because the individuals
have not yet reached age 60 at the time of the life history interview (category: “censored”). In
addition, the lower part of Table 4.1 shows the share of individuals in each cohort that have spent
at least one year between age 15 and 60 in self-employment. Overall there are 8,218 individuals
in the sample that have been self-employed. Two observations can be made regarding the share
of self-employed: first, their share is largest in the oldest cohort and comparable across the other
cohorts. Second, similarly to the findings by Beusch and van Soest (2020) for different cohorts in
the Netherlands, Table 4.1 also shows that a larger fraction of individuals is ever self-employed
than the shares of self-employment observed at any given point in time. Last, Table 4.1 also
shows that the share of periods spent in education is increasing across cohorts. The share of
individual-year observations of individuals not participating in the labour market is decreasing,
and the mirror image of this is the increasing share of observations of employees.
Self-employment rates across countries may be correlated with differences in institutions.
For example, higher minimum wages and/or high employment protection could lead to more self-
employment (out of necessity) if they lead to firms hiring more reluctantly. Figure 4.1 illustrates
6The following categories consist of several categories in the JEP: unemployed or disabled (unemployed and
searching for a job; unemployed and not searching for a job; short term job (less than 6 months); sick or disabled),
not in the labour force (looking after home or family; leisure, travelling or doing nothing), other (training; military
services, war prisoner or equivalent; managing your assets; voluntary or community work; forced labour or in jail;
exiled or banished; labour camp; concentration camp; other), and unknown (refusal; don’t know).
7This should however not be seen as a drawback of the data as it is more likely to lead to the inclusion of women
that help out in their partner’s business among the self-employed.
8The labour market states coded as missing arise mostly because the timing of some spells is not sufficiently clear.
The coding of the JEP furthermore means that one spell with unclear timing can lead to all the following spells being
coded as missing as well, since their timing depends on knowing the exact timing of the earlier spell.
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Table 4.1: Labour market states by cohorts (in %)
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5
(1931-35) (1936-40) (1941-1945) (1946-1950) (1951-55)
Education 5.16 5.76 6.57 7.33 7.90
Employee 56.79 59.86 63.67 65.17 65.05
Self-empl. (SE) 8.39 7.12 6.03 5.80 5.81
Unempl./disabled 1.43 1.19 1.25 1.38 1.66
Inactive 10.54 9.10 7.55 6.13 4.95
Retired 6.13 6.50 6.42 5.53 4.02
Other 1.93 1.67 1.32 1.02 0.95
Unknown 9.64 8.79 7.19 7.43 6.93
Censored 0.21 2.72
Total observations 336,628 478,446 586,546 740,968 741,980
No. of individuals 7,318 10,401 12,751 16,108 16,130
. . . ever SE (in %) 14.39 13.21 12.45 12.84 13.24
Note: Total observation counts and shares are based on individual-year observations for all 62,708
individuals when they are 15–60 years old. “Unknown” denotes labour market states that are missing
in the JEP. “Censored” denotes observations that we cannot make because individuals were younger
than 60 at the time they were interviewed. “Ever self-employed” individuals spend at least one year in
self-employment during the 46 years under consideration.
the differences in self-employment across countries in the JEP sample. The countries are grouped
based on their percentile rank9 in the Rule of Law indicator published in The World Bank’s World
Governance Indicators (Kaufman et al., 2010). The Rule of Law indicator captures perceptions
regarding the extent to which individuals and firms have confidence in and abide by the rules
of society. While it is not directly related to labour market policies, a stronger rule of law can
ex-ante be expected to be either positively or negatively correlated with self-employment. The
former, if individuals are more willing to start their own business because they are protected
by the law, and the latter if individuals turn to self-employment because a weaker rule of law
makes employment contracts unattractive. Christelis and Fonseca (2016) show for example that
self-employment is negatively associated with the index.10 The left column groups countries that
are ranked below the 80th percentile rank, the middle column the countries ranked 80th and
higher up to (and excluding) the 90th percentile rank, and the right column those countries that
rank at the 90th percentile or higher in 1996. This is the earliest year for which the indicator
is available and therefore the best proxy available for the Rule of Law during most individuals’
9The percentile rank of a country in a year is calculated over the sample of all countries for which the indicator is
available in that year.
10Besides the Rule of Law indicator, I have also tried to group the countries based on other policy indicators that
one would (ex-ante) expect to potentially be linked with self-employment. Neither the OECD’s employment protection
indicator (for temporary and/or regular employment contracts) or labour market programme expenditures (in % of
GDP) lead to a grouping of countries with homogeneous self-employment patterns within groups.
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Share of individuals ever SE Share of their trajectory spent in SE
Figure 4.1: Average share of self-employed (SE) and share of years they spend as SE (in %)
active labour market years.
Two observations can be made: first, contrary to the findings by Christelis and Fonseca (2016)
Figure 4.1 shows an increase in the share of (ever) self-employed as the average percentile rank
increases across groups. It should however be noted here that Christelis and Fonseca (2016) not
only included SHARE in their sample but also the US and UK, which in terms of sample size
dominate over the SHARE sample and might thus drive their result. Second, while there is quite
some heterogeneity within the two lower ranking groups, the average share of a trajectory spent
in self-employment seems to be lowest in the lowest ranking countries, and highest in the middle
group.
4.2.2 Descriptive statistics
As the second part of the analysis focusses on the individuals from the JEP once they are 60
or older, Table ?? shows the demographic characteristics of the sample conditional on that age
restriction. Because the majority of observations pertain to already retired individuals, Table
4.2 groups individuals by the labour market state in which they spent the most years between
age 15 and age 60. Exempted from this sorting rule are the individuals that are at least one year
self-employed – They are sorted into the two self-employed groups instead.
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<10 years SE 68 56.03 46.06 35.61 25.67 6.95 4.14 2.66 3.33
≥10 years SE 70 63.18 47.41 30.40 16.41 29.96 15.01 7.16 10.70
Employee 69 50.56 53.07 39.82 24.41 7.85 77.21 61.87 68.78
Out of labour force 71 0.74 39.71 16.03 3.81 1.78 0.10 11.13 6.16
Retired 70 28.42 46.00 32.43 13.11 8.31 0.95 1.96 1.50
Other 70 19.71 45.60 22.33 12.84 2.80 0.80 2.69 1.84
Missing 70 10.46 46.71 28.38 9.02 5.29 1.79 12.53 7.68
Overall 69 45.05 50.65 35.90 20.78 9.54
Note: Labour market groups are defined by the years spent in self-employment (SE) and for individuals with
no SE the labour market state in which they spent most time between age 15–60. The statistics are calculated
for the period when individuals are 60 years or older, over all individual-year observations for each group over
a total of 181,847 observations for 60,993 individuals.
† Includes upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education.
Table 4.2 shows that the groups vary a lot in terms of gender shares. The group of individuals
that spend most of their trajectory as employees consists of equal parts of men and women. The
self-employed group, however, has more men than women, and an even larger share of men is
found in the long term self-employed group (≥10 years SE). The remaining groups on the other
hand consist of more women than men. There are more than twice as many women than men
among the retired, and even more women in the other groups. In particular the group that spends
the majority of their prime age years out of the labour force consists almost entirely of women.
Both long- and short-term self-employed have a partner less frequently compared to employees.
The long-term self-employed also differ in terms of educational attainment from the other self-
employed and employees. They are on average less well educated. The share of individuals with
higher secondary or tertiary education is lower than in the other two groups. Table 4.2 also shows
that almost a third of the long term self-employed had been working in the agriculture, forestry,
and fishery sector, whereas this share is less than 10% in any of the other groups.
Lastly, Table 4.2 also shows that a larger sample-share among men is self-employed. Fur-
thermore, the share of long term self-employed is larger for men than for women. For both
genders though, the share of long term self-employed is much larger than the share of short term
self-employed. Among women, the group in which periods with missing information dominate the
labour market trajectory makes up more than a tenth of the sample. For men on the other hand,




Two variables that I will use to measure financial well-being are reported in Table 4.3. The
first variable is total household income. SHARE asks the designated household respondent to
report the household’s average monthly overall income, after taxes and contributions, in the past
year. In order to make the values comparable across waves and countries they are (if necessary)
converted into euros, and deflated and PPP adjusted. I use the rates SHARE provides, which use
Germany and the year 2015 as the base. I further adjust the income figures for household size
using the square root of household size as the equivalence scale. Because the question is asked to
household respondents only, the sample is restricted to one person per household. In addition, I
also drop outliers from the sample.11
The second variable is individual total pension income. It is the sum of state and occupational
pension income, and annuities from a private pension/insurance plan in the past year. Individuals
who report that they receive no pension income are coded as zeros. Because retirement in SHARE
is only known for individuals that self-identify as retired, and individuals who are not in the
labour force in particular will frequently not identify themselves as retired despite of being
above statutory retirement age and receiving a pension, we cannot know with certainty whether
those with zero pensions have no pension or have either not yet retired. Total pensions are also
converted in euros, and deflated and PPP adjusted using the SHARE rates.12 The question is
asked to all individuals in the regular survey. Because the question is only asked in the regular
survey, no information is available for the countries that only start participating in SHARE with
Wave 713 or from individuals in refreshment samples of other countries that are recruited in
Wave 7, as well as from individuals that participate only in Wave 3. Furthermore, I drop outliers
from the pension income sample.14
Table 4.3 shows the first (Q1) and third quartile (Q3) of the two income variables introduced
above. Comparing the sample shares to those in Table 4.2, we can see that the sub-sample for
those who answered the pension questions seems to be rather representative. On the other hand,
in the income sample for women, those with missing periods in the trajectory, as well as those
out of the labour force, are under-represented, whereas employees are over-represented.
A comparison across genders shows that adjusted total household income is similar for the
two self-employed groups. Male employees on the other hand report higher household income
than their female counterparts. The opposite holds for all other categories. This suggests that
11Outliers are defined as values outside the range [Q1 −1.5∗ IQR,Q3 +1.5∗ IQR]. The quantiles (Q1 and Q3)
and inter quantile range (IQR) are calculated within countries. There are no observations that fall below the lower
bound. Because the majority of the excluded observations report unrealistically high values of monthly income, this is
unlikely to generate selection bias.
12I would like to thank Andrea Bonfatti for providing me with the PPP rates for the Netherlands for the years
2014/15.
13Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia started participating in SHARE
with Wave 7.
14Outliers are defined in the same way as for household income but are calculated without taking the zeros into
account. Again, only the upper bound is binding for some observations.
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Table 4.3: Total household and pension income, and sample share (%) by gender and labour
market group
Men Women
Median Q1 Q3 (%) Median Q1 Q3 (%)
Total household income (monthly)
<10 years SE 876 232 1539 4.23 871 223 1366 2.73
≥10 years SE 829 302 1319 13.35 846 233 1281 6.34
Employee 920 232 1571 79.03 578 150 1250 67.32
Out of labour force 133 108 458 0.12 768 477 1094 9.16
Retired 604 128 1171 0.99 770 176 1361 1.79
Other 481 139 1016 0.92 817 281 1144 2.48
Missing 482 150 995 1.36 932 577 1318 10.18
Total pension income (annual)
<10 years SE 2811 0 14280 4.42 1247 0 8243 2.91
≥10 years SE 5609 0 10911 16.28 1362 0 7648 7.54
Employee 6307 319 16390 75.91 2213 258 9349 59.82
Out of labour force 1611 0 3010 0.10 0 0 2619 11.88
Retired 1592 0 10825 0.92 1129 0 6612 1.89
Other 1003 0 6917 0.81 333 0 6215 2.75
Missing 1293 0 8841 1.56 0 0 5533 13.21
Note: All values are in euro, and PPP as well as inflation adjusted. Household income is also adjusted
for household size with its square root. The statistics for total household and pension income are
calculated over all individual-year observations for each labour market group for all individuals
in the sample aged 60 or older. (Total observation count household income: 33,870 (m), 48,329 (w),
pension income: 48,070 (m), 62,444 (w).) Observation counts differ across measurements because of
sample differences. See Section 4.2.2 for more information on the adjustments and sample selection.
most women in these labour market groups could probably rely on a partner’s income whereas
their male counterparts could not, corresponding to traditional gender roles in these generations.
Pension income reflects these findings but also shows that self-employed and employed men
receive more pension income than their female counterparts.15 Both genders however have more
individuals that receive no pensions among the self-employed than among employees. For men,
Table 4.3 also shows that short term self-employed have a similar median and third quartile of
total pension income as employees have, whereas the long term self-employed have lower values.
In contrast though, the first quartile of short-term self-employed is much lower than employees’
whereas the spread of pensions of long-term self-employed is smaller. Among women, the two
self-employed groups have slightly lower pension incomes than employees.
15This should however not entirely be taken at face value as some pension systems (e.g. Switzerland) do not divide
pensions equally between partners while the second person’s (usually the wife’s) pension will generally be caped.
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4.3 Labour market trajectories over the life cycle
This section first describes the analysis of the labour market trajectories. Each individual’s
trajectory is defined by the labour market states the individual occupies between ages 15 and
60. I use sequence analysis to identify various career patterns and to group the trajectories into
clusters. In the second part of this section I describe the differences between the clusters that I
find.
4.3.1 Sequence analysis: comparing trajectories
The idea to analyse sequences of social events as a whole rather than the events in a given year
(e.g. as cross sectional analysis, event studies, or transition probabilities) was introduced into
the field of social sciences by Abbott (1983). The idea was further developed by, e.g., Abbott and
Forrest (1986), Abbott and Hrycak (1990) and Abbott (1995). The goal of all sequence analysis
is to group trajectories that display similar patterns. That is, to group individuals that are in
the same states at similar times and in a similar order. In technical terms this means that the
sequence of each individual gets compared pairwise to all other individuals’ sequences and a
matrix of how different each sequence is from the others is computed. The summary by Studer
and Ritschard (2016) provides a good overview of the dissimilarity measures used in the field. The
dissimilarity measure can then be used to group the individuals with e.g. a clustering algorithm.
To calculate the dissimilarity measure I use optimal matching (OM), which is the measure
that is most commonly used.16 OM computes an “edit distance” – the least costly way in which
a sequence can be transformed into another sequence. The operations OM uses for this are
substitution, insertion and deletion, and each of them is associated with a cost.17 Choosing these
costs is left to the researcher and generally depends on the question the researcher wants to
answer. It is common to choose the same costs for insertion and deletion, the so-called “indel”
costs.18 This leaves the choice limited to the relative size of indel costs compared to substitution
costs. The cheaper indel costs are, the less importance OM places on the timing of events and
the more on their sequencing, i.e, the order in which they occur. Conversely, relatively high indel
costs will place more importance on the order of events. If indel costs are half of substitution costs,
then OM is indifferent between the two. Hence, if one were only to care about self-employment
spells taking place in a sequence, lower indel costs might be preferred. However, since the timing
of self-employment spells may affect later outcomes – e.g. because mandatory participation in the
pension system differs for employees and the self-employed, as is the case in many European
countries, an individual that is self-employed at the beginning of their career has their whole
working life left to compensate for potential pension gaps, whereas an individual that enters self-
16I use the package SADI in Stata Halpin (2017) for OM.
17See, for example, Beusch and van Soest (2020, Section 3.2) on how edit distances are calculated.
18Hollister (2009) is one of the few to question the methodology of fixed indel and substitution costs. Her proposed
solution has its own problems though, as pointed out by Studer and Ritschard (2016).
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employment later in life has less time during which they can make arrangements to compensate
for these gaps. In such a case, lower substitution costs are preferred such that individuals with a
similar sequence of events are closer to each other.
In this study, I choose symmetric indel costs of 1.5 and take substitution costs of 2 for all
labour market states, with two exceptions: Education and missing years get higher substitution
costs of 3.19 In the case of education I choose the higher costs to differentiate individuals that
remain longer in education. With higher substitution costs for educational spells, trajectories of
individuals that in any form participate in the labour market will be closer to each other than
to those individuals that remain longer in education. For years with missing information on
the other hand, the higher cost is chosen such that substitutions in a sequence with missing
information years are not too easily made.
The choice of substitution costs has little impact on the clustering of never self-employed
trajectories. For this sample, results with uniform substitution costs for all labour market states
would give almost the same solution (not shown in this paper). For the trajectories involving
self-employment, the choice of the costs matters more, in particular the higher cost for missing
years. Without these higher costs, individuals with missing years would tend to get sorted in the
same clusters as individuals who display a similar overall pattern but with a different labour
market state instead of a missing observation.
The discussion of substitution costs for missing years directly raises another discussion point
regarding the sample of trajectories on which OM is performed. As is clear from the discussion
of costs, I also include trajectories that are incomplete – because individuals do not remember
what they did in every year, or because of censoring due to age at the time of the interview. By
simply treating these missing years as a separate state, OM can include the trajectories with
missing years in the analysis. I therefore do not need to rely only on the much smaller sub-sample
of individuals that recall their labour market trajectories perfectly. In fact, without this trick
I would lose around 45% of the sample, of which two thirds of the trajectories miss less than
ten years out of the forty-six under consideration. This would be particularly problematic if the
subsample of complete trajectories is different from those with missing years, since only then the
analysis built on OM uses a population representative set of sequences. As shown in Appendix
4.A the sub-sample of complete trajectories differs from the full sample, so that it is indeed useful
to include the incomplete trajectories.
OM is applied to the full sub-sample of individuals that are at least once self-employed and
separately to the complementing sample of individuals that are never self-employed. The latter
sample is further split by five-year birth cohorts because of computational limitations. After
the OM algorithm has determined the edit distances, I apply Ward’s Method (Ward, 1963), a
hierarchical agglomerative method, to group the trajectories. Ward’s Method produces a tree of
potential groupings. In practice the researcher has to choose where to prune the tree, i.e. how
19While this makes the two labour market states in fact equivalent to two indel operations instead of a substitution,
the more important point is that they are more expensive to substitute with than other states.
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many groups they want to use. While there are some criteria that help with this decision, there
exists no “hard” statistical criterium. In this application I am less concerned with finding the
right number of clusters and more with using the algorithm as a tool to separate individuals
automatically in groups. Hence, the number of clusters is chosen such that the groups match
with ex-ante expectations of self-employment and labour market trajectory types, but also such
that the solution is as parsimonious as possible.
Figure 4.2 shows the Ward’s 12 cluster solution for all individuals in our sample that spend
at least one year in self-employment. I combine the twelve groups from Ward’s solution (denoted
in “[ ]”) into the following nine clusters:
1. Always self-employed [12] – These individuals are typically self-employed during their
whole labour market career.
2. Self-employed from their twenties [9, 10, 11] – These individuals turned self-employed in
their twenties (after spending longer years in education or a few years in employment) and
remain self-employed until they retire.
3. Self-employed from their thirties [1, 2] – These individuals turn self-employed in their
thirties or early forties and remain self-employed until they retire.
4. Late career self-employed [5] – This cluster predominantly consists of individuals who spend
the last 10 to 15 years of their trajectory in self-employment.
5. Self-employed to employee [7] – These individuals are self-employed in the first half of their
career and then switch to employee status.
6. Short self-employment spells [8] – The individuals in these two clusters spend only a few
years in self-employment and spend the majority of their career as employees.
7. Weak labour market attachment [4] – The individuals in this cluster spend the majority of
their trajectory out of the labour market.
8. Pensioners [6] – This cluster is defined by individuals that spend a large part of their
trajectory as (early-)retirees.
9. Unknown trajectories [3] – Typically, a large part of the labour market history of these
individuals is unknown.
The individuals with no self-employment (SE) spells are combined into seven different
clusters:20
20See Appendix 4.C for the index plots, as well as the correspondence table of Ward’s solution for all five cohorts
and the six clusters.
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Figure 4.2: Indexplot of all cohorts
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11. Employees – Individuals in this cluster spend almost their complete career as employees.
The cluster also includes those that leave education in their twenties.
12. Early retirees – Individuals in this cluster retire from employment already in their fifties.
13. Weak labour market attachment (no SE) – This cluster includes individuals that spend
some time of their labour market trajectories as employees and the remainder out of labour
force or as benefit recipients, etc.
14. Out of labour force – The individuals in this cluster spend almost their entire trajectory out
of the labour force.
15. Pensioners (no SE) – Similar to the cluster with self-employment these individuals spend
almost the whole trajectory as pensioners.
16. Benefit recipient or “other” income – This cluster combines the two rather small groups of
individuals that receive benefits or have “other” income throughout their trajectories.
17. Unknown trajectories (no SE) – Like their counterparts among the self-employed, individu-
als in this cluster miss most information of their trajectories.
4.3.2 Differences across clusters involving self-employment
How does the distribution of clusters differ across cohorts? Table 4.4 shows their shares by cohort
for the SE sub-sample, while Table 4.5 shows the overall distribution merging all self-employed
clusters into one category. Several observations can be made. Among the self-employed, the share
of individuals that spend their full labour market trajectory in self-employment is decreasing
across cohorts. While a quarter in the oldest cohort is always self-employed, this holds for only
about one tenth of the youngest cohort. There are changes over time in the size of the other
clusters too. While the changes are relatively small in most, there are two clusters that stand out.
The share of the cluster of individuals that become self-employed in their thirties increases from
cohort 3 to 6, and the cluster of late career self-employed increases in particular between cohorts
1 and 3. For the non-self-employed individuals, Table 4.5 shows that the share of employees
increases over time while the shares of individuals with weak labour market attachment and
those that remain out of the labour force for their whole career decrease over time. The early
retirees on the other hand peak for cohorts 2 and 3 and decrease again thereafter. Similar
patterns are also visible when we look at the shares across cohorts by groups. The exception are
the self-employed that start in their thirties in the lowest ranking countries. There, the increase
is much steeper and likely driving the overall trend.21
21See Table 4.D.4 in Appendix 4.D for the shares of the self-employed clusters across regions and Table 4.D.5 for
the non-self-employed.
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Table 4.4: Self-employed clusters by cohorts (in % of self-employed sub-sample)
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5 Overall
Always SE 26.10 22.96 16.02 12.47 10.80 16.26
SE from 20s 25.33 23.69 23.64 21.69 22.31 23.04
SE from 30s 18.29 17.71 19.48 21.59 25.40 21.08
Late career SE 6.29 11.08 15.45 16.46 16.70 14.10
SE to employee 6.10 5.10 3.85 4.29 5.04 4.77
Short SE spells 5.81 7.00 6.87 7.89 7.28 7.11
Weak LM attachment 4.29 4.30 4.92 5.72 3.81 4.64
Pensioners 3.52 4.52 7.00 5.52 3.47 4.85
Unknown trajectories 4.29 3.64 2.77 4.39 5.19 4.14
No. of individuals 1,050 1,372 1,586 2,029 2,102 8,139
Table 4.5: Clusters by cohorts (in %)
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5 Overall
All SE clusters 14.35 13.19 12.44 12.63 13.06 13.00
Employees 35.15 34.56 39.56 42.36 46.66 40.76
Early retirees 16.23 28.06 24.96 15.97 10.95 18.55
Weak LM attach. (no SE) 13.15 3.79 7.11 9.28 7.32 7.88
Out of labour force 7.86 6.37 5.27 5.86 4.83 5.79
Pensioners (no SE) 1.89 1.39 2.13 3.31 5.72 3.20
Benefits or other 1.74 1.66 1.67 0.57 1.39 1.32
Unknown traject. (no SE) 9.64 10.97 6.87 10.01 10.07 9.50
No. of individuals 7,315 10,399 12,750 16,069 16,096 62,629
Note: All SE clusters includes all self-employed clusters as shown in Table 4.4.
The upper graph in Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of clusters in the self-employed sub-
sample for the countries in SHARE that rank below the 80th percentile rank by Rule of Law
indicators. Compared to the countries ranking between the 80th and 90th percentile in the
middle, and those ranking above the 90th percentile shown at the bottom of Figure 4.3, one can
see that there are some general differences between the groups despite of some heterogeneity in
the two lower ranking groups. In the first group we see that for most countries the self-employed
consist mostly of individuals that turn to self-employment after their thirties or late in their
career. Exceptions are Poland, Croatia and Cyprus which all show a pattern more similar to the
second group of countries where always self-employed and those turning to self-employment
in their twenties dominate. Last, the self-employed individuals in most of the countries that
rank highest in the rule of law indicator are made up relatively evenly between individuals that
turn self-employed in their twenties and thirties while the share of late career self-employed
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is between the shares of the first and second group. The high ranking countries also have a
higher share of individuals with weak labour market attachment that spend some years in
self-employment.
The differences are less strong for the shares of total self-employment and the non-self-
employed clusters across countries and regions. (See Figure 4.E.1 in Appendix 4.E.) The main
characteristics are the following: In the lowest ranking countries the share of self-employed is
almost negligible except for Poland and Cyprus while the share of early retirees is relatively
large. In the group ranking between the 80th and 90th percentile rank, the self-employment
shares are comparable to the shares in the countries ranking above the 90th percentile rank. In
the latter group most countries however have a larger share of employees than the countries in
the other two groups.22
Table 4.6 shows the demographic characteristics from Table 4.2 but now by cluster.23 The
average age in the sample is approximately the same for all clusters, except for the never self-
employed pensioner cluster where individuals are slightly younger on average. In terms of gender,
Table 4.6 shows large differences across the clusters. These differences are stronger than with
the sorting by labour market group. There are about 50% more men than women in the employee
cluster, and some of the self-employment clusters have an even higher share of men. The clusters
of individuals turning self-employed in their 30s, late career self-employed, and the cluster with
short self-employment spells all consist for at least 70% of men. Clusters with weak labour
market attachment, out of the labour force, and unknown trajectory parts are mostly or almost
entirely female. And while the self-employed pensioners cluster contains approximately equal
numbers of men and women, the non-self-employment clusters with both early retirees and
pensioners have a share of approximately 60% women.
Compared with the remainder of the sample, individuals in many of the self-employed clusters
have less frequently a partner. They also differ in terms of their attained education level. These
differences correspond with those already seen in Table 4.2. The clusters that spend more years
in self-employment have fewer indiviudals that have attained higher secondary or even tertiary
education. Among the always self-employed 75% have at most finished lower secondary education
and less than 5% have attained tertiary education. This stands in contrast with e.g. late career
self-employed who are the best educated among all self-employed, with the largest share of
individuals with higher secondary education and a share with tertiary education comparable
to that of employees. While the other clusters involving self-employment all have comparable
secondary education shares, they have fewer individuals with tertiary education compared to
employees. Finally, Table 4.6 also shows that the majority of the always self-employed have been
active in the sector agriculture, fishery and forestry. Among the self-employed that start in their
20s, only around one third is working in that sector, and for those that start in their 30s, less
22The share of employees and early retirees/pensioners of course also depends on the sampling of cohorts in SHARE
and countries’ statutory retirement age.
23The sample is slightly smaller because OM is not calculating an edit distance for some individuals.
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Always SE 71 62.06 45.66 20.23 4.13 59.62 3.12 1.56 2.26
SE from 20s 70 62.44 47.65 27.28 19.85 31.86 4.57 2.25 3.29
SE from 30s 69 73.52 50.42 36.02 22.88 18.31 4.70 1.39 2.88
Late career SE 68 70.63 49.32 45.16 30.48 7.77 2.99 1.02 1.90
SE to employee 70 59.74 43.23 29.20 18.48 8.58 0.88 0.49 0.67
Short SE spells 68 73.39 46.67 33.25 22.93 7.94 1.74 0.52 1.07
weak LM attach. (SE) 69 2.16 38.03 33.18 13.51 11.04 0.03 1.27 0.71
Pensioners (SE) 69 54.36 49.60 40.52 14.62 13.00 0.82 0.57 0.68
Unknown traj.(SE) 69 23.86 38.61 21.45 10.32 9.81 0.29 0.77 0.55
Never SE clusters
Employee 69 61.60 54.82 38.51 32.25 7.33 54.44 27.81 39.80
Early retiree 70 41.71 51.74 42.93 14.41 8.74 17.58 20.12 18.98
weak LM att. (no SE) 70 17.01 45.65 35.60 11.93 7.47 3.00 12.00 7.95
Out of LF (no SE) 70 1.21 40.93 16.54 4.34 1.23 0.16 10.57 5.88
Pensioner (no SE) 67 36.38 53.39 40.05 15.77 7.52 2.09 2.99 2.58
Benefits or other 70 19.23 44.13 20.44 5.65 2.33 0.56 1.91 1.30
Unknown traj. (no SE) 69 14.42 46.85 30.36 9.53 6.62 3.04 14.77 9.49
Overall 69 45.05 50.65 35.90 20.78 9.54
Note: The statistics are calculated for the period when individuals are 60 years or older, over all individual-year
observations for each group over a total of 181,847 observations of 60,993 individuals.
† Includes upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education.
than one in five is in that sector. The self-employed pensioners as well as those with weak labour
market attachment also have slightly higher shares of individuals in agriculture, whereas the
other self-employment clusters are all comparable to employees.
Table 4.7 reports the same income variables as Table 4.3, but broken down by clusters instead
of labor market status. For brevity, the non-self-employment clusters, except for employees, are
left out because the results for these clusters are similar to those for the groups with corresponding
main labour market states shown in Table 4.3. The sub-samples are also relatively representative
with respect to the clusters.24 While the different income measures were rather similar across
the two labour market groups, this no longer holds for the clusters.
Three observation holds across genders: First, always self-employed report lower adjusted
24See Table 4.D.3 in Appendix 4.D for the corresponding sample shares of clusters by gender in the full sample.
133
CHAPTER 4. SELF-EMPLOYMENT CAREERS AND FINANCIAL WELL-BEING IN OLD AGE
Table 4.7: Total household and pension income, and sample share (%) by gender and cluster
Men Women
Median Q1 Q3 (%) Median Q1 Q3 (%)
Total household income (monthly)
Always SE 787 499 1160 13.40 689 147 1003 14.82
SE from 20s 877 419 1367 23.76 925 386 1316 21.52
SE from 30s 833 243 1399 24.74 945 266 1469 14.30
Late career SE 580 187 1359 16.99 780 191 1275 12.47
SE to employee 976 462 1455 4.80 884 191 1544 5.65
Short SE spells 1056 330 1602 9.72 868 164 1500 6.16
Weak LM attach. 954 474 1119 0.20 1001 505 1397 11.40
Pensioners 896 185 1314 4.69 645 135 1155 6.52
Unknown trajectories 829 225 1321 1.70 940 654 1206 7.16
Employee 873 220 1617 55.70 620 193 1312 29.70
Total pension income (annual)
Always SE 6526 0 9566 15.93 1263 0 6235 15.17
SE from 20s 6827 0 11160 24.57 2367 0 8198 22.65
SE from 30s 3145 0 10911 24.72 1341 0 8092 13.99
Late career SE 1638 0 10800 15.13 1440 0 8177 10.48
SE to employee 9980 0 15630 4.82 2527 0 12092 5.07
Short SE spells 9513 339 15712 8.94 1576 0 12053 5.38
weak LM attach. 7232 0 12408 0.15 1160 0 6946 13.29
Pensioners 4084 561 13148 4.19 1744 23 9588 5.59
Unknown trajectories 141 0 8243 1.56 0 0 5077 8.37
Employee 5007 243 15911 53.78 1947 32 9600 26.96
Note: All values are in euro, and PPP as well as inflation adjusted. Household income is also adjusted for household
size with its square root. The statistics for total household and pension income are calculated over all individual-year
observations for each cluster for all individuals in the sample aged 60 or older. Sample shares of the SE clusters are
in % of the SE sub-sample. Employee sample shares are in % of the full sample of each variable. (Total observation
count household income: 33,870 and 5,955 SE (m), 48,329 and 4,386 SE (w), pension income: 48,070 and 9,948 SE
(m), 62,444 and 6,525 SE (w).) Observation counts differ across measurements because of sample differences. See
Section 4.2.2 for more information on sample selection.
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household income compared with the other self-employed clusters or employees. Second, for
late career self-employed the median household and total pension income is low but the third
quartile is as high as that of self-employed that start earlier in their career. Third, we don’t see
large differences for household income within both genders. For pension income however, among
those individuals who only spend a short time in self-employment as well as those that start as
self-employed and then switch to employment a larger share among them seem to do better in
financial terms. Both of these groups report the highest third quartile vaues..25
4.4 Regression results
To better understand whether there are differences with respect to financial outcomes in old age
between the self-employment clusters and the individuals that spend most of their career as
employees, I estimate regression models for several measures of financial well-being. The general
regression model is given by
(4.1) yit =β0 + X ′itβx +W ′iβc +C′iγ+T ′tδ+εit
where yit is the dependent variable of interest. X it contains the demographic characteristics
which are controlled for using different dummy variables. The first set controls for educational
attainment. The reference category is less than lower secondary education, and I control for upper
secondary and tertiary education. I also control for marital status at the time of the interview.
The reference category here are individuals without a partner, and two dummy variables control
for individuals who have a partner who’s alive (irrespective whether they are married or not), or
who are widowed. Next, I control for the sector in which an individual was longest active during
their labour market trajectory. One dummy variable controls for individuals that were active in
the agricultural, forestry, and fishery sector. Another dummy controls for individuals whose sector
is unknown. The reference category are all other sectors. A set of variables control for individual’s
labour market states at the time of the interview. The reference category are retired individuals,
and the controls that enter the regression are a dummy for individuals who are working and one
for all other labour market states. Last, I also include a dummy to control for individuals being
above statutory retirement age.26 Finally, Wi controls for the clusters, taking employees as the
reference category, and Ci and Tt capture cohort and wave fixed effects, respectively.
Table 4.8 shows a summary of the regression results for the income variables discussed earlier.
All models are estimated separately by country group as panel regressions with random effects.27
25The values in Table 4.7 suggest that men with weak labour market attachment do well too, but their sample size
is too small to make strong statements for their cluster. The cluster is only included for the sake of completeness as it
is an important cluster among the female respondents.
26The JEP includes information on statutory retirment ages. I take the maximum age observed for an individual as
the threshold. There are is no statutory retirement age imputed for individuals born before 1939 (almost all countries),
1941 (Bulgaria and Romania) and 1947 (Croatia). For these I take the next available cohort’s threshold as a proxy.
27Because of the many time invariant controls the models cannot be estimated with fixed effects.
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The regressions for household income are estimated using linear regression. Pension income
models are estimated with Tobit to account for the fact that some individuals that report zero
pensions may not yet be retired rather than not have any pension.
With respect to the variables not shown in Table 4.8 the effects are the same across genders.
I find, as expected, that a higher attained education level is associated with higher income.
Individuals that work in the agricultural sector have higher household and pension incomes in
group 1 but not in group 2 and 3. The effect of widowhood also depends on the country group.
Both in group 1 and 3 the effect is positive whereas it is negative in group 2.
With respect to the cluster coefficients the regressions show different patterns across both
genders and country groups. I find that self-employed men in countries in group 1 on average
have statistically significantly lower income than employees if they are always self-employed,
or late in their career, or during short spells. In group 2 and 3 on the other hand most of the
long-term self-employed are worse off than employees. The effect is however insignificant/of weak
statistical significance for men that are always self-employed or become self-employed in their
20s in group 3 countries.
The picture is different if we look at men’s self-reported pensions. Here I find for all men
that are always self-employed that their pension income is lower than employees’. In group 1
individuals that become self-employed in their 20s are found to have comparably lower pension
income too whereas the other clusters have insignificant or only weakly statistically significant
effects (at the 10% confidence level). Similarly, I find, apart from the always self-employed, only
those who become self-employed in their 30s to also have a statistically significant lower income
in group 2. Group 1 and 2 therefore stand in contrast with group 3 where all long-term en late
career self-employed are found to have statistically signficantly lower pension incomes compared
to employees. The effect is estimated to be larger the later individuals start with self-employment.
Opposite to the findings for men, are the regression results for the women. First, I find
for group 1 that not just women with short self-employment spells live in households with
statistically significantly lower household incomes but also all long-term self-employed women.
They stand in contrast to women in group 2 and 3. In group 2 only those that are always self-
employed have lower household incomes and in group 3 I even only find positive income effects for
self-employment. This is also reflected in the pension income results where all self-employment
clusters in Table 4.8 in group 1 have negative coefficients whereas only few clusters in group 2
and 3 are found to have negative coefficients. This suggests that women in group 2 and 3 might
not have the same incentives to turn self-employed as women in group 1. That is, it might be that
women in countries in group 1 are rather driven to self-employment out of necessity whereas
women in countries in group 2 and 3 might rather be additional income earners.
While the income variables show that most long-term self-employment clusters have less
income than comparable individuals that were mostly employed throughout their labour market
trajectory, income alone cannot tell us whether individuals that used to be self-employed are
136
4.4. REGRESSION RESULTS
Table 4.8: Regression summary: income variables
Counry Group 1 Country Group 2 Country Group 3
Rule of Law indicator: (pct rank < 80) (80 ≤ pct rank < 90) (90 ≤ pct rank)
Monthly household income (PPP and household size adjusted, deflated; RE panel)
Men: Always SE -115.2*** -92.38*** 52.60
(39.11) (34.88) (54.58)
SE from 20s -77.07 -125.5*** -86.69*
(51.94) (34.80) (47.55)
SE from 30s -20.82 -98.33** -147.6***
(40.79) (42.56) (44.15)
Late career SE -74.21*** -122.8* -210.6***
(28.67) (67.51) (57.10)
SE to employee -41.43 -111.3 -74.08
(77.69) (72.14) (101.1)
Short SE spells -128.2*** 73.36 -100.9
(45.53) (64.99) (68.86)
Women: Always SE -233.9*** -183.4*** 165.5***
(22.14) (47.40) (61.46)
SE from 20s -179.3*** -69.79 218.1***
(26.36) (48.78) (54.26)
SE from 30s -162.2*** -95.17 114.6**
(56.88) (76.80) (57.47)
Late career SE -60.94 -94.14 -16.33
(39.84) (132.7) (72.56)
SE to employee -94.64 95.91 31.87
(73.91) (104.4) (127.1)
Short SE spells -157.6*** 402.7*** -98.57
(56.43) (113.2) (105.7)
Annual pension income (PPP adjusted and deflated; RE Tobit)
Men: Always SE -1,471*** -3,372*** -1,783**
(294.1) (1,055) (844.5)
SE from 20s -1,467*** -961.5 -2,275***
(475.0) (962.2) (532.0)
SE from 30s -518.0* -2,196** -3,039***
(277.7) (1,071) (495.8)
Late career SE -310.3 -3,112* -3,748***
(225.9) (1,629) (624.7)
SE to employee -1,269* -335.2 998.7
(726.2) (2,005) (1,109)
Short SE spells 47.61 1,692 17.38
(429.4) (1,629) (801.1)
Women: Always SE -2,308*** -3,221** -803.5
(261.4) (1,307) (886.2)
SE from 20s -2,292*** -1,769 -769.9
(349.5) (1,144) (545.9)
SE from 30s -999.0** -5,656*** -1,317**
(397.3) (1,763) (630.9)
Late career SE -843.3*** -920.8 -979.0
(278.6) (2,536) (753.4)
SE to employee -1,879** 4,196* -637.0
(940.8) (2,329) (1,073)
Short SE spells -1,256** 4,096* 915.9
(507.2) (2,463) (1,087)
(Robust) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: See Tables 4.D.7–4.D.10 in Appendix 4.D for more detailed results.
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really worse off because of this. The data can for example not account for the self-employed living
to a higher extent off their savings than former employees, or for individual preferences, i.e. if
self-employed have accounted for this beforehand and made a conscious choice to live with less
means in their old age. Furthermore, state pension income is frequently split between partners
with some countries not assigning equal parts to both individuals but a lower share to the one
that turns retired later in time, which are frequently the women. This might therefore bias the
effects estimated for pension income of women downwards. I therefore also look at other variables
to complete the picture. One further advantage of all the variables discussed hereafter is that the
sample needs no treatment for outliers and there is therefore no sample selection based upon the
dependent variable in the following.
One frequent argument made is that self-employed individuals are more frequently house
owners28 and that they may therefore potentially have lower costs of living if they pay down
their mortgage. As a robustness check I therefore also estimate a panel probit regression for the
probability that the household respondent’s family lives in a dwelling that they own. (Results
not reported here.) Except for the first two self-employment clusters in the second country group,
I however find no statistically significant results that indicate that any of the self-employed
clusters are more likely that employees to own their dwelling. Hence, it seems unlikely that
the self-employed have a potential for reduced living costs through the channel of owning their
dwelling.
In a next step, I look at individuals subjective financial well being. The SHARE survey asks
all household respondents whether their household is able to make ends meet, with answers on a
scale from 1 to 4, where 1 indicates “with great difficulty” and 4 indicates “easily”. The upper half
of Table 4.9 presents the regression results from an ordered probit panel regression explaining
this survey item. Once more I find that most coefficients of the long term self-employed men
are statistically significant and negative. In the case of the always self-employed this also holds
across both genders and all country groups. Overall, this offers some support for the findings for
the income variables and also confirms the findings of Pettinicchi and Börsch-Supan (2019). The
results are also in line with the estimated effects of demographic variables earlier. That is, higher
educated individuals report less difficulties with making ends meet. More notably, widowers
report less difficulties while the effect is the opposite for widows.
As a robustness check I also compute a material deprivation score following Bertoni et al.
(2015). This material deprivation score takes the sum of different survey items that indicate
whether the respondent’s household put up with cold to save on heating costs, did not go to the
dentist because of costs, could not pay unexpected expenses, was at least two months behind with
the rent, or avoided going to the doctor because of the costs. The weights of these survey items
in the deprivation index are based on a regression of the respondents answer on how satisfied
they are with life on a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 indicates complete satisfaction on the survey
28E.g. Zwinkels et al. (2017) show for households with current working solo self-employed in the Netherlands that
they are more frequently houseowners than households with only employees.
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Table 4.9: Regression summary: financial well-being indicators
Counry Group 1 Country Group 2 Country Group 3
Rule of Law indicator: (pct rank < 80) (80 ≤ pct rank < 90) (90 ≤ pct rank)
Making ends meet: 1 – “with great difficulty”; 4 – “easily” (RE ordered probit)
Men: Always SE -0.426*** -0.467*** -0.195*
(0.154) (0.104) (0.110)
SE from 20s -0.625*** -0.291*** -0.136*
(0.174) (0.0898) (0.0762)
SE from 30s -0.00869 -0.259** -0.236***
(0.123) (0.104) (0.0728)
Late career SE 0.167* -0.114 -0.157*
(0.100) (0.162) (0.0878)
SE to employee -0.0640 -0.112 -0.0936
(0.316) (0.168) (0.182)
Short SE spells -0.201 0.225 -0.157
(0.224) (0.160) (0.119)
Women: Always SE -0.436*** -0.577*** -0.271**
(0.127) (0.142) (0.133)
SE from 20s -0.0513 -0.190 -0.0619
(0.143) (0.118) (0.0960)
SE from 30s 0.108 -0.292 -0.367***
(0.170) (0.185) (0.0987)
Late career SE 0.256* -0.363 -0.555***
(0.140) (0.273) (0.129)
SE to employee -0.123 0.283 -0.332*
(0.364) (0.248) (0.193)
Short SE spells -0.236 0.558** -0.222
(0.275) (0.248) (0.164)
Material deprivation score: higher values – more material deprivation (RE panel)
Men: Always SE 0.0173 0.0509*** -0.00512
(0.0287) (0.0156) (0.00924)
SE from 20s 0.0936** 0.0406*** 0.00632
(0.0373) (0.0137) (0.00643)
SE from 30s 0.0179 0.0289** 0.0101
(0.0185) (0.0138) (0.00628)
Late career SE -0.0160 0.000146 0.00668
(0.0149) (0.0187) (0.00661)
SE to employee 0.0560 -0.00156 0.0152
(0.0749) (0.0213) (0.0158)
Short SE spells -0.0437* -0.0207 0.0115
(0.0248) (0.0173) (0.0108)
Women: Always SE 0.0825*** 0.0659*** -0.0110
(0.0219) (0.0232) (0.0122)
SE from 20s 0.0345 0.0150 0.00810
(0.0245) (0.0171) (0.00921)
SE from 30s -0.00714 0.000133 0.0168*
(0.0276) (0.0228) (0.0102)
Late career SE -0.0289* 0.0301 0.0233**
(0.0172) (0.0342) (0.0111)
SE to employee 0.0494 -0.0114 0.00635
(0.0428) (0.0344) (0.0143)
Short SE spells 0.0386 -0.0512* 0.00670
(0.0362) (0.0266) (0.0150)
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: See Tables 4.D.11–4.D.14 for more detailed results.
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items; see Appendix 4.B for details. The score is constructed such that its value lies between 0
and 1, where 0 indicates no material deprivation and 1 very high material deprivation.
The bottom of Table 4.9 reports the results from a random effects linear panel regression. The
results are less strong than for the make ends meet question but overall I find some indication
that long-term self-employed are on average reporting more material deprivation, in line with
the results for making ends meet. That is, individuals with careers with a long period of self-
employment face more frequently financial hardship in old age. Interestingly, there are no
statistically significant result for men in countries in group 3. Since material deprivation can be
considered to be an even stronger measure of financial difficulties than the making ends meet
question, observing less difficulties in this country group might also be related to the relatively
strong social welfare systems in many of these countries.
The results therefore underline that the exclusion of self-employed in many countries’ manda-
tory pension systems for employees is on average not sufficiently compensated through own
financial provisions by these individuals. Those with long-term self-employment careers are more
frequently observed to have financial difficulties at age 60 or older than their peers that spend
the majority of their career in employment and are never self-employed. This is worrying if we
think of the current self-employed who, due to the change in the economy towards more service
industries, on average need less capital to start their business than older generations did.29 As
such they are therefore even less likely than older generations to have wealth accumulated in
their company, an observation that e.g. Mastrogiacomo et al. (2016) make for the Netherlands.
Unless their savings behaviour differs greatly from the older generations, their financial situation
in old age might therefore be even worse if policies are not adapted.
4.5 Conclusion
In order to find out whether self-employment careers are correlated with different outcomes in
individuals’ financial well-being in old age in Europe I first analyse individuals’ labour market
trajectories between ages 15 and 60. Using information from the Job Episodes Panel from SHARE,
I classify the self-employed into different clusters using sequence analysis. I identify nine clusters
of careers involving self-employment across all cohorts and countries considered: (1) always
self-employed individuals, (2) those that become self-employed in their 20s and (3) 30s, (4) late
career self-employed, (5) self-employed that switch to employment halfway in their trajectory, (6)
those with short self-employment spells, (7) individuals with weak labour market attachment, (8)
pensioners, and (9) those with mostly missing information on their trajectories.
I find differences in the shares of the self-employment clusters across country groups by their
percentile rank in terms of the rule of law indicator. Self-employed in countries that rank lower
are mostly individuals that turn self-employed after their thirties or late in their career. In the
29E.g. an individual working as a graphic designer vs. a carpenter.
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countries that rank between the 80th and 90th percentile rank, the majority of self-employed are
either always self-employed or turn self-employed relatively early into their careers. Last, the
self-employed in the countries ranking above the 90th percentile rank most start in their twenties
or thirties. In terms of demographic characteristics I show that the long term self-employed
are on average less well educated than employees and also more likely to have worked in the
agricultural sector.
The results from the regression analysis of two different income measures – household income
and total (individual) pension income – show that even when controlling for education and
sectoral activity the long term self-employed on average receive less income than employees
when they are 60 years and older no matter the gender. The same holds also for late career
self-employed men but only those in group 3 countries are found to have a strongly statistically
significant lower pension income compared to employees. Over all, only the individuals in the
cluster that switch to employment halfway in their career and those with short self-employment
spells are found to have on average no statistical difference in income from employees.
More striking though is the difference between women where the results suggest that most
women in the third group turn to self-employment to earn an extra income that improves the
households financial situation and puts them above the average household where women are
employees. This stands in contrast to women in group 1 countries where the negative coefficients
in the income regression suggest that these women were rather self-employed out of necessity
and not because they would earn a higher income.
In order to better understand whether clusters with lower incomes are also doing less well
financially otherwise I also analyse other measures of financial well-being. First, I look at
probability of households owning the dwelling they live in. I find overall no statistical evidence
for self-employed being more likely to live in a self-owned dwelling. In the following analysis I
also look at the household’s ability to make ends meet. The results show that the long term self-
employed have more difficulties making ends meet than employees. This result is also confirmed
when analysing a variant of a material deprivation score.
The results found in this study therefore suggest that an inclusion of the self-employed in
the pension system comparable to that of employees is needed. This is even more a concern if we
think of current self-employed careers in the service economy, where individuals are unlikely to
accumulate much capital in their company, in comparison with the older generations who worked
more frequently in more capital intense enterprises. If older generation long-term self-employed
are already more frequently having financial difficulties in old age, the risk for the younger
generation may be even higher.
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Table 4.A.1: Share (%) of (in)complete labour market trajectories by different categories
Wave 3 Wave 7
Incomplete Complete Incomplete Complete
missing censored
Gender: men 14.65 22.57 62.78 16.43 83.57
women 30.92 20.89 48.18 24.53 75.47
Cohort: 1 22.85 77.15 22.18 77.82
2 25.09 74.91 20.45 79.55
3 22.95 77.05 19.70 80.30
4 24.95 17.52 57.54 20.93 79.07
5 21.11 78.87 0.02 21.60 78.40
Self-employed: never 24.79 21.37 53.84 21.27 78.73
at least 1 year 17.30 22.97 59.72 17.82 82.18
Overall 23.41 21.67 54.92 20.92 79.08
Note: The total JEP sample consists of 75,431 individuals of which 24,006 were interviewed in Wave 3 and 51,425
in Wave 7. For the two youngest cohorts interviewed in Wave 3 there are (almost) no complete trajectories because
the interviews took place in all countries except for Ireland in 2009. Wave 7 interviews took place in 2017 and
hence few individuals in the youngest cohort have reached age 60.
Appendices
4.A On missing observations and their inclusion
Because the JEP is a retrospective panel its usefulness relies on there being no recall bias in the
life history interviews. Havari and Mazzonna (2015) have analysed the first version of the JEP,
which only included Wave 3, and conclude that in general the respondents are able to remember
their health and socio-economic status in their youth (ages 0–15) well. Hence one can assume that
the respondents should also remember events that took place later in their life, which are more
recent after all, relatively well. As Brugiavini et al. (2013) point out however, special attention
should be paid to the missing data and inconsistencies regarding job spell dates. There are in fact
quite a lot of individuals that have gaps in their labour market history (see share of “Unknown”
in Table 4.1). Some of these missing observations are by construction (the JEP codes all following
years’ labour market states as missing if there is a date conflict that cannot be resolved) and
because wave 3 interviews were less “thorough” in covering all episodes in individuals’ lifes.
Unlike the interviews of wave 7 they did not fill in information for individuals that never worked,
and did not ask for information on gaps in employment longer than 6 months. Hence, excluding
those individuals with missing years may likely lead to selection bias against those with weaker
ties to the labour market.
Table 4.A.1 shows the shares of incomplete trajectories by different variables across the two
waves of SHARELIFE. I make a difference here too between trajectories that are censored – the
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individual is interviewed before they have turned 60 – and those that have missing years – the
interview did not cover the period or the individual could not remember, or periods are missing
because a previous job spell had missing data or date inconsistencies. The share of censored
trajectories suggests that their exclusion would likely lead to little selection bias as numbers
are relatively equal for both genders or across the two sub-samples of the self-employed and
those that were never self-employed. However, looking at the same variables we see that the
trajectories are unequally distributed between these variables. Women have a larger share of
trajectories with missing information than men and so do the self-employed compared to their
counterpart. Because of this it is prudent to deal with the missing years in the trajectories in a
manner that allows to keep all individuals in the sample.
One last observation can be made regarding the differences between the Wave 3 and 7
interviews. While the latter are more thorough in covering all episodes in an individual’s life
Table 4.A.1 shows that the share of trajectories with missing years still remains relatively large
among individuals interviewed in Wave 7. The change in interview structure mostly improves
the trajectories of women. There is a 20% decrease among their missing trajectories but the
shares still remain large overall. The same can be seen in Table 4.A.2 which shows the share of
incomplete labour market trajectories by country and wave. It shows that the share of incomplete
trajectories varies quite between countries but also that the change in the interview structure
actually does not greatly improve the share of trajectories that miss at least one year.30
4.B Material deprivation score
Table 4.B.1 shows the regression results on which the hedonic weights for the material depriva-
tion score following Bertoni et al. (2015) are based. The dependent variable in all regressions is
individual life satisfaction where 0 indicated complete dissatisfaction and 10 complete satisfac-
tion. Since the questions for the material deprivation indicators were only asked to household
respondents the sample is limited to them. The first column shows the benchmark regression
using the full set of indicators as used by Bertoni et al. (2015). All indicators take value one if an
individual indicates that their household could not afford to buy meat, fruit, or the necessary
groceries regularly, have continued to wear worn out clothes or shoes longer to save money, put
up with cold to save on heating costs, not gone to the dentist because of costs, not bought (new)
glasses despite of needing them, could not afford to go on a week long holiday or pay unexpected
expenses, or were at least two months behind with their rent.
Because the full set of material deprivation indicators were only asked in Wave 5 of SHARE
the resulting sample based on that regression is relatively small. As a robustness check I therefore
also construct hedonic weights for a smaller set of indicators. The second column shows the
regression result for the reduced set of indicators that are available beyond Wave 5 of SHARE
30The shares in both tables however do not take into account if the gaps in the trajectories are reduced in their
length.
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Table 4.A.2: Share (%) of (in)complete labour market trajectories by country
Wave 3 Wave 7
Incomplete Complete Incomplete Complete
missing censored
Austria 23.58 13.11 63.30 20.35 79.65




Czech Republic 8.56 24.15 67.29 12.96 87.04
Denmark 13.09 29.24 57.68 17.05 82.95
Estonia 18.33 81.67
Finland 14.59 85.41
France 26.29 22.93 50.79 24.62 75.38
Germany 31.02 20.68 48.31 29.27 70.73
Greece 13.15 27.34 59.51 20.97 79.03
Hungary 11.95 88.05
Ireland 27.63 16.12 56.26
Israel 29.34 70.66





Netherlands 34.93 19.46 45.61





Spain 27.35 19.21 53.44 28.02 71.98
Sweden 14.28 17.35 68.38 14.87 85.13
Switzerland 26.99 24.04 48.97 27.54 72.46
Note: The total JEP sample consists of 75,431 individuals of which 24,006 were interviewed in
Wave 3 and 51,425 in Wave 7.
144
4.C. NON-SELF-EMPLOYED CLUSTER SOLUTION
but using the same sample. Column 3 expands the reduced model with an indicator that takes
value one if an individual answered that they did not go to the doctor in the past year because
of the costs of a doctor visit. Column 4 then shows the same regression but for a larger sample
adding Wave 6 and 7. Last, column 5 does not include the indicator for meat consumption as it
was not asked to individuals that did the retrospective interview in Wave 7 and thereby increases
the sample further by all other individuals that participated in that wave.
All indicators are highly statistically significant in all regressions in which they enter. In
general, as less regressors are included in the model the absolute size of the estimated coefficients
increases. Overall, the coefficients are however relatively stable across the reduced models with
the only exception being the indicator for rent payment arrears that decreases substantially in
absolute size once Wave 6 and 7 are included in the sample too. It should also be noted that in
the reduced models the hedonic weights based on the coefficients are relatively close to constant
weights.
4.C Non-self-employed cluster solution
Table 4.C.1 gives an overview of how I sort the different groups based on Ward’s algorithm into the
seven clusters of non-self-employed across all cohorts. Figures 4.C.1–4.C.5 show Ward’s solution
for a 12-group partitioning for each cohort.
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Table 4.B.1: Ordered probit regressions for hedonic weights for material deprivation score
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Life satisfaction Benchmark Reduced Reduced+ Reduced+ all Max. sample
Meat -0.224*** -0.382*** -0.339*** -0.318***









Heating -0.163*** -0.312*** -0.307*** -0.301*** -0.314***
(0.0260) (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0197) (0.0153)
Dentist -0.192*** -0.366*** -0.300*** -0.277*** -0.296***





Unexpected expenses -0.147*** -0.430*** -0.420*** -0.411*** -0.399***
(0.0213) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0148) (0.0110)
Rent -0.444*** -0.531*** -0.507*** -0.333*** -0.353***
(0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.0918) (0.0716)
Doctor -0.283*** -0.334*** -0.337***
(0.0365) (0.0300) (0.0233)
Observations 22,120 22,120 22,120 32,802 56,489
Wald Chi-squared 5415 4655 4715 6573 10508
logLikelihood -38639 -39019 -38989 -57891 -98977
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Panel regression including country (all) and wave (column 4 and 5) fixed effects.
Table 4.C.1: Correspondence between clusters used in analysis and Ward’s solution
Cohort
Clusters in analysis 1 2 3 4 5
Employee: 3, 8, 9 1, 4, 5 1, 2, 4 1, 9, 10 1, 2, 4
Employees with early retirement: 4 2, 3 3, 9 3, 4 3
Weak labour market attachment: 1, 2 9 8 2 6
Not active in labour force: 12 12 10 8, 12 7, 9
Pensioners: 5 8 5 5 5
Benefit recipients and other: 6, 7 6, 7 6, 7 7 8
Unknown trajectories: 10, 11 10, 11 11, 2 6, 11 10, 11, 12
Note: The cluster correspondence is for a 12-group partitioning by cohort. The solution is based on Ward’s
Method and implemented with Stata.
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Graphs by Ward’s 12 cluster solution
Figure 4.C.1: Indexplot of cohort 1 (never self-employed)
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Figure 4.C.2: Indexplot of cohort 2 (never self-employed)
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Figure 4.C.3: Indexplot of cohort 3 (never self-employed)
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Figure 4.C.4: Indexplot of cohort 4 (never self-employed)
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Figure 4.C.5: Indexplot of cohort 5 (never self-employed)
151
CHAPTER 4. SELF-EMPLOYMENT CAREERS AND FINANCIAL WELL-BEING IN OLD AGE
4.D Additional tables and regressions
Table 4.D.1: Age at end of education by gender in JEP sample
Share (%) with
1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile missing information
Men 15 18 20 3.10
Women 14 17 19 3.87
Overall 15 17 20 3.52
Note: The total JEP sample consists of 62,708 individuals (28,313 men and 34,395
women).
Table 4.D.2: Age at retirement by gender in JEP sample
Share (%) with
1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile no retirement
Men 57 60 63 24.68
Women 55 59 62 34.89
Overall 55 60 63 30.28
Note: The total JEP sample consists of 62,708 individuals (28,313 men and 34,395
women).
Table 4.D.3: Sample shares (%) of clusters by gender
Men Women
Always SE 16.29 15.90
SE from 20s 23.86 22.91
SE from 30s 24.55 14.12
Late career SE 15.60 10.36
SE to employee 4.62 4.97
Short SE spells 9.08 5.25
weak LM attach. 0.18 12.93
Pensioners 4.29 5.75
Unknown trajectories 1.53 7.80
Note: Sample shares are calculated over all individual-year observations for all
individuals in the sample aged 60 or older that are at least one year self-employed.
Total observation counts: 15,680 (m), 9821 (w).
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Table 4.D.4: Self-employed clusters by cohorts & groups (in % of self-employed sub-sample)
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5 Overall
Percentile rank < 80
Always SE 48.00 37.86 23.55 12.21 9.41 19.99
SE from 20s 16.80 19.42 13.13 11.45 12.76 13.76
SE from 30s 4.00 7.77 12.74 23.16 32.64 20.60
Late career SE 5.60 13.59 27.03 26.21 24.48 22.25
SE to employee 6.40 6.31 3.47 3.05 2.09 3.56
Short SE spells 9.60 6.31 3.86 7.89 5.23 6.23
weak LM attach. 3.20 1.94 3.47 3.05 1.88 2.60
Pensioners 4.00 3.88 11.97 9.41 5.65 7.39
Unknown trajectories 2.40 2.91 0.77 3.56 5.86 3.63
No. of individuals 125 206 259 393 478 1,461
80≤ percentile rank < 90
Always SE 34.95 32.42 24.45 21.13 15.05 24.23
SE from 20s 25.54 22.46 26.84 26.61 29.03 26.36
SE from 30s 11.29 13.56 18.29 18.71 22.64 17.64
Late career SE 4.84 7.42 6.16 7.74 9.27 7.35
SE to employee 6.18 4.45 3.38 3.87 6.23 4.80
Short SE spells 4.57 7.63 5.77 6.77 6.99 6.48
weak LM attach. 3.76 3.39 5.57 4.35 3.65 4.15
Pensioners 3.23 3.18 7.16 4.84 2.28 4.11
Unknown trajectories 5.65 5.51 2.39 5.97 4.86 4.88
No. of individuals 372 472 503 620 658 2,625
Percentile rank ≥ 90
Always SE 15.19 12.10 8.50 7.28 8.59 9.75
SE from 20s 27.12 25.79 25.00 22.64 22.46 24.23
SE from 30s 26.22 23.49 22.33 22.74 23.71 23.49
Late career SE 7.41 12.82 17.48 18.01 17.91 15.54
SE to employee 5.97 5.19 4.25 5.02 5.69 5.18
Short SE spells 5.79 6.77 8.50 8.56 8.49 7.85
weak LM attach. 4.88 5.62 4.98 7.58 4.87 5.70
Pensioners 3.62 5.62 5.34 4.43 3.21 4.42
Unknown trajectories 3.80 2.59 3.64 3.74 5.07 3.85
No. of individuals 553 694 824 1,016 966 4,053
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Table 4.D.5: Clusters by cohorts and groups (in %)
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5 Overall
Percentile rank < 80
All SE clusters 6.01 6.42 6.46 7.32 8.57 7.22
Employees 37.87 37.34 38.82 44.82 48.48 42.74
Early retirees 31.72 42.07 38.82 22.85 13.32 27.35
Weak LM attach. (no SE) 13.26 2.96 6.73 9.02 6.87 7.45
Out of labour force 4.47 3.64 3.32 3.47 2.33 3.26
Pensioners (no SE) 1.35 1.12 2.07 4.77 9.38 4.57
Benefits or other 1.15 0.97 1.12 0.41 1.27 0.95
Unknown traject. (no SE) 4.18 5.48 2.67 7.34 9.77 6.47
No. of individuals 2,081 3,211 4,011 5,366 5,576 20,245
80≤ percentile rank < 90
All SE clusters 18.47 17.26 15.77 14.64 15.52 15.99
Employees 24.98 23.80 26.75 31.48 36.75 29.84
Early retirees 14.75 26.14 27.06 18.35 14.06 19.79
Weak LM attach. (no SE) 12.07 2.56 5.39 8.15 6.18 6.65
Out of labour force 13.41 12.29 10.57 10.72 8.66 10.75
Pensioners (no SE) 1.44 1.35 2.79 3.47 5.00 3.13
Benefits or other 2.93 3.18 2.82 0.99 2.17 2.25
Unknown traject. (no SE) 11.97 13.42 8.84 12.19 11.67 11.58
No. of individuals 2,014 2,735 3,189 4,234 4,240 16,412
Percentile rank ≥ 90
All SE clusters 17.17 15.58 14.85 15.71 15.38 15.61
Employees 39.75 39.16 47.46 47.44 51.74 46.11
Early retirees 7.14 19.13 13.73 8.72 6.74 10.90
Weak LM attach. (no SE) 13.76 5.14 8.36 10.25 8.50 8.98
Out of labour force 6.58 4.69 3.64 4.65 4.46 4.64
Pensioners (no SE) 2.52 1.62 1.78 1.99 2.96 2.18
Benefits or other 1.37 1.24 1.41 0.43 0.97 1.02
Unknown traject. (no SE) 11.71 13.43 8.77 10.81 9.25 10.56
No. of individuals 3,220 4,453 5,550 6,469 6,280 25,972
Note: All SE clusters includes all self-employed clusters as shown in Table 4.D.4.
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Table 4.D.6: Total household and pension income, and sample share (%) by gender and cluster
Men Women
Median Q1 Q3 (%) Median Q1 Q3 (%)
Total household income (monthly)
All self-employed 844 277 1367 17.58 855 229 1316 9.08
Employee 873 220 1617 55.70 620 193 1312 29.70
Early retiree 1069 451 1556 17.73 486 41 1081 23.15
Weak LM att. (no SE) 705 213 1210 3.07 783 172 1362 12.07
Out of LF (no SE) 366 117 626 0.18 773 493 1101 8.73
Pensioner (no SE) 634 143 1177 2.33 579 139 1241 2.99
Benefits or other 450 110 985 0.57 843 449 1130 1.75
Unknown traj. (no SE) 525 157 1030 2.84 890 501 1286 12.55
Total pension income (annual)
All self-employed 5217 0 11439 20.69 1341 0 7808 10.45
Employee 5007 243 15911 53.78 1947 32 9600 26.96
Early retiree 12636 2135 18173 17.23 4927 285 10239 19.08
Weak LM att. (no SE) 3818 0 12373 3.01 2160 91 8547 12.17
Out of LF (no SE) 589 0 3831 0.17 0 0 1514 11.26
Pensioner (no SE) 1608 0 11974 1.78 1078 0 6913 2.68
Benefits or other 714 0 6772 0.56 0 0 5812 1.95
Unknown traj. (no SE) 1376 0 9136 2.79 124 0 5753 15.46
Note: All values are in euro, and PPP as well as inflation adjusted. (Total household and pension income use
the constant PPP scale from SHARE with Germany as the base. The base year is 2015.) Household adjusted for
household size with its square root. The statistics for total household and pension income are calculated over all
individual-year observations for each labour market group for all individuals in the sample aged 60 or older. (Total
observation count household income: 33,870 (m), 48,329 (w), pension income: 48,070 (m), 62,444 (w).) Observation
counts differ across measurements because of sample differences. See Section 4.2.2 for more information on sample
selection.
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Table 4.D.7: Regression results: household income (monthly), men
Counry Group 1 Country Group 2 Country Group 3
Rule of Law indicator: (pct rank < 80) (80 ≤ pct rank < 90) (90 ≤ pct rank)
Education: Upper/post-secondary 86.94*** 141.3*** 299.3***
(10.61) (18.08) (20.76)
Tertiary education 127.9*** 451.8*** 581.0***
(16.62) (26.00) (27.46)
Has partner 74.89*** -104.0*** 37.27***
(8.840) (13.41) (13.19)
Widowed 25.78** -77.33*** 133.6***
(12.54) (27.48) (25.88)
LM status: working 113.0*** 71.79** 47.86***
(18.40) (28.94) (18.53)
other 16.94 -134.7*** -68.06***
(15.81) (20.92) (22.35)
Above statutory ret. age 52.70*** 4.986 43.40***
(11.11) (14.00) (13.85)
Cluster: Always SE -115.2*** -92.38*** 52.60
(39.11) (34.88) (54.58)
SE from 20s -77.07 -125.5*** -86.69*
(51.94) (34.80) (47.55)
SE from 30s -20.82 -98.33** -147.6***
(40.79) (42.56) (44.15)
Late career SE -74.21*** -122.8* -210.6***
(28.67) (67.51) (57.10)
SE to employee -41.43 -111.3 -74.08
(77.69) (72.14) (101.1)
Short SE spells -128.2*** 73.36 -100.9
(45.53) (64.99) (68.86)
Weak LM attach. -134.2*** -167.2 -278.2**
(13.27) (176.0) (123.3)
Pensioners -193.3*** 1.696 -198.1**
(48.42) (83.87) (97.65)
Unknown trajectories -225.7*** -294.3*** 128.5
(23.73) (89.56) (167.4)
Constant 66.89*** 1,062*** 838.6***
(21.82) (30.85) (33.34)
Observations 7,167 9,292 17,083
Nr. of individuals 4,616 4,641 7,994
σu 321.5 511.2 839.5
σe 129.1 258.5 342.2
R2 within 0.0584 0.0128 0.0076
R2 between 0.115 0.170 0.0962
R2 overall 0.111 0.163 0.0849
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Random effects panel regression including cohort and wave fixed effects, and controlling for non-SE
clusters and primary sector. Income is PPP adjusted, deflated (2015 as base year) and adjusted for household
size. The sample is limited to household respondents only.
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Table 4.D.8: Regression results: household income (monthly), women
Counry Group 1 Country Group 2 Country Group 3
Rule of Law indicator: (pct rank < 80) (80 ≤ pct rank < 90) (90 ≤ pct rank)
Education: Upper/post-secondary 89.72*** 115.4*** 261.6***
(7.109) (16.10) (18.55)
Tertiary education 149.2*** 327.8*** 315.1***
(11.76) (26.51) (26.32)
Has partner 74.00*** -39.40*** 65.61***
(6.645) (12.20) (11.31)
Widowed 4.271 -89.27*** 49.47***
(6.071) (14.10) (14.23)
LM status: working 152.7*** -29.02 81.70***
(15.76) (26.48) (16.43)
other -0.280 -66.46*** -27.04**
(11.43) (10.97) (12.88)
Above statutory ret. age -13.47 -44.41*** 67.12***
(10.09) (13.12) (11.72)
Cluster: Always SE -233.9*** -183.4*** 165.5***
(22.14) (47.40) (61.46)
SE from 20s -179.3*** -69.79 218.1***
(26.36) (48.78) (54.26)
SE from 30s -162.2*** -95.17 114.6**
(56.88) (76.80) (57.47)
Late career SE -60.94 -94.14 -16.33
(39.84) (132.7) (72.56)
SE to employee -94.64 95.91 31.87
(73.91) (104.4) (127.1)
Short SE spells -157.6*** 402.7*** -98.57
(56.43) (113.2) (105.7)
Weak LM attach. -8.864 -178.4*** 213.3***
(84.55) (49.43) (61.24)
Pensioners -164.8*** -172.6* -144.6
(44.51) (90.14) (98.04)
Unknown trajectories -56.49 -63.53 219.6***
(79.55) (55.18) (72.14)
Constant 268.9*** 1,127*** 607.9***
(16.63) (31.90) (30.22)
Observations 15,452 11,950 20,432
Nr. of individuals 8,595 5,837 9,221
σu 269.7 469.8 759.4
σe 132.7 239.4 305.5
R2 within 0.051 0.001 0.005
R2 between 0.190 0.182 0.0745
R2 overall 0.201 0.165 0.0701
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Random effects panel regression including cohort and wave fixed effects, and controlling for non-SE
clusters and primary sector. Income is PPP adjusted, deflated (2015 as base year) and adjusted for household
size. The sample is limited to household respondents only.
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Table 4.D.9: Regression results: pension income (annual), men
Counry Group 1 Country Group 2 Country Group 3
Rule of Law indicator: (pct rank < 80) (80 ≤ pct rank < 90) (90 ≤ pct rank)
Education: Upper/post-secondary 426.1*** 1,158** 3,691***
(88.34) (525.0) (268.8)
Tertiary education 777.4*** 4,858*** 4,512***
(115.1) (601.0) (305.7)
Has partner 366.1*** -1,496*** 582.9***
(73.80) (454.1) (182.0)
Widowed 547.3*** -685.8 1,140***
(125.8) (991.3) (371.2)
LM status: working -1,121*** -36,579*** -17,279***
(89.07) (890.2) (280.2)
other -2,275*** -27,057*** -14,275***
(139.9) (1,068) (407.7)
Above statutory ret. age 1,300*** 3,213*** 4,711***
(72.96) (593.3) (209.1)
Cluster: Always SE -1,471*** -3,372*** -1,783**
(294.1) (1,055) (844.5)
SE from 20s -1,467*** -961.5 -2,275***
(475.0) (962.2) (532.0)
SE from 30s -518.0* -2,196** -3,039***
(277.7) (1,071) (495.8)
Late career SE -310.3 -3,112* -3,748***
(225.9) (1,629) (624.7)
SE to employee -1,269* -335.2 998.7
(726.2) (2,005) (1,109)
Short SE spells 47.61 1,692 17.38
(429.4) (1,629) (801.1)
Weak LM attach. -374.1 20,475** -5,815
(2,331) (10,043) (8,570)
Pensioners -911.0* -5,276** -2,760**
(535.3) (2,146) (1,235)
Unknown trajectories -382.7 -9,047** -4,966**
(874.4) (4,292) (2,080)
Constant -184.1 12,139*** 6,922***
(181.2) (1,042) (467.2)
Observations 8,805 14,138 24,267
Censored obs. 1,736 3,486 5,479
Nr. of individuals 4,212 6,067 9,715
σu 2,193*** 9,793*** 9,218***
(33.35) (257.3) (98.73)
σe 1,339*** 17,492*** 7,165***
(15.61) (149.8) (49.39)
Wald Ξ2 2525 3027 8694
logLikelihood -64944 -121921 -202045
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Random effects Tobit regression including cohort and wave fixed effects, and controlling for non-SE
clusters and primary sector. Pension ncome is PPP adjusted and deflated (2015 as base year).
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Table 4.D.10: Regression results: pension income (annual), women
Counry Group 1 Country Group 2 Country Group 3
Rule of Law indicator: (pct rank < 80) (80 ≤ pct rank < 90) (90 ≤ pct rank)
Education: Upper/post-secondary 698.1*** 648.7 1,964***
(69.18) (451.3) (204.4)
Tertiary education 899.4*** 3,789*** 2,849***
(99.88) (547.0) (245.4)
Has partner 225.4*** -902.7** -13.94
(57.78) (394.2) (151.3)
Widowed 217.9*** -1,875*** 38.04
(64.10) (501.6) (212.5)
LM status: working -612.9*** -27,179*** -13,322***
(80.15) (884.5) (275.7)
other -2,629*** -23,488*** -9,400***
(121.9) (491.9) (195.8)
Above statutory ret. age 903.5*** 2,821*** 5,631***
(70.56) (534.0) (184.1)
Cluster: Always SE -2,308*** -3,221** -803.5
(261.4) (1,307) (886.2)
SE from 20s -2,292*** -1,769 -769.9
(349.5) (1,144) (545.9)
SE from 30s -999.0** -5,656*** -1,317**
(397.3) (1,763) (630.9)
Late career SE -843.3*** -920.8 -979.0
(278.6) (2,536) (753.4)
SE to employee -1,879** 4,196* -637.0
(940.8) (2,329) (1,073)
Short SE spells -1,256** 4,096* 915.9
(507.2) (2,463) (1,087)
Weak LM attach. -1,432** -4,807*** -2,040***
(575.6) (1,609) (669.1)
Pensioners -1,573*** -7,057*** -1,991*
(386.2) (2,293) (1,172)
Unknown trajectories -1,584 -8,117*** -5,690***
(969.1) (1,805) (1,095)
Constant 1,243*** 7,330*** 4,857***
(157.1) (1,019) (395.2)
Observations 13,222 17,879 30,150
Censored obs. 1,499 7,824 9,995
Nr. of individuals 6,032 7,288 11,498
σu 2,059*** 8,446*** 7,054***
(24.84) (224.1) (81.16)
σe 1,280*** 15,369*** 6,974***
(11.32) (131.0) (44.53)
Wald Ξ2 3185 4856 8838
logLikelihood -106343 -115063 -215880
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Random effects Tobit regression including cohort and wave fixed effects, and controlling for non-SE
clusters and primary sector. Pension income is PPP adjusted, and deflated (2015 as base year).
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Table 4.D.11: Regression results: making ends meet, men
Counry Group 1 Country Group 2 Country Group 3
Rule of Law indicator: (pct rank < 80) (80 ≤ pct rank < 90) (90 ≤ pct rank)
Education: Upper/post-secondary 0.306*** 0.455*** 0.681***
(0.0441) (0.0496) (0.0381)
Tertiary education 0.734*** 1.142*** 1.061***
(0.0595) (0.0582) (0.0439)
Has partner -0.0536 0.169*** -0.00894
(0.0459) (0.0409) (0.0301)
Widowed -0.0573 0.204*** 0.179***
(0.0670) (0.0750) (0.0565)
LM status: working 0.527*** 0.196*** 0.387***
(0.0590) (0.0577) (0.0408)
other -0.376*** -0.609*** -0.412***
(0.0784) (0.0735) (0.0574)
Above statutory ret. age 0.290*** 0.00784 -0.0135
(0.0543) (0.0433) (0.0353)
Cluster: Always SE -0.426*** -0.467*** -0.195*
(0.154) (0.104) (0.110)
SE from 20s -0.625*** -0.291*** -0.136*
(0.174) (0.0898) (0.0762)
SE from 30s -0.00869 -0.259** -0.236***
(0.123) (0.104) (0.0728)
Late career SE 0.167* -0.114 -0.157*
(0.100) (0.162) (0.0878)
SE to employee -0.0640 -0.112 -0.0936
(0.316) (0.168) (0.182)
Short SE spells -0.201 0.225 -0.157
(0.224) (0.160) (0.119)
Weak LM attach. -0.636 -0.265 -1.567***
(0.471) (0.647) (0.371)
Pensioners -0.429 -0.0699 -0.286*
(0.288) (0.222) (0.155)
Unknown trajectories -1.129*** -0.227 -0.699**
(0.368) (0.409) (0.336)
Cut 1 -1.024*** -1.396*** -2.044***
(0.108) (0.0954) (0.0727)
Cut 2 0.650*** 0.272*** -0.616***
(0.107) (0.0944) (0.0688)
Cut 3 2.020*** 1.549*** 0.881***
(0.112) (0.0963) (0.0694)
σ2u 0.936*** 1.601*** 1.383***
(0.0639) (0.0711) (0.0508)
Observations 9,068 13,346 23,090
Nr. of individuals 5,364 5,568 9,118
logLikelihood -10878 -15589 -22260
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Random effects ordered probit regression including cohort and wave fixed effects, and controlling for
non-SE clusters and primary sector. Scale from 1–4 where 1 indicates making ends meet “with great difficulty”
and 4 “easily”. The sample is limited to household respondents only.
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Table 4.D.12: Regression results: making ends meet, women
Counry Group 1 Country Group 2 Country Group 3
Rule of Law indicator: (pct rank < 80) (80 ≤ pct rank < 90) (90 ≤ pct rank)
Education: Upper/post-secondary 0.312*** 0.610*** 0.548***
(0.0335) (0.0428) (0.0341)
Tertiary education 0.574*** 1.176*** 0.892***
(0.0492) (0.0581) (0.0422)
Has partner 0.246*** 0.118*** 0.128***
(0.0349) (0.0373) (0.0273)
Widowed -0.210*** -0.0923** -0.0773**
(0.0377) (0.0432) (0.0338)
LM status: working 0.548*** 0.0685 0.312***
(0.0498) (0.0629) (0.0416)
other -0.263*** -0.246*** -0.191***
(0.0597) (0.0368) (0.0305)
Above statutory ret. age 0.276*** -0.112*** -0.103***
(0.0441) (0.0408) (0.0308)
Cluster: Always SE -0.436*** -0.577*** -0.271**
(0.127) (0.142) (0.133)
SE from 20s -0.0513 -0.190 -0.0619
(0.143) (0.118) (0.0960)
SE from 30s 0.108 -0.292 -0.367***
(0.170) (0.185) (0.0987)
Late career SE 0.256* -0.363 -0.555***
(0.140) (0.273) (0.129)
SE to employee -0.123 0.283 -0.332*
(0.364) (0.248) (0.193)
Short SE spells -0.236 0.558** -0.222
(0.275) (0.248) (0.164)
Weak LM attach. -0.402 -0.248 -0.209*
(0.276) (0.171) (0.110)
Pensioners -0.160 -0.210 -0.584***
(0.213) (0.232) (0.163)
Unknown trajectories -0.161 -0.121 -0.588***
(0.446) (0.173) (0.150)
Cut 1 -0.664*** -1.624*** -2.037***
(0.0916) (0.0955) (0.0671)
Cut 2 1.063*** 0.0329 -0.541***
(0.0920) (0.0941) (0.0649)
Cut 3 2.447*** 1.276*** 0.881***
(0.0943) (0.0955) (0.0648)
σ2u 1.104*** 1.401*** 1.394***
(0.0451) (0.0539) (0.0432)
Observations 19,094 17,214 28,512
Nr. of individuals 9,662 6,911 10,741
logLikelihood -22592 -20011 -29921
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Random effects ordered probit regression including cohort and wave fixed effects, and controlling for
non-SE clusters and primary sector. Scale from 1–4 where 1 indicates making ends meet “with great difficulty”
and 4 “easily”. The sample is limited to household respondents only.
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Table 4.D.13: Regression results: material deprivation score, men
Counry Group 1 Country Group 2 Country Group 3
Rule of Law indicator: (pct rank < 80) (80 ≤ pct rank < 90) (90 ≤ pct rank)
Education: Upper/post-secondary -0.0162** -0.0335*** -0.0306***
(0.00699) (0.00644) (0.00347)
Tertiary education -0.0425*** -0.0717*** -0.0426***
(0.00812) (0.00685) (0.00362)
Has partner -0.00328 -0.0163*** -0.00219
(0.00691) (0.00557) (0.00265)
Widowed 0.0320*** -0.0163 0.000116
(0.0112) (0.0101) (0.00471)
LM status: working -0.0320*** 0.00385 -0.0102***
(0.00906) (0.00873) (0.00357)
other 0.0705*** 0.0959*** 0.0464***
(0.0158) (0.0144) (0.00809)
Above statutory ret. Age -0.0425*** 0.00657 0.00423
(0.0122) (0.00743) (0.00406)
Cluster: Always SE 0.0173 0.0509*** -0.00512
(0.0287) (0.0156) (0.00924)
SE from 20s 0.0936** 0.0406*** 0.00632
(0.0373) (0.0137) (0.00643)
SE from 30s 0.0179 0.0289** 0.0101
(0.0185) (0.0138) (0.00628)
Late career SE -0.0160 0.000146 0.00668
(0.0149) (0.0187) (0.00661)
SE to employee 0.0560 -0.00156 0.0152
(0.0749) (0.0213) (0.0158)
Short SE spells -0.0437* -0.0207 0.0115
(0.0248) (0.0173) (0.0108)
Weak LM attach. -0.0109 0.0403*** 0.161
(0.0762) (0.00883) (0.141)
Pensioners 0.114 0.00116 0.0321**
(0.0852) (0.0321) (0.0156)
Unknown trajectories 0.164*** 0.0230 0.0567*
(0.0597) (0.0501) (0.0312)
Constant 0.146*** 0.132*** 0.0604***
(0.0168) (0.0119) (0.00596)
Observations 3,268 6,665 11,765
Number of id 2,273 4,199 6,768
σu 0.101 0.140 0.0824
σe 0.115 0.115 0.0828
R2 within 0.0283 0.0041 0.0017
R2 between 0.119 0.0868 0.0688
R2 overall 0.108 0.0723 0.0570
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Random effects panel regression including cohort and wave fixed effects, and controlling for non-SE
clusters and primary sector. Lower values indicate more material deprivation. The sample is limited to
household respondents only.
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Table 4.D.14: Regression results: material deprivation score, women
Counry Group 1 Country Group 2 Country Group 3
Rule of Law indicator: (pct rank < 80) (80 ≤ pct rank < 90) (90 ≤ pct rank)
Education: Upper/post-secondary -0.0173*** -0.0500*** -0.0275***
(0.00567) (0.00629) (0.00333)
Tertiary education -0.0408*** -0.0758*** -0.0392***
(0.00755) (0.00703) (0.00369)
Has partner -0.0221*** -0.00676 -0.0131***
(0.00577) (0.00592) (0.00288)
Widowed 0.0149** 0.0152** 0.00291
(0.00618) (0.00695) (0.00374)
LM status: working -0.0223*** -0.00611 -0.0156***
(0.00819) (0.00982) (0.00405)
other 0.0484*** 0.0445*** 0.0216***
(0.0122) (0.00668) (0.00401)
Above statutory ret. Age -0.0569*** 0.0277*** 0.00276
(0.0104) (0.00775) (0.00400)
Cluster: Always SE 0.0825*** 0.0659*** -0.0110
(0.0219) (0.0232) (0.0122)
SE from 20s 0.0345 0.0150 0.00810
(0.0245) (0.0171) (0.00921)
SE from 30s -0.00714 0.000133 0.0168*
(0.0276) (0.0228) (0.0102)
Late career SE -0.0289* 0.0301 0.0233**
(0.0172) (0.0342) (0.0111)
SE to employee 0.0494 -0.0114 0.00635
(0.0428) (0.0344) (0.0143)
Short SE spells 0.0386 -0.0512* 0.00670
(0.0362) (0.0266) (0.0150)
Weak LM attach. 0.0276 0.0285 -0.00317
(0.0450) (0.0238) (0.00911)
Pensioners -0.0154 0.0360 0.0300
(0.0282) (0.0343) (0.0193)
Unknown trajectories 0.0107 0.000850 0.0225
(0.0868) (0.0270) (0.0164)
Constant 0.208*** 0.114*** 0.0748***
(0.0142) (0.0133) (0.00610)
Observations 7,195 8,894 15,195
Number of id 4,465 5,411 8,409
σu 0.116 0.154 0.0927
σe 0.130 0.132 0.0995
R2 within 0.0149 0.0049 0.0024
R2 between 0.0712 0.117 0.0503
R2 overall 0.0570 0.102 0.0396
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Random effects panel regression including cohort and wave fixed effects, and controlling for non-SE
clusters and primary sector. Higher values indicate more material deprivation. The sample is limited to
household respondents only.
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4.E Additional figures
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Benefits or other Unknown traj. (no SE)
Figure 4.E.1: Share (in %) of clusters in countries
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